What if... Britain had voted to leave the EEC in 1975?

Awkwardly Ever After

Published on the DGAP's IP Journal

In our eighth contribution in the PISM/DGAP counterfactuals series, SAIS's Tim Oliver examines what the UK and EU might look like today if the UK’s referendum on Europe had failed nearly 40 years ago.

On June 5, 1975 a Labour government put a choice to the British people: they could either leave the European Economic Community or, as Prime Minister Harold Wilson urged them to do, vote to stay on the new terms his government had negotiated. A 67 percent vote in favor, with a turnout of 65 percent, seemed a solid commitment. European integration has nevertheless remained one of the most divisive issues in British politics, splitting parties and helping topple prime ministers. Relations between the UK and the rest of Europe have been difficult too, typified by opt-outs and vetoes.

It is therefore easy to surmise that both British politics and European integration would have been better off had the British voted to leave in 1975. However, the present “What if….” analysis suggests that both the UK and the EEC would have remained tightly bound to each other, drawn together by the UK’s need for some form of close economic and political relationship and the EEC’s desire to manage its role as the central economic and political organization of Europe. The fact that both would have found this setup difficult offers pointers to what may lie ahead should Britain ever vote to leave.

The Alternative EEC: Decentralized and Liberal

The morning of June 6,1975 was a sombre one for the European Commission. It had viewed a successful enlargement to include the UK as a useful means of counterbalancing France and thus of asserting its own political predominance. Instead, Britain’s exit proved a trigger for the member governments to invest more thoroughly in bilateral relations, with the effect that the EEC’s central institutions remained quite weak. Searching for means of pushing forward with integration, the Commission’s proposed Single European Act thus reflected a careful compromise between north and south.

The proposal would have reduced the common market’s remaining economic barriers but also put in place strong common social rights. In negotiations between governments, however, it was the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic agenda then sweeping the US that shaped the result, with West Germany supported by the Netherlands promoting market liberalization. Unsurprisingly, there was resistance, with each of the seven member states taking turns being labelled “the awkward partner.” France’s willingness in particular to object and threaten vetoes was the source of much debate and led to its growing sense of semidetachment.

And yet, soon enough there were grounds for political deepening, this time in the form of another ambitious enlargement project. Despite  “losing the UK,” renewed enlargement was driven powerfully by changes in the Mediterranean. Even the British government, sitting now in the European Free Trade Area and wary of the EEC’s growing market size, supported membership for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, recognizing that economic links alone would be insufficient to support political changes in these countries. This gave the EEC a significant opportunity to build its position as the predominant organization of European politics.

Nevertheless, enlargement triggered bitter budgetary arguments – again mainly involving France – as European funds flowed southward. These tensions reached a new high as the Cold War reached its denouement. The reunification of Germany and the applications for EEC membership from Eastern Europe (strongly backed by a US keen to see the EEC compliment NATO expansion) shifted Europe’s center eastward. In a twist, France now became the member state most eager to talk of a new attempt at British membership, with Paris seeing this as a way to counterbalance the new Germany and an eastward shift of power.

The Alternative Britain: Fragmented and Interventionist

For British politics, the morning of June 6, 1975 was also a somber one. This publicly-imposed U-turn was a humiliation for the government akin to the Suez debacle of 1956. The resignation of Prime Minister Harold Wilson further weakened a Labour Party governing on a slim majority. But it was probably the leadership of the center-right Conservative Party – then the more pro-European of the two main parties – which was most damaged by the outcome. Even if they weren’t in power, many Tories saw the no vote as a personal defeat on an issue they considered central to Britain’s future....

Read the complete piece here: https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/eye-europe/awkwardly-ever-after 

Questions about the EU-UK relationship.

In response to my piece with John Bruton on the LSE British Politics Blog, two friends asked questions on Facebook about how the UK’s debate connects/compares with those taking place elsewhere in the EU. I don’t want to post their questions here without their permission, and their questions are far more complex than I've just summarized them. I felt I should post my lengthy - and somewhat rambling - reply here rather than post it as a ridiculously long reply on Facebook.

You're absolutely right: Britain's relationship with the EU is not the only one that is subject to domestic demands and strong debates. Throughout the EU there are demands for change, which as you note, are currently fragmented and incoherent. Nor is it just the UK where those demands have been growing stronger, although again, this has not necessarily resulted - yet - in any clarity. And the tension between the UK and the EU, and the perception this is all about the UK being awkward, is nothing new. I often think back to the title of a book by Stephen George which coined a phrase you hear all the time about the UK-EU relationship: "An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community." Note the indefinite article in the title. Britain is AN awkward partner, not THE awkward partner as you'll often hear it said. Every member state of the EU can be a pain in the arse at some point, e.g. the UK hasn't brought the Euro to the edge of collapse, has never rejected an EU treaty, has a good rate of enforcing EU law etc etc. But there are limits to how far this can be pushed, this George's books, and this is perhaps the problem for current UK-EU relations.

There is a feeling among other governments that the UK’s behaviour reflects naked national self-interest with only casual regard to the wider European interest. This isn't helped by the perception it’s not even about the UK’s national interest and more about the Conservative Party and UKIP. HMG has become aware of this and has changed its approach from demanding unilateral changes to the EU for the UK’s benefit, to pushing more the idea of EU-wide reform that’s good for the whole EU. That helps (see below), but the perception remains this is just about the UK and that the UK is giving little thought to where this could take the rest of the EU.

