The Five Routes to a Brexit: how the UK might leave the EU

A piece for the LSE's EUROPP Blog.

Given the dispute over the new President of the European Commission, and UKIP’s success in the European Parliament elections, the UK’s EU membership is likely to be a key issue in the campaign for the 2015 UK general election. Tim Oliver writes that while a great deal has been written on whether the UK will leave the EU, less attention has been paid to how a ‘Brexit’ might occur in practice. He assesses five ways in which the UK might leave the European Union, noting that even if the country were to give up its membership there would still be a number of unresolved questions as to the kind of UK-EU relationship which could emerge.

How Britain might withdraw from the EU is an often overlooked question in comparison to the broader topic of whether it will ever decide to do so. With the Conservative Party, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and UKIP all committed – in differing ways – to holding an in-out referendum at some point, it might be assumed that this is the way Britain will leave. But the referendum route is in fact one of five ways a ‘Brexit’ might happen.

Each of the five ways available varies in practicality. Some are little more than academic and legal exercises that stand little chance of survival in the real world. Nevertheless, they are worth thinking about as they provide an overview of what options are open to Britain and the EU. They raise questions about what ‘out’ means. They also shed light on where the UK-EU relationship could end up. We must not forget that a Brexit is a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is debatable whether or not a Brexit can deliver the end of settling the Europe question in British politics or the British question in European politics.

1. The big bang: a referendum supporting withdrawal triggers Article 50 TEU

The most widely anticipated route by which Britain could leave the EU is via a nation-wide referendum where the result supports withdrawal. This could happen in several ways. A government could implement a manifesto commitment to holding a referendum. How this happens will depend on the party in government. David Cameron has committed the Conservative Party to holding an in-out referendum after an attempted renegotiation of Britain’s membership.

It could also occur thanks to a treaty change in the EU or a significant transfer of powers. This would trigger the current 2011 European Act requiring a referendum in the event of such a change. This is also the situation for which the Lib Dems and Labour have promised to hold an in-out referendum. Finally, a referendum could be caused by the House of Commons voting through a private members bill requiring a referendum. Whatever causes a referendum, the campaign, vote and result will be a spectacular political moment – a ‘big bang’ – in the history of Britain and the EU. Whether or not it will settle the Europe question in British politics is another matter.

A result supporting withdrawal would likely lead HM Government to trigger Article 50 TEU. The British Prime Minister would submit to the European Council written notice of Britain’s intention to negotiate a withdrawal. Article 50 sets out how the EU is to handle the withdrawal of a member state. It sets a timeframe of two years for negotiations. The Commission would recommend a lead negotiator for the EU that is then approved by the Council. Negotiations would cover both the withdrawal of Britain, and the framework for a new post-withdrawal EU-UK relationship. Separate negotiations would also need to take place within the remaining EU to change it to reflect the withdrawal of Britain.

The final deal offered to Britain would be subject to the approval of the European Parliament followed by the European Council acting by qualified majority vote. It will therefore be a deal that has to suit the EU, not just the UK. The European Parliament, Council, or even British Government or Parliament could reject the deal. In such an event an extension to the negotiations may become necessary, but this can only be agreed upon with the unanimous agreement of Britain and the rest of the EU.

2. The big leap: a unilateral decision by a British government to withdraw

A British government could declare it intends to withdraw from the EU without seeking the approval of the British people through a referendum and without negotiating a withdrawal with the rest of the EU. The first step to achieving this would be a vote by the House of Commons to repeal the 1973 European Communities Act that took Britain into the then EEC. Under international law there is nothing – in theory – to stop Britain, or any other member state, unilaterally withdrawing from an organisation such as the EU. And under the uncodified British constitution, the sovereignty of parliament means the executive does not need to seek the approval of the British people through a referendum.

Even if the British government did secure approval through a referendum and the big bang scenario was then played out, Britain would not necessarily need to resort to Article 50 and negotiate with the EU because under international law it has the right to withdraw anyway. It was the existence of this right that led to objections to the introduction of Article 50 TEU during the 2001-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe. For supporters of Article 50 its existence provides a degree of order for what would be an unprecedented event. But Article 50 only compels the EU to seek a negotiation with the withdrawing member state. It cannot require Britain, or any withdrawing member state, to reciprocate.

