In response to my piece with John Bruton on the LSE British Politics Blog, two friends asked questions on Facebook about how the UK’s debate connects/compares with those taking place elsewhere in the EU. I don’t want to post their questions here without their permission, and their questions are far more complex than I've just summarized them. I felt I should post my lengthy - and somewhat rambling - reply here rather than post it as a ridiculously long reply on Facebook.
You're absolutely right: Britain's relationship with the EU is not the only one that is subject to domestic demands and strong debates. Throughout the EU there are demands for change, which as you note, are currently fragmented and incoherent. Nor is it just the UK where those demands have been growing stronger, although again, this has not necessarily resulted - yet - in any clarity. And the tension between the UK and the EU, and the perception this is all about the UK being awkward, is nothing new. I often think back to the title of a book by Stephen George which coined a phrase you hear all the time about the UK-EU relationship: "An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community." Note the indefinite article in the title. Britain is AN awkward partner, not THE awkward partner as you'll often hear it said. Every member state of the EU can be a pain in the arse at some point, e.g. the UK hasn't brought the Euro to the edge of collapse, has never rejected an EU treaty, has a good rate of enforcing EU law etc etc. But there are limits to how far this can be pushed, this George's books, and this is perhaps the problem for current UK-EU relations.
There is a feeling among other governments that the UK’s behaviour reflects naked national self-interest with only casual regard to the wider European interest. This isn't helped by the perception it’s not even about the UK’s national interest and more about the Conservative Party and UKIP. HMG has become aware of this and has changed its approach from demanding unilateral changes to the EU for the UK’s benefit, to pushing more the idea of EU-wide reform that’s good for the whole EU. That helps (see below), but the perception remains this is just about the UK and that the UK is giving little thought to where this could take the rest of the EU.
The UK has scored some notable results with the budget and some other areas. But it remains very difficult for the rest of the EU to feel they can engage with UK efforts to reform the EU without falling into the trap of helping the UK/Tory party more than the EU on a wider basis. Take HMG’s current ‘Review into the Balance of Competences’, i.e. an incredibly detailed review of what the EU does in the UK, and whether the balance between the EU and member states (with the UK as the focus) is right (conclusion so far is that the balance is right. It’s provoked cries of a whitewash by Tory Eurosceptics who now argue the review should focus less on the evidence collected and more on what the British people feel!) It’s an incredible exercise from an academic perspective. Rarely do you see a state sit down and assess the impact of the international on it. The reports are being published in tranches and will eventually inform any UK attempt at a renegotiation. But the rest of the EU has spurned involvement in it, seeing it as just a UK power-grab rather than a genuine attempt to analyse the EU and thus prepare the ground for wider EU change. The same might be said for the large number of ideas, events, publications etc. coming out of the UK on how to reform the EU, and there are a large number of them. I’m pretty sure the competences review will be closely read all over the EU, but few will want to admit to it. Here the UK is running the risk of ‘right message, wrong messenger.’
And it’s not as if the rest of the EU don’t have their own ideas. Others in the EU feel they have been very busy not just proposing changes but making big changes. The Greeks are hardly likely to think it’s novel to hear demands for the EU to change or hear ideas about how this should happen and what their role should be. The Germans are constantly pushing EU reform, especially to make sure the huge investments – both financial and political – they've made in the EU work out. While not wanting to play down Germany’s power in the EU, I think it would pay for the UK to think about how even Germany – with its huge investments in the EU and the EU’s dependence on it - finds it difficult to get changes to the EU. The Dutch launched their own review similar to the UK’s, but were keen to make clear the differences. And yes, they do have growing levels of Euroscepticism. The next European Parliament elections will make that very clear. What’s different with other EU members is that they’re agendas are not quite so dominated (at least not yet) by a ‘give us what we want, or we leave’ message.