The UK has scored some notable results with the budget and some other areas. But it remains very difficult for the rest of the EU to feel they can engage with UK efforts to reform the EU without falling into the trap of helping the UK/Tory party more than the EU on a wider basis. Take HMG’s current ‘Review into the Balance of Competences’, i.e. an incredibly detailed review of what the EU does in the UK, and whether the balance between the EU and member states (with the UK as the focus) is right (conclusion so far is that the balance is right. It’s provoked cries of a whitewash by Tory Eurosceptics who now argue the review should focus less on the evidence collected and more on what the British people feel!) It’s an incredible exercise from an academic perspective. Rarely do you see a state sit down and assess the impact of the international on it. The reports are being published in tranches and will eventually inform any UK attempt at a renegotiation. But the rest of the EU has spurned involvement in it, seeing it as just a UK power-grab rather than a genuine attempt to analyse the EU and thus prepare the ground for wider EU change. The same might be said for the large number of ideas, events, publications etc. coming out of the UK on how to reform the EU, and there are a large number of them. I’m pretty sure the competences review will be closely read all over the EU, but few will want to admit to it. Here the UK is running the risk of ‘right message, wrong messenger.’

And it’s not as if the rest of the EU don’t have their own ideas. Others in the EU feel they have been very busy not just proposing changes but making big changes. The Greeks are hardly likely to think it’s novel to hear demands for the EU to change or hear ideas about how this should happen and what their role should be. The Germans are constantly pushing EU reform, especially to make sure the huge investments – both financial and political – they've made in the EU work out. While not wanting to play down Germany’s power in the EU, I think it would pay for the UK to think about how even Germany – with its huge investments in the EU and the EU’s dependence on it - finds it difficult to get changes to the EU. The Dutch launched their own review similar to the UK’s, but were keen to make clear the differences. And yes, they do have growing levels of Euroscepticism. The next European Parliament elections will make that very clear. What’s different with other EU members is that they’re agendas are not quite so dominated (at least not yet) by a ‘give us what we want, or we leave’ message.

And this brings us to whether the EU should worry about the UK leaving/pushing open reform which then spreads/converges with other demands across the EU. Yes, this is a concern but it’s not just about the UK and it’s a fear that remains vague. First, unsurprisingly the rest of the EU is paying far more attention to ideas/public frustrations about how to reform the Eurozone than it is to ideas that appear to originate in how to change the UK-EU relationship. It is change to the EU to deal with the Eurozone that is therefore the big can of worms that is yet to be opened fully. That fits into the UK agenda, more of which below. The concern with the UK – and I've been arguing for a while that the rest of the EU does need to take more notice of this – is that wider changes to the EU could be triggered by the UK whichever way it goes. Here we need to dust down the good old domino theory. Domino theory 1: UK pushes and opens a renegotiation of UK-EU relations and therefore opens the possibility of wider changes to EU (potentially very damaging to the union’s coherence), many of which would be driven by other states also wanting to ‘pick and mix’ their membership requirements. Domino theory 2: UK fails to open renegotiations and leaves, triggering changes to the internal balance of power in the EU and changes to the direction and nature of the EU, possibly pushing others to leave.

The key here is whether, as you ask, the sentiments of the British and other Europeans could converge. If so then domino theory 1 becomes a bigger concern (if, that is, there was no agreement on what was being converged, just that the timing of those demands converged). In a way this is exactly what the PM is hoping for. He’s banking on some form of treaty change/big changes between 2015-2017 (and thus after the next UK general election, therefore plausibly pushing the issue off the agenda until then, at least that’s the PM’s hope!), treaty changes based on the need to change the EU to adapt to the Eurozone crisis. So Britain – or more specifically Cameron - is himself relying on others in the EU to help trigger change the UK can then secure a deal through. This in itself angers other governments: why should Germany, Denmark, France etc be made to change the EU in line with a UK electoral timetable? Others also have election timetables too, and while that doesn't make convergence impossible, it might not happen when Cameron wants it.

That aside, we’re now into the territory of how to do this. A big new treaty? Wow. Very few – at least right now - want to have to go down that route again even though it could be the only way to set in stone the changes made to the Eurozone. But it could mean Lisbon all over again. And Lisbon began long ago with the 2001-2003 work of the European Convention, a large gathering of opinions on how to reform the EU that led to the European Constitution, which when rejected was changed slightly and passed (with incredible difficulty) as the Lisbon Treaty. So the treaty option is currently not appealing. Changes could be made without a treaty change, but that could happen now and neither Cameron or the rest of the EU are ready for that. In a twist the UK is the country that now pushes the treaty change option hardest, despite in the past being the state that instead preferred pragmatic non-treaty changes. And it’s the rest of the EU that is now minded to push for pragmatic changes as opposed to whole new treaties. So how then do we reconcile it all? That’s the million dollar question. My concern is that the UK generally seems oblivious to the situation the rest of the EU is also in and how the UK has to fit into it if it is to have any success at all. For me, I’m also worried the rest of the EU is being too dismissive/overlooking the UK. Miliband’s warning the UK is in danger of sleepwalking out of the EU also works with the EU: it’s in danger of being asleep as the UK sleepwalks out the door. I don’t want to overplay Britain’s position, but what a UK exit might mean for the EU (or for EU-US, EU-NATO, EU-Russia/Eastern Europe, EU-Turkey, Eurozone, German-French relations etc) is generally not openly talked about. In fact being made to think about such an unpalatable development is one reason that some in the rest of the EU are angry at the approach the UK is taking. They consider it blackmail.

Not sure if that helped! What I despair at when listening to the UK debate is how oblivious even those in quite senior positions in UK politics are at what the rest of the EU is doing/thinking. There is also a lazy assumption that it’s just about getting close to the Germans: a sort of hug them close approach. Germany and Merkel are key, but they’re not the only ones. Changing the EU is a huge task, and not one the UK can do easily or opt out of. Even if the UK leaves, the way the EU changes will be of direct concern to the UK. There’s no getting away from it (and the same can be said to a lesser extent for the EU: the UK won’t go away, it will be among the EU’s most important relationships and one that’s constantly pushing the EU to change in ways of interest to it.)