This, however, is a largely academic exercise. Ignoring Article 50 would be a big leap into the unknown. A refusal to follow the procedures set down, or to leave with only a vote of the House of Commons and thus without a referendum, would produce considerable political, legal and economic uncertainty in both Britain and Europe. This option may then be plausible in theory, but reality dictates that a referendum would be necessary and that negotiations would need to take place to create ‘a proper treaty framework, regulating the time frame and details of the divorce.’

3. The big kick: the EU expels Britain

A unilateral decision by a British government to withdraw from the EU might seem difficult, but is less so than the third option of the EU expelling Britain. Should Britain’s behaviour and demands become so unacceptable to the EU then the other member states and EU institutions could try to find a way to kick Britain out. This is the least likely scenario because of the legal and political problems this would present to the EU. The EU’s treaties contain no provision for the expulsion of a member. Even suspension is difficult, the EU having available to it through Article 7(2) and (3) TEU only limited options to suspend certain membership rights of a member state. These steps are also intended to encourage the errant member state to correct its behaviour rather than as a first step towards banishing it.

Any attempt to expel Britain would require unanimous agreement by the rest of the EU, no easy feat in itself. It would lead not only to the British government seeking to annul such a decision, but private individuals, companies and organisations – from Britain, the rest of the EU and elsewhere – could also take legal action against the EU. Expulsion would also add to the animosity between Britain and the EU. Relations within the EU could also be strained, with some states fearing they may be next.

4. The big freeze: a passive expulsion from the EU

Rather than confronting Britain head on with a deliberate attempt to expel it, there is the possibility the EU may get rid of Britain through a passive expulsion. The same antagonistic behaviour by Britain that could provoke a big kick could instead lead – and in some cases already has led – to some in the EU reciprocating with cold indifference, further weakening relations. Just as confrontation with an unwanted and unhappy guest can be avoided by making them feel so uncomfortable that they leave of their own accord, so too might the rest of the EU feel it would be easier to make things so uncomfortable that Britain leaves the EU of its own accord.

By itself this ‘big freeze’ approach would not get rid of Britain. It would instead lead to Britain going down the route of a ‘big bang’ or ‘big leap’. Alternatively, instead of isolating and ignoring Britain, the rest of the EU may opt to discuss openly with Britain the possibility that it may be better for all concerned if it took the route of a ‘big leap’ or ‘big bang’. The problem here is that the UK has been isolated in the past and hung on.

5. The big divide: the rest of the EU leaves Britain behind

It may come to pass that the way Britain leaves the EU is not through a referendum, a unilateral decision to withdraw, or a direct or passive expulsion. Instead a Brexit may happen through a slower and gradual process of changes to the EU whereby Britain does not leave the EU, but the EU leaves Britain behind. Developments here will revolve around the evolution of the Eurozone. If these contribute further to the emergence of a two-speed or multispeed EU then Britain could find itself increasingly isolated and locked out of key decision making forums. As such Britain would find itself outside the EU thanks to moves by the rest of the EU to create new institutions from which Britain is excluded.

The British government has taken steps to try to prevent the emergence of any such inner-EU within a wider-EU. But David Cameron’s veto of the fiscal compact in December 2011 showed that if necessary the rest of the EU would go around Britain to set up arrangements separate to the EU and thus beyond Britain’s reach. This is not what the rest of the EU wanted to do. Some states, especially non-Eurozone members such as Sweden and Poland, remain fearful that they too will be cut out. But compared to Britain, they continue to display a commitment to the EU that is not often found in the UK.

A continued failure by the EU and Britain to reach agreement over the future direction of the EU may lead the rest of the EU – Eurozone and other non-Eurozone members – to conclude that further such developments will be necessary to create a divide that excludes Britain. It is, of course, debatable whether or not the rest of the EU could ever create an entirely new organisation that leaves Britain in a defunct, redundant outer tier. But the possibility remains one that we should not overlook given the difficulties of expulsion and the possibility Britain may not withdraw, and that even if the British electorate were to vote to remain in the EU, the country is likely to remain an awkward partner.