And this brings us to whether the EU should worry about the UK leaving/pushing open reform which then spreads/converges with other demands across the EU. Yes, this is a concern but it’s not just about the UK and it’s a fear that remains vague. First, unsurprisingly the rest of the EU is paying far more attention to ideas/public frustrations about how to reform the Eurozone than it is to ideas that appear to originate in how to change the UK-EU relationship. It is change to the EU to deal with the Eurozone that is therefore the big can of worms that is yet to be opened fully. That fits into the UK agenda, more of which below. The concern with the UK – and I've been arguing for a while that the rest of the EU does need to take more notice of this – is that wider changes to the EU could be triggered by the UK whichever way it goes. Here we need to dust down the good old domino theory. Domino theory 1: UK pushes and opens a renegotiation of UK-EU relations and therefore opens the possibility of wider changes to EU (potentially very damaging to the union’s coherence), many of which would be driven by other states also wanting to ‘pick and mix’ their membership requirements. Domino theory 2: UK fails to open renegotiations and leaves, triggering changes to the internal balance of power in the EU and changes to the direction and nature of the EU, possibly pushing others to leave.
The key here is whether, as you ask, the sentiments of the British and other Europeans could converge. If so then domino theory 1 becomes a bigger concern (if, that is, there was no agreement on what was being converged, just that the timing of those demands converged). In a way this is exactly what the PM is hoping for. He’s banking on some form of treaty change/big changes between 2015-2017 (and thus after the next UK general election, therefore plausibly pushing the issue off the agenda until then, at least that’s the PM’s hope!), treaty changes based on the need to change the EU to adapt to the Eurozone crisis. So Britain – or more specifically Cameron - is himself relying on others in the EU to help trigger change the UK can then secure a deal through. This in itself angers other governments: why should Germany, Denmark, France etc be made to change the EU in line with a UK electoral timetable? Others also have election timetables too, and while that doesn't make convergence impossible, it might not happen when Cameron wants it.
That aside, we’re now into the territory of how to do this. A big new treaty? Wow. Very few – at least right now - want to have to go down that route again even though it could be the only way to set in stone the changes made to the Eurozone. But it could mean Lisbon all over again. And Lisbon began long ago with the 2001-2003 work of the European Convention, a large gathering of opinions on how to reform the EU that led to the European Constitution, which when rejected was changed slightly and passed (with incredible difficulty) as the Lisbon Treaty. So the treaty option is currently not appealing. Changes could be made without a treaty change, but that could happen now and neither Cameron or the rest of the EU are ready for that. In a twist the UK is the country that now pushes the treaty change option hardest, despite in the past being the state that instead preferred pragmatic non-treaty changes. And it’s the rest of the EU that is now minded to push for pragmatic changes as opposed to whole new treaties. So how then do we reconcile it all? That’s the million dollar question. My concern is that the UK generally seems oblivious to the situation the rest of the EU is also in and how the UK has to fit into it if it is to have any success at all. For me, I’m also worried the rest of the EU is being too dismissive/overlooking the UK. Miliband’s warning the UK is in danger of sleepwalking out of the EU also works with the EU: it’s in danger of being asleep as the UK sleepwalks out the door. I don’t want to overplay Britain’s position, but what a UK exit might mean for the EU (or for EU-US, EU-NATO, EU-Russia/Eastern Europe, EU-Turkey, Eurozone, German-French relations etc) is generally not openly talked about. In fact being made to think about such an unpalatable development is one reason that some in the rest of the EU are angry at the approach the UK is taking. They consider it blackmail.
Not sure if that helped! What I despair at when listening to the UK debate is how oblivious even those in quite senior positions in UK politics are at what the rest of the EU is doing/thinking. There is also a lazy assumption that it’s just about getting close to the Germans: a sort of hug them close approach. Germany and Merkel are key, but they’re not the only ones. Changing the EU is a huge task, and not one the UK can do easily or opt out of. Even if the UK leaves, the way the EU changes will be of direct concern to the UK. There’s no getting away from it (and the same can be said to a lesser extent for the EU: the UK won’t go away, it will be among the EU’s most important relationships and one that’s constantly pushing the EU to change in ways of interest to it.)
