Piece for the Huffington Post on US views of a Brexit

My first outing for the Huffington Post. More such pieces to follow.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tim-oliver/the-last-thing-america-needs_b_4097564.html

A European Union Without Britain Is the Last Thing America Needs

Compared to the House of Commons vote on Syria, a British referendum vote to quit the European Union would have far more significant implications for the future of transatlantic relations.

The House of Commons decision not to support U.S. military action against Syria, along with opinion polls pointing towards growing public support to quit the E.U., has prompted warnings the U.K. risks isolating itself from both the U.S.A. and the E.U. But focusing on the implications for U.K.-U.S. and U.K.-E.U. relations distracts from the larger relationship Britain's isolationism would affect: the U.S.-European relationship.

The U.S.A. would be left facing an E.U. changed by the disappearance of one of its largest, economically liberal and outward-looking members. Europe's divisions could be deepened, the E.U. and N.A.T.O. weakened and wider transatlantic relations complicated. Alternatively, the U.S.A. could find itself facing a more united E.U., with the U.K. adrift between the two.

An EU in Flux

A British exit could plunge the E.U. into more navel gazing as it negotiates a U.K. exit, and changes its institutions, budgets and policies to reflect the U.K.'s disappearance.

Combined with changes to the Eurozone, the E.U.'s balance of power could shift. The E.U. could become more inward-looking, tending more toward protectionism. Instead of looking out to the Atlantic the union could look more towards the Mediterranean. Smaller states could gain over large states. The Franco-German axis could be unsettled, leaving a more dominant Germany. E.U. enlargement could stall in the face of unease amongst western states at Europe's center shifting further south or eastwards.

On the other hand, rid of a notoriously awkward and non-Euro member, the Eurozone could become the undisputed core of the E.U., pushing the E.U. further towards "ever closer union." Europe's social model could be freed of British attempts to weaken it. Of course, the extent to which Britain's awkwardness can slow the E.U. has been put into perspective by the Eurozone's own struggles to find solidarity and leadership.

Washington would also face a wider Europe changed by the U.K.'s post-withdrawal relationship with the E.U. If the U.K. and other non-E.U. members thrived and the Eurozone continued to struggle, then Britain's withdrawal could trigger centrifugal forces leading other member states to question their membership, in turn unravelling the E.U. But should the U.K. suffer and the Eurozone stabilise, then the U.K. could be further isolated.

Europe Further Divided

For the U.S.A. or Asia, a British withdrawal may reinforce views of Europe as riven by division and decline. There will still be no answer to "who speaks for Europe?" if the U.K. and other non-E.U. European states disagree with the E.U. Europe could become more vulnerable to divide and rule by external powers.

The disappearance from the E.U. of one of its major military powers could further strain efforts at Europe-wide defense cooperation, whether through the E.U. or N.A.T.O. Alternatively, freed of British hesitancy, E.U. defense efforts could be reinvigorated, albeit never destined to reach their full potential without the U.K.

There will be no shortage of applicants to fill London's place of claiming to be America's closest ally in the E.U. While such applicants might not offer a relationship that can claim to be as "special" as that with the U.K., for the U.S.A. they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe remaining an area of the world in which it retains considerable interests.

However, should a British exit further destabilize the E.U., complicate transatlantic relations and threaten the prospects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to enhance transatlantic cooperation in the face of rising powers, then it would only further dampen what hopes Washington still has for Europe to act as an effective partner.

Britain Adrift in Transatlantic Relations

The vote on Syria raised once again the debate about Britain's place in the world, but this is a debate shaped more than anything else by discussion about Britain's place in Europe. This is a debate so persistent and divisive because it goes to the heart of British identity, security and political economy. It is on the issue of Europe that rests so much of the question of what country the UK wants to be.

A decision by the British to answer this question by quitting the E.U. will still leave the U.S.A. facing a Britain struggling to come to terms with its place in the world. Some talk of a vote to quit the E.U. as the means to reclaim Britain's sovereignty, asserting Britain's independence as a "Switzerland with nukes." That those nukes would have to be carried on U.S. built and serviced missiles shows the limits of that independence.

More importantly, Britain would still struggle to assert its sovereignty in the face of a Europe where the E.U. is likely to remain the predominant political actor, and a more important actor in the daily lives of the British than any other state or international organisation, including the U.S.A.