Finally, you're right about the Scots. I'm doing some work on this at the moment - and so excuse me while I get some of this off my chest - and I'm tired of hearing the false dichotomy of a pro-European Scottish white to a Eurosceptic English black. It overlooks so much. On the one hand it overlooks how, to pick one example, hopes for independence would be very badly damaged if Salmond said an independent Scotland should join the Euro. There's still some polling done on opinion on UK membership of the Euro. Support in Scotland for the UK (and ok, the question is about the UK and not necessarily whether it should happen to an independent Scotland) joining the Euro is around 11%. So it would be mad for the SNP to push that right now (although that might change in the longer-term, but certainly not in time for the referendum). On the other hand the dichotomy overlooks how levels of Euroscepticism vary across England, with a large number of polls showing Londoners holding higher levels of support for the EU than the Scots (e.g. in the aforementioned polling on the Euro, 14% of Londoners want the UK to join!) Generally the UK overall has a strong Eurosceptic tone. I think it says more of how dire the pro-European outlook can sometimes be in the UK that people point to Scotland for signs of pro-Europeanism. Once at an event in Germany I heard a respected British journalist answer a question about Scotland and the EU by quoting figures from a recent opinion poll that showed regional support for the suggestion the UK should leave the EU. The UK average, he pointed out, was around 50%. He then said “But in Scotland only 40% want the UK to quit the EU." A colleague later asked me, "What does he mean *only* 40%?" The situation on the EU in Scotland is more complex than I have space or time to discuss here, and for a variety of reasons the political elite/culture is more comfortable with putting across a more pro-European message than you'll find coming out of Westminster. But as you note, this is not just about 'Little Englanders.'

Anyway, I have skimmed over some very complex issues, I'm not sure if I've answered the questions entirely, and I know some people out there will certainly disagree with what I've said (this is about the EU, after all). Comments welcome.

Consent of a majority of the rest of the EU will be needed if there is to be a new UK-EU relationship

A piece published with John Bruton on LSE's British Politics and Policy blog.

Consent of a majority of the rest of the EU will be needed if there is to be a new UK-EU relationship

The only place in the EU where the issues that might arise from a UK renegotiation or withdrawal are being debated in any detail is in the UK itself. But any change in the relationship will have an impact on all member states. Tim Oliver and John Bruton write that it is therefore not simply about what Britain wants from its relationship with the EU, but also what the other 27 states would want, and whether these can be reconciled.

The possibility of the UK leaving the EU is likely to remain a live issue for many years to come. It is not an issue that London, Brussels, Dublin, the rest of Europe or the UK’s allies should casually dismiss. An in-out referendum could be brought about by a government seeking a renegotiation and referendum, triggered by a treaty change or new treaty, or from a backbench rebellion in a House of Commons where a government has a slim majority.

The only place in the EU where the issues that might arise from a UK renegotiation or withdrawal are being debated in any detail is in the UK itself. Even then the debate is narrowly focussed on UK concerns, and takes little account of the effect on the 27 other member states of the EU of the various UK renegotiation/withdrawal scenarios. Nor, with a few exceptions, is there any appreciation of what a separation would mean for Britain and Europe’s allies and others around the world.

The downside of this approach is that UK public and media opinion may develop unrealistic expectations of the terms it could achieve in a renegotiation, leading to disappointment, and a consequent increase in support for outright withdrawal. In fact, EU countries are already so integrated with one another that any UK attempts to alter the relationship will be a domestic issue for all members. Furthermore, there is a risk that the UK public will make the mistake of thinking that they will be negotiating with a single entity called “Europe”, when in fact they will be involved in something much more complex: a negotiation with 27 other EU members, all of whom will have different red lines, different ambitions, and different axes to grind.Other EU leaders have taken a vow of silence on the internal UK debate, even though it is one in which their own electorates have a vital interest. Understandably, they do not want to aggravate UK public opinion, which might claim to resent “foreign” intervention in what would be construed, inaccurately, as a purely “domestic” UK matter.

Even if the UK withdraws, the painful truth for the UK – government, parties, business and public – is that the consent of a majority of the rest of the EU will be needed for a new UK-EU relationship. Britain cannot simply assume this will happen. For example, it will be for the rest of the EU to decide whether it allows continued privileged access for the UK to the EU Single Market (for example in financial services).

Certainly both sides have much to lose if the negotiations fail. The UK runs an overall £28 billion (2011 figures) trade deficit in goods and services with the rest of the EU, and by 2050 the UK could be the largest country in the EU in terms of population and economy. But the £28 billion forms a small part of an EU economic area worth around £11 trillion. Focusing on the economics also overlooks the politics. The EU is a political union, and the UK will retain a deep political and strategic interest in how the EU evolves, whether it is a member or not. Shaping that political union, in British interests, from the outside will be very difficult indeed.

So should the UK decide to leave, what could it expect the EU to set down as negotiating red lines? This would all depend on the rest of the EU’s assessments of the economic and political implications for the EU of a UK exit; an issue which, with a few exceptions, has been subject to little or no discussion.

A UK withdrawal would take place under the EU Treaty’s Article 50, requiring both the European Council and the European Parliament to agree the terms to be granted to the UK for a new relationship. The decisive role of the Parliament, or that of the Council, is little appreciated in the UK. Similarly few appreciate the potential for these two, and potentially the European Court of Justice, to block or delay a deal, for example on grounds of unfair discrimination.