Finally, you're right about the Scots. I'm doing some work on this at the moment - and so excuse me while I get some of this off my chest - and I'm tired of hearing the false dichotomy of a pro-European Scottish white to a Eurosceptic English black. It overlooks so much. On the one hand it overlooks how, to pick one example, hopes for independence would be very badly damaged if Salmond said an independent Scotland should join the Euro. There's still some polling done on opinion on UK membership of the Euro. Support in Scotland for the UK (and ok, the question is about the UK and not necessarily whether it should happen to an independent Scotland) joining the Euro is around 11%. So it would be mad for the SNP to push that right now (although that might change in the longer-term, but certainly not in time for the referendum). On the other hand the dichotomy overlooks how levels of Euroscepticism vary across England, with a large number of polls showing Londoners holding higher levels of support for the EU than the Scots (e.g. in the aforementioned polling on the Euro, 14% of Londoners want the UK to join!) Generally the UK overall has a strong Eurosceptic tone. I think it says more of how dire the pro-European outlook can sometimes be in the UK that people point to Scotland for signs of pro-Europeanism. Once at an event in Germany I heard a respected British journalist answer a question about Scotland and the EU by quoting figures from a recent opinion poll that showed regional support for the suggestion the UK should leave the EU. The UK average, he pointed out, was around 50%. He then said “But in Scotland only 40% want the UK to quit the EU." A colleague later asked me, "What does he mean *only* 40%?" The situation on the EU in Scotland is more complex than I have space or time to discuss here, and for a variety of reasons the political elite/culture is more comfortable with putting across a more pro-European message than you'll find coming out of Westminster. But as you note, this is not just about 'Little Englanders.'
Anyway, I have skimmed over some very complex issues, I'm not sure if I've answered the questions entirely, and I know some people out there will certainly disagree with what I've said (this is about the EU, after all). Comments welcome.
Fears of the UK serving as a Trojan horse for America resurfaced during the bitter European disputes over the Iraq War. And indeed, throughout the 1990-2000s – and particularly under the Bush administration – Washington would on occasion cherry pick the diplomatic support of individual member states to advance broader diplomatic goals. Yet in backing the US over the 2003 Iraq War, the UK was not alone in the EU, with the then governments (if not necessarily the citizens) of sixteen of the current twenty-eight member states, supporting the war in some way. Moreover, just two years after the Iraq war, President Bush made very clear in his 2005 trip to Brussels that the United States had an enduring interest in a strong, successful European Union.
The American Interest
The Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s support for a strong and united EU, with the UK as an engaged member. US policymakers increasingly appreciate that US power is reduced from just a decade ago, if only in relative terms. Unilateralist impulses have been replaced by a search for like-minded and reliable allies capable of helping to advance common Atlantic values. As President Obama made clear in his state visit to the UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for global action in the world today.
From the perspective of Washington, the UK and EU are increasingly bound together, and must remain so if the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy and relevant in a world marked by the profound shift of power and economic influence away toward the East and the South.
In the medium term, the US will seek to work through NATO or through coalitions of the willing on key issues. But in the longer-term, the US will likely need a strong and coherent EU to advance common interests and values in a globally competitive world. And as Obama’s then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Phil Gordon, declared in a visit to London in January 2013: "We welcome an outward-looking European Union with Britain in it. We benefit when the EU is unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused on our shared interests around the world and in Europe. … We want to see a strong British voice in that European Union. That is in the American interest."
The United States has expressed frustrations at Europe’s inability to act coherently in the world either through the EU or NATO. The EU’s own problems, especially those in the eurozone, leave the United States concerned about the damage a eurozone collapse could cause to both Europe and the United States. Though the US realizes a phase of naval-gazing is inevitable while the EU deals with its eurozone challenges, it nonetheless finds it frustrating. This adds to fears the EU is too inward-looking in general.
From Washington’s perspective, British membership the EU enhances the prospects for the EU and US cooperation. American and British alignment on a range of issues – such as economic liberalization, free trade, and security outlooks – makes UK membership in the EU in the direct interest of the United States. Efforts to reform the EU, to make it more responsive and dynamic, are therefore welcomed by Washington. However the United States is also alert to concerns from other member states that British efforts here are more about British domestic politics and national interest, and not those of either the EU or stable transatlantic relations.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has emerged as a crucial focus of US-EU relations. For the United States this deal is not simply about trade. If successfully negotiated, it could shift the center of gravity of transatlantic relations from NATO toward a US-EU relationship. Britain has been central to efforts to move this forward, thanks in no small part to its position as one of the United States' largest trading and investment partners. But Britain’s strained relations with the EU haunt negotiations.