For the U.S.A., a British exit would change both the U.K. and the E.U., forcing it to reassess the relative merits to be given to its bilateral relationship with the U.K. compared to its much larger multilateral relationship with the E.U. Navigating a course between the two is not something any U.S. Administration should relish
.

Comment on the UK Government's review into the balance of competences between the UK and the EU

I've been taking more and more interest in the UK Government's review into the balance of competences between the UK and the EU. It's a great case study for examining the coalition, the operation of Whitehall, UK-EU relations and how we understand the EU today. The following piece appeared on the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog:

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/37115

The government’s review of EU competences offers valuable academic insights into both Britain and the EU

Blog Admin

The British government’s ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’ into the EU’s role in British life might be surrounded by political tensions, but as Tim Oliver argues, it offers a unique insight into the operation of British government, the politics of the UK’s coalition government, UK-EU relations, the evolution of the EU, and how today we assess what the EU is and approach arguments about what it should be.

The Coalition government’s announcement in July 2012 that, as agreed at the insistence of the Conservative Party as part of the 2010 Coalition Agreement, it was to conduct a full review of the EU’s involvement in British life, has now reached its half way stage. In July 2013 the government published six reviews: health, taxation, the single market, animal health and welfare and food safety, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, and foreign policy. A total of 32 reviews will be published by the autumn of 2014.

Each review follows a similar format: first explaining the historical development of the area reviewed; second, assessing the current situation; third, asking what the UK’s national interest is in the area; finally exploring what options there are for going forward, such as repatriation of powers. The reviews avoid making recommendations, their intention being to inform the political decision that will follow the review. Each draws on evidence submitted in writing or taken in person at a range of meetings.

While 26 reports are still to be published, it is already clear that for academics the review can open up to analysis a variety of issues in current British and international politics.

Coalition Politics

For students of how the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is operating, the political management of the review, its origins and eventual use offer a way of examining how the three groups that shape the government on this issue – Liberal Democrats, the strongly Eurosceptic parts of the Conservative Party, and the less Eurosceptic parts of the Conservative party – approach an issue that deeply divides them. Accusations by John Redwood, a strongly Eurosceptic Conservative MP, that the review is turning into a whitewash shows how it may be seen by some Eurosceptics. Given the depth of such tensions it remains to be seen whether the review will last the course. Nevertheless, both its political outcomes and its use as an instrument for managing such a deep political tension will be a focus for studying the operation of Britain’s first post-1945 coalition government.

Operation of Whitehall

It is, of course, nothing new for a government to use a technical, in-depth inquiry to neutralise a sensitive issue. This review, however, will have presented unique challenges for Whitehall, thanks to its implications for coalition relations, cross-governmental scope, international implications and wider domestic sensitivity. The review then offers a unique example of officialdom walking the fine line between the political and technical, with the language used in the review, indeed the very bureaucratic sounding name, intended to ensure it runs as a technical and inherently dull activity. So far the reviews published provide a wealth of technical detail. Nevertheless, despite the 390 public submissions I count so far, questions will inevitably be asked about how open, selective and thorough the process has been. If the review is to serve as a central plank to any British renegotiation then the method of the review, and thus the reliability of the approach, will come under significant political, media and academic scrutiny.

UK-EU Relations

The sheer breadth of the 32 reviews in themselves tell us something about the nature of the UK-EU relationship, something Eurosceptics will point to as what they feel is wrong. At the same time, the detail of the review, and to a lesser extent exercises such as the Conservative group ‘Fresh Start’, have provided a welcome injection of detailed evidence based analysis to the debate. This in itself is a radical change given how, as the Leveson Report on Press Regulation made clear, Britain’s media has often resorted to simply making up stories about the EU. For academic analysis, particular interest will be into how – or if – a technical review shapes final public opinion. Will politicians, the media and voters be swayed by an approach based on the opinions of experts and evidence, or will emotion, gut instinct and made-up stories prevail? And how will the narrow reviews connect to the wider cross-cutting debates about Britain’s political economy, identity, constitution, security and place in the world?