It is highly likely that, as with Norway and Switzerland, the UK will be expected to make a continuing financial contribution to the EU budget, in return for UK access to the EU single market. It is highly unlikely the EU will willingly accept any formal UK involvement in EU decision making that compromises the EU’s own sovereignty.

Brussels will expect the UK, even if outside the EU, to uphold the rights of EU citizens in the UK, as the rest of the EU will be expected to uphold the existing rights of UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU. UK involvement in deals such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will be possible, but strictly only on whatever terms are agreed between Brussels and Washington D.C.

EU and UK officials, diplomats and negotiators will, no doubt, work hard and constructively to find solutions to these dilemmas.

The problem will lie in the politics. Will the UK accept what the EU has to offer and what can it do if it doesn’t? Could the UK decide to hold a second referendum before any withdrawal actually happens, a sort of double-lock system to ensure the British people are comfortable with what they have been offered by the EU? Could a government be sure it could get any withdrawal bill through the House of Commons if the terms of a new relationship are not to Britain’s benefit?

In the event no agreement was reached within the two years (or no extension to negotiations agreed, which could only be done with the unanimous agreement of all 27 EU states), the UK would be out of the EU, with no special rights at all, and automatically subject to WTO agreed restrictions and tariffs on its exports to EU countries and services. Customs posts would have to be reintroduced on the border in Ireland and at cross-channel ports. It would be a loss for both sides, but more so for the UK.

The UK will also have to ask itself what type of EU it can hope for, if it is no longer a member. The EU will remain the UK’s single largest relationship, dwarfing that with the USA. The UK has to ask itself if it wants the EU to remain a viable and confident organisation, one it is comfortable living next to, and in the shadow of.

In or out of the EU, the UK has a clear interest in the EU remaining effective. An effective EU, like an effective NATO, contributes to European security, and creates a single market that is good for British prosperity. Britain would not sell as much in a Europe that had revereted to 27 different markets with 27 different currencies. An EU that could not make decisions, because it was paralysed by fear about who might be next to follow the UK out the door, would not be good for Britain.

And what might the US and other UK allies think? The UK should not expect the USA to give up on the EU, just because the UK has.

A question likely to weigh heavily in the minds of those in Washington is what a British withdrawal would mean for what was originally an American sponsored project: the European Union. The wider geopolitical implications remain unclear, with possible implications for states such as Turkey, and the future of NATO and European cooperation on defence and security. That UK involvement in European integration has been an important background factor to the Northern Ireland peace process should not be forgotten. The entire dynamics of the relationship between the two parts of Ireland, and within Northern Ireland, would be radically changed by a UK exit from the EU.

The question to ask then is not simply what Britain wants when renegotiating its relationship in the EU or when leaving the EU, but also what each of the other 27 states in the EU would want, and whether these can be reconciled.

A piece for E!Sharp on the British questions that could face the next European Commission

The British questions facing the next Commission

A piece for E!Sharp

The next European Commission, to be appointed after May’s European Parliament elections, will have more than enough on its agenda. The ‘British question’ might be one many in Brussels would prefer to put at the bottom of a list that will include questions about the Eurozone crisis and managing the growing economic and security challenges posed by the world beyond Europe.

But history could play out in a way that Britain poses the next Commission not one question, but a series of questions that could radically change the EU: questions on Scotland; about a renegotiation of UK membership; of how to handle the EU’s first in-out referendum since 1975; what to do in response to British hopes for a new treaty; how to face a host of British initiatives on economic reform or the EU’s security and international standing; and, biggest of all, how to cope with the implications for the EU should the British vote to leave the Union. 

For more see here: http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/162-the-british-questions-facing-the-next-commission/ 

Another piece for the Huffington Post

Cool the Talk of TTIP as an 'Economic NATO'

Calling the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) an "economic NATO" seems logical enough, but the comparison should not be taken too far.

The build-up to and launch of TTIP negotiations between the United States and the European Union has led to a flurry of debate and speculation about what the world's largest trade and investment deal could herald. The deal could bring welcome opportunities for economic prosperity in the U.S. and Europe, and the chance to push wider global trade negotiations. It also offers the West a geopolitical tool, and it is this that has attracted deserved but sometimes excited comment.

By uniting the two core parts of the West, TTIP would allow them to engage emerging economic powers which are quickly shaping the global economy. By bringing together 40 percent of the world economy, rules agreed across the Atlantic could then form the core of global rules and norms, shaping the rise of new powers. Some commentators have gone so far as to declare that TTIP could be an 'economic NATO.'

The metaphor seems logical, and in part it is. For more than 50 years the two sides of the North Atlantic have pursued various policies to bind themselves together economically to complement NATO's military bonds. If the U.S. and the Europeans can combine their economic power then, like NATO, they would command the planet's most powerful and transformative economic relationship.

But it pays to be circumspect when making the comparison.

Continue reading here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tim-oliver/cool-the-talk-of-ttip-as-_b_4427037.html

Piece for The National Interest.

A UK-EU Divorce: Bad News for America

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Jeff Lightfoot, Tim Oliver 

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December 3, 2013

The recent unveiling of a bust of Sir Winston Churchill in the Capitol Building offered a reminder of the long-standing special relationship between Great Britain and the United States. But there is something that keeps the relationship special today which the British shy away from: Britain’s membership in the European Union.

Since the 1960s, successive American administrations—Democratic and Republican—have supported the UK’s participation in European integration, a project the United States encouraged in order to help unite Western Europe after the Second World War.

Read the complete piece here

Britain outside Europe? The US View (DGAP's IP Journal)

UK withdrawal from the EU would be a double loss

Jeffrey Lightfoot, Tim Oliver

Britain is one of the United States' most important relationships, but Britain's position within the EU is central to its importance. A UK exit from Europe would weaken the geopolitical position of Britain and change the EU and Europe in ways which could be detrimental to US interests.