While a TTIP without the UK (in the case of its secession from the EU) would not be impossible – indeed, the United States and other EU members have warned this could happen – it would be a more difficult deal to secure, especially in Washington, where it would be a more difficult sell to Congress. Talk of Britain joining NAFTA, or securing some other deal with the United States, overlooks how for Washington any such relationship would take place in the shadow of TTIP.
Despite talk of an Asian pivot, the Unites States remains committed to Europe. An improved geopolitical relationship is the prize the United States seeks through TTIP. For Washington, TTIP could be less effective if Britain were not playing a leading part in the EU side of the relationship.
NATO remains an important part of the USA’s relations with Europe, but in part thanks to failures in Europe to organize better on defense or act coherently on security matters, Washington is growing weary of the security alliance. Operations in Libya where the US role proved essential, along with the behavior of states such as Germany over Syria, and the UK after the House of Commons vote, have reinforced concerns. As a result, US concerns that EU defense cooperation could undermine NATO have given way to a desire to see any progress on defense, regardless of the facilitator. Washington see the lack of European capability – be it through NATO or the EU – as the primary risk to NATO and future of transatlantic security cooperation.
Beyond concerns about trade and security, the general political debate in the United States about the UK and the EU can seem lackluster. Relations with the UK are still seen very much through talk about Churchill or Thatcher. While some Republicans lament US relations with the EU, the potential for this to extend into executive policy should the Republicans win the White House is, at best, remote. Moreover, no one in the United States any longer sees the European Union – with its many crises – as a threat to American power, as some did in the late 1990s. Instead, a lazy but popular view of Europe, the UK included, (especially among conservatives) center on it as a place alien to US values and in decline, thanks to such things as socialized medicine and Islamization.
A Brexit: Implications for the United States
For Washingtong, the UK’s geopolitical relevance would be much reduced by withdrawal from the EU. Britain would remain an important ally, with strong economic, social and cultural links. The practical core of any “special relationship” would more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing, and special forces. The UK’s involvement in US intelligence activities monitoring other EU member states points to how strong this link is. British prime ministers will likely continue the long-standing approach of offering British military contributions to US military operations as a way of securing influence in Washington, in turn securing a continued US defense commitment to the UK. But declining UK military capabilities mean this looks set to be increasingly difficult. Other options will need to be considered. The United States does not see EU membership as limiting the UK to only engaging in European matters. Washington welcomes London’s global engagement, but this is built in part on a foundation of European and transatlantic links. Any efforts by Britain from the outside to play a bridging role between the United States and the EU will not likely be welcome in either party. Britain therefore risks finding itself side-lined in US-EU relations.
Britain must avoid a situation in which a US administration is forced to choose between a deep and special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a more brittle, but much larger and important relationship with the rest of the EU. From the perspective of Washington the Britain and EU are increasingly bound together, and should remain so for the health and relevance of the transatlantic relationship. Nor will Washington appreciate – if anything it will deeply resent – being drawn in to play the part of a counselor to limit the damage, not least to its own relations with its European allies, from a UK-EU divorce.
The United States, like powers such as Russia or China, will not assess Britain’s withdrawal simply in terms of what it means for their relations with the UK; they will assess it in terms of what it means for their more important and larger relationship with the EU. The implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal are generally under researched, but it could make the EU more inward-looking, unwilling to enlarge further, less focused on the Atlantic, and even further from being able to martial the full potential for military and diplomatic power. It will remain dependent on a US security guarantee.
Alternatively, freed of an awkward member it could become a more coherent actor. Whichever way the EU moves, the UK should not expect Washington to disengage from the EU because Britain has withdrawn. If anything Britain’s absence will mean that Washington has to increase its relations with the remaining members of the EU, to the detriment of relations with the UK. There would be no shortage of applicants to fill the position of claiming to be Washington's closest ally within the EU, and the United States will be keen to build closer relations with them, for example with France, the Netherlands, or Poland. While such applicants might struggle to offer a relationship that could claim to be as ‘special’ as British-American ties, for Washington they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe, and the EU, being an area of the world in which Washington will retain considerable interests.