For those interested in how a state identifies its national – or European – interests, the review process opens up the British system, although much remains behind closed doors. The evidence submitted to each review lays bare the competition between private, civil society, international, political and governmental interests that so often shape a state’s views. It shows an EU member state coming to terms with how to balance sovereignty, competing national and sectoral interests, international obligations and membership of the EU.

The reviews specific purpose of informing a possible renegotiated relationship between the UK and EU, one that is to reflect the UK’s national interest, should make it a central point of reference for studying any such attempt. When the history of the 2010-2020 period of UK-EU relations is written it could well be about a renegotiation, an in-out referendum and potentially a withdrawal; events that will have defined so much of UK politics, Britain’s place in the world and an EU changed by a change in relations with one of its largest members. The review will underpin much of this, and be referred back to for guidance should the UK opt to withdraw.

Comparisons have already been made with other reviews intended to propose reforms to the EU, such as the Dutch review. The British review will take its place amongst the many studies and academic reviews of an EU in a state of flux. Academics are in a position to put aside the politics that led other member states to decline involvement in what some see as a unilateral British review. Instead we can examine and assess a review that is amongst the most extensive, well-resourced and organised of any review of EU activity since the 2001-2003 European Convention.

The Evolution of the EU

For students of international relations and European integration the review does something we rarely see: a state comprehensively cataloguing the impact on it of the international. Any reading of the reviews also shows how Europeanisation often reflects globalised pressures or wider Western multilateral efforts.

With the EU remaining an organisation of member states, the UK’s experiences can to some extent be extrapolated to other member states. Here the scale of EU involvement in British life might seem to point to some form of downloading or spill-over theory of integration, but the reviews also point to examples where Britain has successfully uploaded or cross-loaded its policy agenda. As Simon Usherwood has noted of the published reviews, that they point to a broadly appropriate balance of competences reflects the complex negotiating system of the EU.

Theoretical debates aside, with the EU in a state of flux the review serves as an exercise of taking-stock of the EU’s development, an entity which remains sui generis in international relations. That today many in the EU struggle to think of it as an international organisation, which it technically remains, is demonstrated in page after page of the published reviews.

Conclusion

How will academics analyse the review in several years’ time? Will we see it as a futile, politically motivated activity, subsumed into the larger political tensions of the coalition government at a time of heightened tensions between the UK and the EU? Or will we look at both the politics and beyond it to see a review, which while it has its problems, stands as a unique experience for both Britain and the EU, and a unique opportunity for the study of both?

Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 

About the Author

Tim Oliver is a Fritz Thyssen Transatlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C. Educated at the University of Liverpool and the London School of Economics, he has worked in the European Parliament, the House of Lords, and taught at UCL, LSE and as a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Selected FP spots from 16-22 September 2013

1. UK and South Africa: A Relationship Worth Maintaining
   Alex Vines of Chatham House and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive, South African Institute of International Affairs, remind us of the close relations between South Africa and the UK, especially relevant when the FCO is pushing for stronger relations with African states. 
2. 64% of Brits have a favourable view of the UN
   Pew Research shows global views of the UN
3. Tony Blair nearly destroyed the Foreign Office. William Hague is rebuilding it
   Peter Oborne's short piece notes an important step forward - or back to the future - for the FCO: the re-opening of its language school. 
4. UK should use competence review as a constructive exerciseMichael Emerson of the Centre  for European Policy Studies looks at how the Balance of Competences Review could work for the UK. Despite ongoing concerns about the political neutrality review, it looks to be on course to provide a wide-ranging review - the first of its type in the EU - of the role the EU plays in the UK.
5. Hand-waving as renegotiation: The UK’s (and EU’s) limited option
   Meanwhile Simon Ushwerwood considers some of the options Britain faces should the Balance of Competences Review need to be used in a renegotiation. 
6. Labour should 'be prepared to use military force as a last resort
   Labour still wrestling with the fallout from the Syria vote.
7. Foreign aid: transparency will help African nations prosper
   The Observer's editorial makes a valid, if perhaps obvious point.
8. Transatlantic Trends 2013
   More to come from this regular survey, but the basics are here. 
9. Green Standard 2013
   The Green Alliance review how the three UK wide parties green credentials compare on the economy, communities, nature and international leadership.
10. Trident and the Liberal Democrats
    There was plenty of analysis of the Lib Dem decision to back a 'Trident-Lite' system. This BASIC review is neat and to the point. 