US support for a strong British role in Europe helped create fear that Britain was an "American Trojan horse" set to sabotage European unity on behalf of Washington. No one personified these fears more than French President Charles de Gaulle, who twice vetoed UK entry into the Common Market. Yet these fears overlooked the USA’s close relations with other major continental European powers, especially Germany. And they misunderstood the fundamental interest the United States had in European unity on economic and security grounds, concerns born from its involvement in two World Wars centered around Europe.The US has been a long-standing supporter of both European integration and a British role in the European project. The US-designed Marshall Plan for assisting the reconstruction of Europe required European unity and cooperation as a means of facilitating reconstruction and security. When in 1962 retired US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role” he immediately followed it with another clear statement: “The attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the US and on being the head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, unity, or strength – this role is about played out.” The part about playing “a separate power role apart from Europe” is often overlooked, not least by the British. Acheson’s speech reflected growing opinion in Washington DC that has led US administrations from Kennedy onward to push for UK participation in European integration.

Fears of the UK serving as a Trojan horse for America resurfaced during the bitter European disputes over the Iraq War. And indeed, throughout the 1990-2000s – and particularly under the Bush administration – Washington would on occasion cherry pick the diplomatic support of individual member states to advance broader diplomatic goals. Yet in backing the US over the 2003 Iraq War, the UK was not alone in the EU, with the then governments (if not necessarily the citizens) of sixteen of the current twenty-eight member states, supporting the war in some way. Moreover, just two years after the Iraq war, President Bush made very clear in his 2005 trip to Brussels that the United States had an enduring interest in a strong, successful European Union.

The American Interest

The Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s support for a strong and united EU, with the UK as an engaged member. US policymakers increasingly appreciate that US power is reduced from just a decade ago, if only in relative terms. Unilateralist impulses have been replaced by a search for like-minded and reliable allies capable of helping to advance common Atlantic values. As President Obama made clear in his state visit to the UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for global action in the world today.

From the perspective of Washington, the UK and EU are increasingly bound together, and must remain so if the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy and relevant in a world marked by the profound shift of power and economic influence away toward the East and the South.

In the medium term, the US will seek to work through NATO or through coalitions of the willing on key issues. But in the longer-term, the US will likely need a strong and coherent EU to advance common interests and values in a globally competitive world. And as Obama’s then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Phil Gordon, declared in a visit to London in January 2013: "We welcome an outward-looking European Union with Britain in it. We benefit when the EU is unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused on our shared interests around the world and in Europe. … We want to see a strong British voice in that European Union. That is in the American interest."

The United States has expressed frustrations at Europe’s inability to act coherently in the world either through the EU or NATO. The EU’s own problems, especially those in the eurozone, leave the United States concerned about the damage a eurozone collapse could cause to both Europe and the United States. Though the US realizes a phase of naval-gazing is inevitable while the EU deals with its eurozone challenges, it nonetheless finds it frustrating. This adds to fears the EU is too inward-looking in general.

From Washington’s perspective, British membership the EU enhances the prospects for the EU and US cooperation. American and British alignment on a range of issues – such as economic liberalization, free trade, and security outlooks – makes UK membership in the EU in the direct interest of the United States. Efforts to reform the EU, to make it more responsive and dynamic, are therefore welcomed by Washington. However the United States is also alert to concerns from other member states that British efforts here are more about British domestic politics and national interest, and not those of either the EU or stable transatlantic relations.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has emerged as a crucial focus of US-EU relations. For the United States this deal is not simply about trade. If successfully negotiated, it could shift the center of gravity of transatlantic relations from NATO toward a US-EU relationship. Britain has been central to efforts to move this forward, thanks in no small part to its position as one of the United States' largest trading and investment partners. But Britain’s strained relations with the EU haunt negotiations.

While a TTIP without the UK (in the case of its secession from the EU) would not be impossible – indeed, the United States and other EU members have warned this could happen – it would be a more difficult deal to secure, especially in Washington, where it would be a more difficult sell to Congress. Talk of Britain joining NAFTA, or securing some other deal with the United States, overlooks how for Washington any such relationship would take place in the shadow of TTIP.

Despite talk of an Asian pivot, the Unites States remains committed to Europe. An improved geopolitical relationship is the prize the United States seeks through TTIP. For Washington, TTIP could be less effective if Britain were not playing a leading part in the EU side of the relationship.

NATO remains an important part of the USA’s relations with Europe, but in part thanks to failures in Europe to organize better on defense or act coherently on security matters, Washington is growing weary of the security alliance. Operations in Libya where the US role proved essential, along with the behavior of states such as Germany over Syria, and the UK after the House of Commons vote, have reinforced concerns. As a result, US concerns that EU defense cooperation could undermine NATO have given way to a desire to see any progress on defense, regardless of the facilitator. Washington see the lack of European capability – be it through NATO or the EU – as the primary risk to NATO and future of transatlantic security cooperation.

Beyond concerns about trade and security, the general political debate in the United States about the UK and the EU can seem lackluster. Relations with the UK are still seen very much through talk about Churchill or Thatcher. While some Republicans lament US relations with the EU, the potential for this to extend into executive policy should the Republicans win the White House is, at best, remote. Moreover, no one in the United States any longer sees the European Union – with its many crises – as a threat to American power, as some did in the late 1990s. Instead, a lazy but popular view of Europe, the UK included, (especially among conservatives) center on it as a place alien to US values and in decline, thanks to such things as socialized medicine and Islamization.