A piece for the LSE's EUROPP blog.

A piece for the LSE's EUROPP blog about whether the EU's unwillingness to discuss the possibility of a 'Brexit' is playing into the hands of Eurosceptics.

The EU’s unwillingness to discuss the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ is playing into the hands of Eurosceptics

British Prime Minister David Cameron has made a commitment to hold a referendum on the UK’s EU membership, should his party win the next general election. Tim Oliver writes that while the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ has been much discussed in the UK context, across the rest of the EU the issue has largely been downplayed or avoided. He argues that if EU leaders continue to remain silent on the topic it may add momentum to the arguments of British Eurosceptics.

In Britain the idea of quitting the European Union provokes lively debate about its desirability, likelihood and what it could mean. But as I recently discovered while researching the potential impact of a UK exit on the EU, debate elsewhere in the EU is limited. Yet it would be a significant moment for the EU if a country of 63 million Europeans voted to leave. So why, when the possibility has become more real than ever before, has debate elsewhere been so limited?

First, discussing the idea of a withdrawal from the EU has long been a taboo. Under international law there is nothing to prevent a member state exercising the right to leave, exactly what the UK would have done had it voted to leave in its 1975 referendum. Yet it was not until the advent of the European Constitution in 2004 that the right was clearly stated. Even then the idea faced opposition. Amendments were tabled to remove the article outlining a process of withdrawal, now known as Article 50 TEU.

As the Dutch Government made clear in justifying an amendment to delete the article: ‘facilitating the possibility to withdraw from the Union is contrary to the idea of European integration as set out in the preamble of the TEU: “Resolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.’ The idea Britain might break with this, or as David Cameron has suggested, seek to stay in the EU but drop the commitment to ‘ever closer union,’ questions the EU’s founding ideas. No wonder it provokes an uncomfortable silence from elsewhere.

Feeding this taboo is a concern that triggering Article 50 would open a Pandora’s Box the rest of the EU might prefer was kept firmly shut and best not thought about. Questions overhang how the process set out in Article 50 is to be enacted. What negotiating red lines should the EU set down? What type of post-withdrawal relationship should be offered to the UK?

Then there is the prospect of shifts in the balance of power within the EU brought about from reorganising its institutions, budgets and policies to make up for the absence of the British. Would small states gain over large states? Would north and west lose out to south and east? Would Europe become less open and more protectionist, and what hopes would there be for EU foreign and security cooperation? What would happen to relations with other non-EU European states, NATO, and the United States? Might other member states be tempted to threaten withdrawal to get their way or, alternatively, could the EU become more willing to threaten the expulsion of a difficult member state? Could the withdrawal be blamed on British Euroscepticism, or would it reflect and connect with growing Euroscepticism elsewhere? Could the withdrawal unleash centrifugal forces that begin the unravelling of the EU, or could the EU, rid of an awkward member, find it easier to move towards ‘ever closer union’?

The rest of the EU could also be forgiven for thinking we’ve been here before. The current debate has strong echoes of the successful, if ultimately insignificant, renegotiation followed by an in-out referendum in 1975. Then there’s the never ending series of complaints and snipes the EU has been subjected to in the UK political debate. Again, the rest of the EU could be forgiven for thinking this is just another example of the British threatening to throw their toys out of the pram. Even in Britain few are certain whether the British will ever follow through on the commitment to hold an EU referendum, everything hanging on developments between now and a general election due by 2015. So why should the rest of the EU pre-empt such a move by confronting the issue? It might appear better to wait it out and call Britain’s bluff by remaining silent.

Ignoring British demands, or refusing to take them seriously, certainly appeals to those who see the approach adopted by David Cameron in his January 2013 speech as nothing short of trying to blackmailthe rest of the EU. Cameron’s demand for a renegotiated relationship or Britain will likely vote to leave, rests on the idea the EU can’t say no because letting Britain go would damage the EU. The potential disruption and damage to the EU is not something to be overlooked, but from the perspective of the rest of the EU it is the UK who would suffer the far bigger consequences. It’s as if Britain is threatening to shoot the EU in the foot while aiming the gun at its own head. A refusal to discuss a Brexit therefore stems in part from a view of Cameron’s strategy as self-defeating, illogical and just plain bonkers.

More than anything the rest of the EU has largely ignored the issue because of the far greater damage the collapse of the euro could bring. This is especially so for Germany, the country that more than any other will make the final call on negotiations with the UK. But this week’s federal election means Germany is not interested right now. If anything, for members of the Eurozone Britain’s attempts to try and separate itself have provoked only feelings of anger at what they see as Britain’s latest show of non-solidarity. Not only has the crisis in the Eurozone therefore left little room to debate the British question, it has if anything provoked some feelings that losing the UK might be necessary collateral damage for saving the euro. What this collateral damage would be, however, is unclear.

How long then can the rest of the EU avoid discussing the issue of a Brexit? There remains a chance a referendum could be triggered sooner than many think. More likely the EU would have to face the issue after 2015. If a newly elected British government pursued a renegotiation and referendum, then it will be difficult for the EU to ignore the possibility of discussing a withdrawal. The British public and the rest of the EU will need to know what will happen should the British say no to any renegotiated relationship and opt to leave.

If anything, the rest of the EU’s silence could add to the momentum for Britain to leave by playing into the hands of Eurosceptics – who would then be left to argue either that the rest of the EU doesn’t care about the UK, or doesn’t want to admit how much it needs it. Here the EU needs to realise that if it were to remain silent and do little to keep Britain in, then a Brexit could end up looking like a passive expulsion. Just as confrontation with an unwanted guest at a party can be avoided by making them feel so uncomfortable and isolated that they leave, so too might it be easier to make things suitably uncomfortable that Britain leaves of its own accord. But it still leaves the unanswered question of what type of party the rest of the EU will then be left with.

Selected FP spots 9-15 September 2013

Every day I spend time clearing Feedly of the close to 500 feeds I've asked it to follow, most connected to British politics, Britain's international relations or international relations in general. Feedly, and before it Google Reader, have long been the way I follow the news, announcements by government, the work of Parliament, think tank publications, events, blogs, and any websites that catch my eye.

Sometimes I miss clearing it for 2-3 days, in which case I face the chore of clearing a backlog of several thousand unread articles. Whether it's a night's worth of feeds or a backlog from a bank holiday weekend, I'll end up skimming most of the articles headlines or summaries. As with skimming a newspaper, only a small proportion of the articles I skim over will interest me. Often a lot of will be repeated in several feeds, the product of that day's news. But everyday articles are fed through that don't fit that day's news summaries. Often they can be reports from think tanks, publications by government, or the work of Parliament.

Once I've read an article that interests me it usually follows the thousands I skimmed over by being stamped 'marked as read', most never to be seen again. But sometimes an article sticks in my mind that I want to do more with. Some end up saved, then perhaps entered into Zotero. The lucky ones even make it into articles and research. But I've long wanted to try and do more with them than this. So each week I'm going to flag up ten articles I've found of interest, specifically those relating to the UK's international relations. My criteria for interesting? They don't fit the daily news agenda, or if they do they stand out as they say something different.

This is going to take some time to refine, and this week's entry isn't helped by how it was only on Wednesday that I thought I should start doing this, by which time half the week's feeds were marked as read. That, and the lack of a paywall, explains the number of Guardian pieces. That said, here's a first attempt...

1. The Guardian reports on life on the distant remnant of empire that is Ascension Island where inhabitants fear they may be headed the same way as the original inhabitants of Diego Garcia.

2. Mats Persson writes in the Guardian about what the Swedish 2003 Euro referendum can teach us about any UK in-out referendum on the EU. I've argued the way Britain is approaching the issue won't work, and in his piece Mats Persson makes a contribution which goes some way beyond the shallow way an in-out referendum is debated in the UK. 

3. Writing in the Conversation, Michael Galsworthy and Michael Browne make a case for the UK to remain in the EU for the benefits it brings for scientific research. Meanwhile elsewhere on The Conversation John Bryson argues a skills shortage in engineering is undermining Britain's chance of global success. 

4. Writing in the Guardian, Michael White draws out what the German elections could mean for UK-EU relations. 

5. International Affairs September issue has a series of articles on the UK, covering everything from the UK's strategic choices in the face of a US pivoting towards Asia, through to Britain's diaspora links providing new links for its place in the world. There's even a book review by a one Tim Oliver... 