A Brexit: Implications for the United States

For Washingtong, the UK’s geopolitical relevance would be much reduced by withdrawal from the EU. Britain would remain an important ally, with strong economic, social and cultural links. The practical core of any “special relationship” would more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing, and special forces. The UK’s involvement in US intelligence activities monitoring other EU member states points to how strong this link is. British prime ministers will likely continue the long-standing approach of offering British military contributions to US military operations as a way of securing influence in Washington, in turn securing a continued US defense commitment to the UK. But declining UK military capabilities mean this looks set to be increasingly difficult. Other options will need to be considered. The United States does not see EU membership as limiting the UK to only engaging in European matters. Washington welcomes London’s global engagement, but this is built in part on a foundation of European and transatlantic links. Any efforts by Britain from the outside to play a bridging role between the United States and the EU will not likely be welcome in either party. Britain therefore risks finding itself side-lined in US-EU relations.

Britain must avoid a situation in which a US administration is forced to choose between a deep and special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a more brittle, but much larger and important relationship with the rest of the EU. From the perspective of Washington the Britain and EU are increasingly bound together, and should remain so for the health and relevance of the transatlantic relationship. Nor will Washington appreciate – if anything it will deeply resent – being drawn in to play the part of a counselor to limit the damage, not least to its own relations with its European allies, from a UK-EU divorce.

The United States, like powers such as Russia or China, will not assess Britain’s withdrawal simply in terms of what it means for their relations with the UK; they will assess it in terms of what it means for their more important and larger relationship with the EU. The implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal are generally under researched, but it could make the EU more inward-looking, unwilling to enlarge further, less focused on the Atlantic, and even further from being able to martial the full potential for military and diplomatic power. It will remain dependent on a US security guarantee.

Alternatively, freed of an awkward member it could become a more coherent actor. Whichever way the EU moves, the UK should not expect Washington to disengage from the EU because Britain has withdrawn. If anything Britain’s absence will mean that Washington has to increase its relations with the remaining members of the EU, to the detriment of relations with the UK. There would be no shortage of applicants to fill the position of claiming to be Washington's closest ally within the EU, and the United States will be keen to build closer relations with them, for example with France, the Netherlands, or Poland. While such applicants might struggle to offer a relationship that could claim to be as ‘special’ as British-American ties, for Washington they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe, and the EU, being an area of the world in which Washington will retain considerable interests.

Britain outside Europe? Introduction (the DGAP's IP Journal)

Views on the future of the UK and EU, from Europe and beyond

Almut Möller, Tim Oliver

We have debated what a withdrawal or renegotiated relationship with Europe would mean for Britain. But what would a Brexit or new relationship mean for the rest of the EU, other member states, allies, and the global standing of both Europe and the United Kingdom? Analysts from other EU member states and beyond give us their perspectives on the implications of a change in Britain's relationship with the Union.

Reaction to the speech in the UK was considerable. While it is not actually certain that a referendum will be held, it seems increasingly likely. And with opinion polls pointing strongly toward a Eurosceptic vote, the UK could be headed toward leaving the EU.Britain’s relationship with the EU has always attracted considerable comment, not least in the UK itself. This was certainly the case in early 2013 when Prime Minister David Cameron committed a future Conservative government to renegotiate the Britain’s relationship with the EU, which would then be put to the British people in an in-out referendum.

There has been a great deal of debate about what a withdrawal or renegotiated relationship would mean for Britain. Yet by focusing on the UK we overlook the equally important discussion of what such a move could mean for the rest of the EU, other member states, Europe's allies, and the global standing of both Europe and the UK. If Britain exits the Union, this would change the EU, transform the UK’s relations with the EU and its members, and have implications for the UK and the European Union’s position in the world, as well as for relations between member states left in a union without the United Kingdom.

The UK would need the other 27 EU member states to agree to a renegotiated relationship, so it is crucial to understand other countries’ debates on Britain’s plans in order to assess the likelihood that David Cameron can secure his goal. To date there has been little to no attempt to bring together discussion or analysis of what a UK withdrawal or renegotiated relationship would mean for other countries in and beyond the European Union.

This project therefore shifts the perspective of the debate by asking colleagues from think tanks, research institutions, and universities across Europe and beyond how the UK’s current policies toward the EU are being discussed in their country. Over the next half a year we will be publishing several overviews each month on IP Journal.

Contributors have been asked to provide a short overview of the discussions and opinions in their country. For those states within the EU, suggested questions to guide their work include:

1. What debate has there been about the UK’s relations with the EU? What role is Britain seen as having played in the EU?
2. What official government statements and other political opinions have been voiced about the possibility of the UK seeking a renegotiated relationship with the EU?
3. What is the attitude of the general public toward the UK and its relations with the EU? Are there any opinion polls or other measures of public opinion that provide data on this?
4. What are the views of British aims to reform the EU and how to manage relations between the eurozone and the rest of the EU?
5. What impact would a UK withdrawal from the EU have on your state and its relations with the UK?
6. What approach would your state like to see the UK take toward the EU?

For states outside the EU such as the United States and China the questions were slightly adapted:

1. What debate has there been in your country about the UK’s relations with the EU? What role is Britain seen as having played in the EU?
2. What views are their of British aims to reform the EU and how relations between the eurozone and the rest of the EU be managed?
3. What impact would a UK withdrawal from the EU have on your state’s relations with the UK?
4. What impact would Britain's withdrawal have on your state’s relations with the rest of the EU?
5. What approach would your state like to see the UK take toward the EU?

We hope this project will shed light on the so far largely overlooked angles of Britain’s future relationship with the EU, and inspire some new thoughts in London and other capitals on the implications of a British withdrawal from the European Union. With this we also aim to contribute to the wider reform debate about the European Union, including the question of differentiated integration between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of the eurozone.