6. The Guardian's map of the UK's arms trade offers a reminder of how local this issue is.

7. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs looks back at the effects on Britain's place in the world of HM the Queen's Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games.

8. The House of Commons Library has updated its Commons Library Standard Note on Parliamentary approval for deploying the armed forces. 

9. The Syria vote continues to provoke debate. Nick Cohen has little time for Ed Miliband's position. Meanwhile, as the Guardian reports, several senior politicians signed a letter drafted by Save the Children, urging the UK not to forget its humanitarian responsibilities. 

10. Tim Street, writing on the BASIC blog, explores the democratic and legal background to Britain's nuclear weapon system, a topic often overlooked in a debate too often narrowed to one of cost. 

On Tuesday the Liberal Democrat conference will see debates and votes on Europe and Trident. I'll therefore leave until next week any articles examining the Liberal Democrat approach to these issues.

Europe Without Britain: Assessing the Impact on the EU of a British Withdrawal

The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - the German Institute for International and Security Affairs - Berlin, has published my research paper analysing the impact on the EU of a British withdrawal. You can access it here. 

I don't support a British withdrawal – a Brexit – from the EU. Nor do I support the way the Prime Minister has approached the idea of a renegotiation of the UK's membership. And while I think the possibility  the British will vote to withdraw is still open to debate, the possibility has clearly increased. What has not increased is debate elsewhere in the EU as to what this might mean for it. Over the next few days I'll outline why this is the case in some comment pieces elsewhere and linked here. 

If this research paper argues one thing more than any other, it is that there needs to be more argument about this issue. A British withdrawal could change the EU quite profoundly, for better or worse. But as things stand most analysis of this is based on very shallow speculation. 

Without setting out the detail of the paper – read it! - I do end the report with 10 questions the EU needs to ask itself about a Brexit:

1. Should the EU refuse to discuss the idea of a British withdrawal until a vote to withdraw actually happens?
2. Should the issue of withdrawal be discussed as part of any renegotiation of Britain’s relationship inside the EU?
3. What red-lines should the EU set down for any discussion of withdrawal, either in any renegotiation or during a withdrawal negotiation? 
4. How is Britain’s part in European integration – both positive and negative – to be assessed?
5. To what extent would a UK withdrawal help solve the problems with the Eurozone and make possible further progress towards ‘ever closer union’?
6. What would a UK withdrawal mean for the EU’s international standing and security?
7. What type of relationship would the EU like to have with a UK that has left the EU, and how would this fit with, or change, the EU’s relationships with other non-EU parts of Europe?
8. Should further written clarification be prepared about Article 50 TEU, and if so who is to do this?
9. What processes should the EU follow to manage the internal changes to the EU brought about by a UK withdrawal?
10. How would a UK withdrawal shift the balance of power in the EU and the direction of European integration?

What would a British Withdrawal from the EU mean for the EU?

Worry not, I'm not advocating a British withdrawal from the EU! But what I am advocating is that the EU starts thinking about what it would mean for it. So far the debate has focused almost entirely on what a withdrawal would mean for the UK. Let me be clear: a British withdrawal would involve bigger costs for the UK than the EU. But we cannot deny the effect on the EU would be palpable. Yet discussion of what could be a major event in the EU's development has been very limited. You can read my piece in the IP Journal of the DGAP: https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/who-suffers-most-brexit

Why an In-Out Referendum Won't Settle the European Question in British Politics

I'm uneasy about adding to the current obsession with arguing about Europe, but for what it's worth here is my two pennies' worth...

http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/britains_european_question.html

Book review of 'Three Germanies: West Germany, East Germany and The Berlin Republic'.

This book review will appear in Political Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 2014.

Michael Gehler (2011) Three Germanies: West Germany, East Germany and The Berlin Republic. London: Reaktion Books Ltd. 330pp, £16.95 (p/b), ISBN 9781861897787

No visitor to Berlin can understand the past or future of the city without understanding its division into east and west or efforts since 1990 to reunite it putting Berlin back as not only the German capital but as one of the great capitals of Europe and the world. So too is it impossible to understand modern Germany, its place in Europe and the world and its future without reference to its previous division. Yet all too often the history of Germany since 1945 is told as separate histories of East and West. With the Cold War fading into history and Germany an increasingly ‘normal’ state this approach is clearly outdated.

Michael Gehler’s history is therefore a welcome change. His chronological history begins with the emergence of East and West Germanies and the role they played in the division of Germany and Europe. Through a comprehensive history he draws out their parallel development highlighting commonalities as much as differences. Sections on the post-1990 Berlin Republic draw the history together. There is little new, its unique contribution being a joined up history. While the book provides some social, economic and cultural history it is on the politics that it is strongest. Sadly the legacy of the Germanies from before 1933 is given cursory mention. The book will be of use to those interested in Cold War history and Germany’s place in post-1945 international relations and European integration.

The writing, translation and editing of the book do not make it an easy read. The text conveys no sense of tension, crises pass by in a matter of fact way. Even the politics can be dry and difficult to follow; I was sometimes left confused about various political events. Most annoying of all is the delivery of the book’s wide-ranging detail. Too often details of events, institutions and individuals come across as a clumsy muddle. Worryingly I tired of noting small inaccuracies. Sometimes the balance can also frustrate. For example, the Baader-Meinhof Gang receives nearly five pages of discussion while a mere two pages are spent focusing on the Stasi despite the latter daily terrorising far more Germans for far longer with a deeper lasting psychological impact. Some prior knowledge of German history would therefore be helpful. As a joined up history then it is bold and welcome. Sadly the detail of the history is too often anything but joined up.

Book review of 'Escape from Camp 14'.

Book review for International Affairs 88: 5, 2012

Escape from Camp 14: one man’s remarkable odyssey from North Korea to freedom in the West. By Blaine Harden. London: Pan Macmillan. 2012. 256pp. £16.99. isbn 978 023074 873 6. Available as e-book.

The past decade has seen a number of excellent books about North Korea, each telling of life in this ultra-nationalist, ultra-repressive and ultra-secretive country. Shin Dong-hyuk’s life story takes us to its most secret, dangerous and depraved part: its political prisons. Shin is the only person known to have been born into and successfully escaped what is essentially a Gulag within the larger Gulag of North Korea. His remarkable story reminds us that North Korea is not just about nuclear weapons, famine or the absurdities of the kleptocratic communist dynasty of the Kims, headed now by portly Kim Jong Un, a man of similar age to Shin. Shin’s story, like an increasing number of others documented by campaign groups, international organizations and governments, shows that North Korea’s vast system of political prisons constitute a crime against humanity. Modelled on the Soviet Gulags but having long outlasted them (while receiving far less attention), they today hold an estimated 200,000 prisoners. They have remained hidden from view and off the agenda in discussions about or with North Korea. Stories such as Shin’s and various campaigns are pushing them to the fore.

Blaine Harden, a US journalist, spent several years putting together Shin’s story through detailed interviews and research. Born in 1982 in Camp 14, Shin’s life—like that of his fellow 15,000 prisoners—was a miserable daily struggle to survive. Growing up, he was surrounded by death (his first memory was the public execution of another prisoner who had tried to escape), beatings, abuse, snitching, strict discipline often carrying death as punishment, bullying, thieving, illness, cold, dirt and relentless hard labour. In a country where food was scarce the prospects for prisoners were beyond dire. His parents were political prisoners unknown to one another until guards rewarded their hard work by pairing them and allowing them to have intercourse a couple of times a year (sex between prisoners at any other time would lead to them being shot). Shin, born a slave to replenish camp numbers due to high death rates, was the lowest of the low in the strictly stratified social structure of Communist North Korea. He carried the blood crime of his father’s brother who had escaped North Korea. This unpardonable act condemned his extended family to three generations of life in prison. For Shin, this meant a life born into and to be spent in prison. Schooling was rudimentary, Shin’s low status meaning he was not even deemed worthy of indoctrination into the cult of the Kims. School and everything about the camp taught him that to survive he should have no qualms about informing on others. Aged 13 he thus informed on an escape plan by his mother and half-brother. Suspected of being complicit, he was detained within an underground prison, severely tortured for weeks and upon his release made to witness the public executions of his mother and half-brother. At the time Shin felt nothing but anger towards his family members, feelings only understood by reading about the dehumanizing impact of life spent in a prison where prisoners rarely felt friendship, care or compassion. Shin knew no better, nor did he hope for a better future, as hope requires knowledge of something better and he knew of no other world. His life changed when a new prisoner told him of the world beyond the prison. Shin’s escape was driven by dreams not of freedom but of the food that world might offer. While his escape plan was fantastically naive, a combination of luck, his own resourcefulness and the chaos of the famine then gripping North Korea allowed him to reach China and from there South Korea. The book ends with a description of Shin’s struggle to come to terms with his life in the camp, his guilt towards his mother and half-brother and the knowledge that his father was almost certainly tortured and executed because of his escape.