Piece for LSE EUROPP blog

London and Berlin are not speaking the same language when it comes to EU reform.

The UK and Germany have both expressed a desire to reform the way the EU functions. Almut Möller and Tim Oliver argue that due to their contrasting constitutional traditions and outlooks, the two countries risk misunderstanding or antagonising one another. They point out that the German discussion around EU competences is part of a country-wide debate on federalism, while the UK’s proposition of a competences review is informed by the ideas of Parliamentary sovereignty and the repatriation of power.

In his January speech on Europe, David Cameron committed a future Conservative government to renegotiating the relationship between Britain and the EU. This new relationship would then be put to the British people in an ‘in-out’ referendum. Seeking allies in their efforts to change the EU, and thus keep Britain in, Cameron along with many others in the UK have set their sights on Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel. 

They hope that the need for reform in the Eurozone will open the way for a review of EU competences and repatriation of powers. These hopes have been heightened by occasional comments about the need for reforms in the EU from German politicians. However, Britain risks missing the point that German debates about EU competences are shaped by a political and constitutional outlook that is in sharp contrast to that of the UK.

First, German debates about Europe have always been framed in a way that reflects what Germany feels is good for Europe, not just Germany. Although the country is becoming more at ease with the notion of self-interest, British unilateralism and national self-interest sit uneasily with this approach. Second, the UK should not think it can use German debates on EU reforms for domestic purposes. Tactically speaking, it might be useful to point out to the UK public that London is not alone in its reform agenda. However, if taken too far this might be seen as London trying to manipulate Berlin, and could potentially annoy Germany. Finally, Britain’s efforts could tempt Germany to stress that the UK alone cannot lead this debate. The UK must connect its agenda to wider European and national debates about competences and needs to regain credibility from a continental perspective.

To understand this situation better, Britain and Germany should remind themselves of their contrasting constitutional histories and cultures. Germany’s thinking on EU competences is part of a domestic debate about federalism. The patchwork of kingdoms, dukedoms and principalities that made up Germany until 1871, still exist today in the form of sixteen Bundesländer (federal states). While the constitution might be clear about the distribution of power between the central government and the federal states, in reality, the demarcation of competences is not so clear-cut. Over the past ten years two major commissions have been convened on the reform of the German federal system, and it looks like a third one is on the way.

This debate extends to the EU. The commitment of successive federal governments to hand over powers to the EU led the Bundesländer to push for constitutional rights in the early 1990s. Germany’s powerful constitutional court has regularly chastised the federal government for going beyond its powers in these matters.

To this we must add memories of 1933-45 and the Western Allies’ subsequent insistence on strong regional government to constrain central government, as well as Germany’s later determination to see itself integrated into the EU. Germany’s views on what the EU should and should not do emerge from this historical background. The Bundesländer has been at the forefront of debates about competences in the EU and have managed to incorporate exclusive, shared, supporting, supplementing and coordinating competences into the EU’s legal order categories in the Lisbon Treaty, similar to those found in the German constitution.

In contrast, the UK’s debates about federalism and EU competences are not well-developed; they are often muddled, and almost entirely focused on the UK. British politics remains dominated by the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty, with all power retained by Westminster. Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, along with the recreation of a Greater London Assembly, might have started a process of turning the UK into a federal system. Yet, devolution implies powers can also be taken back or suspended, as they have been on occasion in Northern Ireland, when the peace process has faltered. The majority of the UK continues to be governed by one of the most centralised systems in Europe. For Westminster, powers and competences are not shared, they are either centralised or devolved. For Westminster, competences held by the EU are seen in a similar way as powers in devolved government: they are given, not shared, and can be taken back by Westminster.

So, it was no surprise that when the UK government announced it would conduct a ‘Balance of Competences Review’ to examine the role of the EU in British life and whether that balance needs to be redressed, Germany declined to participate. Berlin sensed the review was driven more by Westminster’s self-interest, than a desire to reform for the good of Europe. Cameron has since changed his approach and now talks of EU-wide subsidiarity and democracy, rather than unilateral repatriation. This moves some way towards ‘talking the talk’ of the Germans on the balance of competences, but Germany remains wary. After the difficult ratification of the last round of the Lisbon Treaty, there is little appetite for far-reaching reforms. Ironically, Germany has become more pragmatic with regard to treaty reform, while the British agenda is becoming more ambitious, and even ideological.

British misunderstanding of Germany’s approach surfaced again during the recent German federal elections. Angela Merkel mentioned the possibility that reforms to the Eurozone might lead to a review of the balance of EU competences and did not rule out the transfer of competences back to member states. However, Merkel was speaking in a federal election campaign and in a parallel election campaign in Bavaria, a region crucial for her party. Bavaria is noted for guarding against Berlin handing powers to Brussels. To German ears, Merkel’s comment was yet another contribution to the federalism debate. For British commentators, it was misinterpreted as a major concession to Cameron.

Finally, from Germany’s perspective, Westminster’s obsession with the EU might seem strange when the possibility of a UK break-up has become more real now than ever before. Instead of obsessing about EU competences, Westminster might like to pay more attention to rebalancing the competences within the UK and moving towards a more federal system. A federal United Kingdom and a federal Germany might then be able to better understand each other’s views on reform of the European Union.

Piece for E!Sharp on a Brexit

Is the EU asleep as Britain sleepwalks out of the EU?

http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/151-is-the-eu-asleep-as-britain-sleepwalks-out-of-the-eu/

There is no shortage of analysis into what it would mean for Britain to quit the EU. But what it would mean for the EU is less than clear, something I discovered while researching the potential impact of a UK exit on the EU. The UK might be characterised as an awkward or unwilling partner, one that has delayed European integration, but it has also brought much to the EU, something largely unbeknown to its own people let alone to the rest of the EU. Whether for better or worse, losing Britain would hardly be an insignificant moment for the EU’s development. Ed Miliband, leader of the UK’s Labour Party, warned that despite the British debate, Britain risks ‘sleepwalking out of the EU’. But with debate elsewhere in the EU so limited, is the EU also asleep?

To some in the EU discussing the idea of a member state leaving is a taboo. The inclusion in the EU’s treaties of a withdrawal clause setting out how a member state might withdraw was itself resisted by some who saw it as a challenge to the founding aim of the EU creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ The idea Britain might break with this, or as Prime Minister David Cameron suggested, stay in the EU but drop the commitment to ‘ever closer union,’ is a direct challenge to that aim.

Losing a member state opens a Pandora’s Box of potential problems. Nobody is too sure how the withdrawal clause would work. The EU would have to draw up negotiating red-lines and in facing the UK hold its nerve in negotiating with a state with which it has mutually deep economic and political relations it would not want to endanger, but one it would not want to be held to ransom over either.

The remaining EU would also have to change. Institutions, budgets and policies would be open to reform. Smaller states may gain over larger states. North and West could lose out to South and East. Instead of facing the Atlantic the EU would face more towards the Mediterranean. Germany’s central position could be further enhanced. Europe could succumb to more protectionist thinking. The position of Ireland would need to be thought about. A withdrawal might connect with growing Euroscepticism elsewhere unleashing centrifugal forces unravelling the EU, especially if the Euro faced another period of crisis. It would change relations with the rest of non-EU Europe such as Norway or Turkey. Relations with the U.S. could change, as might NATO. Or perhaps a UK withdrawal will have only a limited impact on the EU’s internal dynamics, if anything freeing it of an awkward partner, making it easier to move towards ‘ever closer union’.

The rest of the EU might be forgiven for thinking this is a recurring bad dream from which it regularly awakes to find all is well. Britain has long bemoaned its EU membership. Cameron’s commitment to a referendum echoes the successful, if ultimately insignificant, renegotiation followed by an in-out referendum in 1975. It remains open to speculation whether another referendum will even happen. Instead it might appear better for the EU to wait it out and call Britain’s bluff by remaining silent.

Ignoring British demands certainly appeals to those who see Cameron’s approach as nothing short of trying to blackmail the rest of the EU. Cameron’s demand for a renegotiated relationship or Britain will likely vote to leave, rests on the idea the EU cannot say no because letting Britain go would hurt the EU. The potential disruption and damage to the EU is not something to be overlooked. But from the perspective of the rest of the EU the loss of the UK would probably not be lethal to European integration. Instead it is the UK who would suffer more. It’s as if Britain is threatening to shoot the EU in the foot while aiming the gun at its own head. Refusing to discuss a Brexit therefore stems in part from a view of Cameron’s strategy as self-defeating, illogical and just plain bonkers.

More than anything the eurozone crisis poses a far greater threat. This is especially so for Germany, the country that more than any other will make the final call on relations with the UK. If anything, Britain’s attempts to try and separate itself from the eurozone crisis has provoked feelings of anger at Britain’s latest show of non-solidarity, with some feeling the loss of the UK might be necessary collateral damage for saving the euro. What this collateral damage would be, however, remains unclear.

It may be that privately parts of the EU have concluded that any renegotiation is doomed because what the EU can offer and what Britain will demand are destined to be too far apart, making a withdrawal inevitable. If so then the only strategy seems to be to remain silent and hope for the best. But this still begs the question of what the EU will look like if the UK does leave.

Book review of Zhiqun Zhu's 'New Dynamics in East Asian Politics: Security, Political Economy and Society'

Will appear in Political Studies Review, Volume 13 of the Journal, Issue 1, January 2015, available via Wiley Online Library. 

Zhiqun Zhu (2012) New Dynamics in East Asian Politics: Security, Political Economy and Society. London: Continuum. 337pp, £19.99 (p/b), ISBN 978 1 4411 6621 0

This wide ranging book works well as an introduction to studying the contemporary politics of East Asia. Focused on China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas, the book’s interdisciplinary approach leads it to being neatly divided into three sections covering security and foreign policy, new political economy, and changing societies. As Zhu explains in the introduction, the aim of the book is to avoid a traditional approach of writing about government, institutions and processes. This is born out in the largely well-written and researched chapters which cover a wealth of topics including the media, gender, national identity and nationalism, student politics, the film industry, local politics, the changing nature of anti-Americanism, environmental issues, security and foreign policy, welfare, and political economy. Throughout the book the coverage ranges from the international and wider-regional perspective through to the national and local. The chapters use a range of theoretical approaches and research models. Each chapter draws on a good selection of sources, with the end of each chapter including further readings and useful questions for on-going discussion.

The book faces four problems, all of which it largely overcomes. First, tying together such a wide range of topics was never going to be easy. But the book manages this by allowing the reader an insight into how this area of the world is coping with globalisation, changes in technology, shifts in power, and the political expectations and outlooks of the peoples of the region. Second, it provides a balanced approach in its coverage of the five states, although clearly due to its size China receives the most attention. The USA is ever-present, understandable given its role as a major East Asian power. However, its use as the main point of reference when making comparisons meant other areas of the world such as South East Asia, Europe or the Middle East received few mentions. Third, the book successfully resists the temptation to focus solely on international relations and security, instead drawing out the incredible economic and social transformations. But it provides a good analysis of the military and political tensions that could undermine these transformations, but which are also being driven by them in part. Finally, the book’s aim to discuss contemporary developments means some chapters will date very quickly, although the overall analysis of the book will remain of interest for many years.