Shin’s story is told in a short 200 pages, easily covered in one sitting but not easily digested mentally. Between chapters outlining the stages of his life, other chapters provide context for Shin’s life and escape through discussion of North Korea’s politics, history, the Kims’ kleptocratic totalitarian regime and its international relations. The book can therefore be easily read by those new to North Korea. The book will also be of interest to anybody interested in how humans survive in the face of extreme political oppression. As such, it has been compared to The diary of Anne Frank or Dith Pran’s account of his escape from Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia. The scale of the misery Shin experienced and the luck of his escape lead some to question his story, but Harden has gone to meticulous lengths to verify it. Some also might wonder what point there is in publicizing the pain of a damaged man. Shin now campaigns by using his story to highlight the situation in North Korea. For Shin and Harden, the world can no longer ignore the crimes North Korea inflicts on its people. It is not just North Korea’s nuclear weapons the world needs to discuss and address but an entire regime of unmatched political repression and brutality. This important book, one no reader will easily forget, shows why.

Sorry it's been a while since I last posted. Having spent two and a half wonderful years as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst I'm now spending 8 months based in Berlin as a TAPIR fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.  Next June I move onto Washington D.C. to work at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS followed by an 8 month stint at RAND. I thought I should restart my blog as a way of adding updates of my work... 

The following review was prepared for an academic journal who now tell me it will be out sometime in late 2009...!

Paul Wilkinson (ed) (2007) Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11. Abingdon: Routledge. 417pp, £22.99, 978 0 415 38375 2

Analysing terrorist threats and the adequacy of the UK’s response is to walk a tightrope of exaggeration on one side and underplaying the reality of the threat on the other. Wilkinson’s book faces the unenviable task of analysing the UK’s balancing act while providing a balanced analysis itself. In doing so it examines a number of issues.

First, it provides an assessment of the groups posing a threat to the UK. Along with chapters on international terrorist groups there are chapters reminding us of the numerous Northern Ireland and animal rights groups that continue to pose a threat. But it is groups like Al-Qaeda that command the most attention; groups and movements that as the book highlights the UK complacently overlooked in the past. Such is the level of the threat that as the book notes (p51) by 2003 there were an estimated 100 suicide bombers resident in the UK. Figures such as this are presented in a calm and analytical way and not in such a way as to simply alarm.

Second, the book discusses the various means of attack that these groups either seek or have at their disposal. Here the dangers of nuclear, biological or cyber terrorism are not over-hyped. But so too are the authors careful not to downplay methods with the most catastrophic of consequences.

Third, the book addresses the ability of the UK to cope with the full range of threats and whether the UK is sufficiently keeping one step ahead. Central to this is the theme of joined up government, or more accurately: governance. For as the book shows, tackling these threats extends across areas from maritime or aviation security through to immigration and cyber-security.

Every chapter is very well referenced and a good introduction and conclusion top and tail the book. There are, however, three areas where the book slips. First, the book doesn’t mention threats such as that which the British government recently identified as the single biggest threat to the UK’s security: infectious diseases. While of course the book is about terrorist threats, there is a lack of discussion about how the UK prepares for a wider mixture of threats; an approach the recently published UK National Security Strategy attempted. Second, the sheer number of acronyms used makes the book an alphabet soup, frustrating even for those familiar with the area. A list at the back of the book would have been extremely welcome. Finally, while the book is a study of the UK it doesn’t consider sufficiently the UK’s links with the EU, the USA or other allies and how sufficient these links are.

Tim Oliver
London School of Economics and Political Science