The Bigger Picture

Thinking about how a Brexit may happen reminds us of three important facts about UK-EU relations. First, there is no neat and simple way in which Britain could leave the EU. All five options present a myriad of legal, political and other difficulties for Britain and the EU. The withdrawal of a member state from the EU is an unprecedented event, and one which would be difficult not only for Britain but also for the EU.

Second, whether a referendum sanctions withdrawal or the EU somehow expels Britain or isolates it, neither Britain nor the EU will be able to completely ignore the other. Britain will remain a major European power, with Britain’s population expected to overtake Germany’s in the next 20-30 years. Similarly, unless there is some catastrophic failing of the Eurozone and disintegration of the Union, the EU will remain Europe’s predominant political organisation. Brussels will be the lodestar for much of European politics, economics and security (if not perhaps military security). It is where Britain will spend a large amount of its time looking towards.

This all begs the question then of what ‘out’ means. As noted at the start, a Brexit is a means to an end and not an end in itself. For each of the above scenarios, ‘out’ is a difficult concept. A referendum or unilateral declaration of withdrawal cannot compel the EU to give the UK what it wants beyond an official withdrawal. What ‘out’ the UK then secures will be shaped by what the rest of the EU and other powers such as the United States are willing to grant it in terms of new or recalibrated political and economic relations. Similarly, expulsion or exclusion would not solve the longer-term problem for the EU of how to deal with Britain.

A ‘Brexit’ would have important implications at the European and international levels

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy blog and EUROPP blog: 

The implications of a ‘Brexit’ for the UK has been endlessly discussed, but its implications for the EU and other international powers has hardly been considered. Tim Oliver explores the complex set of possibilities and implications at the European and international level that both the UK and EU need to keep in mind as they move forward.

UKIP’s success in the recent European Parliament elections has once again raised questions about whether Britain is headed towards an EU exit, AKA ‘a Brexit’. The likelihood of this happening remains open to debate. But the debate is focused almost entirely on what such a move could mean for Britain. In contrast, with only a few exceptions, the implications for the EU and wider international relations are given next to no thought. Ed Miliband’s warning that Britain risks sleepwalking towards an EU exit should be heeded by the rest of the EU who appear to be asleep to what it could mean for them. The same might be said for other powers such as the USA. A British exit will change the EU and European integration with implications for the UK, transatlantic relations and the West.

An EU without the UK could go a number of ways. When added to the Eurozone’s problems, a Brexit could tip the EU towards being a more inward-looking, less Atlantic focused union shaped more by the outlook of smaller states and whose centre of power has moved eastwards. Alternatively it could strengthen the position of Germany. Or, more neatly aligned with the Eurozone and rid of its most awkward member, the EU could tip towards a United States of Europe. While some other states may contemplate following the UK, hoping a Brexit will reveal the EU to be a house of cards that comes crashing down as soon as the British leave will likely only prove true if a Brexit combines with wider problems in the EU to trigger a crisis in Germany, the EU’s heart. While Britain has contributed much to the EU, it alone has not held the EU back, caused all its problems or held it together.

Even if, as seems likely, quitting the EU damages the UK’s standing, a Britain outside the EU will remain a major European power. It will be one of the EU’s biggest trading and political relationships. By the 2040s it will have overtaken Germany as the most populous country in Europe. Britain will therefore not disappear from EU politics, just as it is nonsense to think a vote to leave the EU means the EU disappears from British politics. From the outside London may well attempt to use its new position to change or redraw Europe’s regional politics, moving arrangements away from the politically driven European Union towards a more traditional state based trading system with NATO (read USA) as the security provider. Whether a Brexit can redraw the regional politics of Europe will depend in large part on how the UK copes outside the EU and how the EU copes without it.

A Brexit offers the EU and Europe some possible positive opportunities. A new arrangement with the UK on the outside could offer ways forward in relations with Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Switzerland, or even Ukraine; states that may never join the EU but with whom the EU will always have – or seek – a close relationship. However, the UK and/or the EU may be unwilling to extend any UK-EU model to these other states, and those states may themselves reject such an offer preferring their own individually tailored models instead.

Despite what some in the UK may hope, any new UK-EU relationship will depend largely on what the remaining EU (including the European Parliament) is prepared to grant it. The UK will be the junior partner, despite the UK’s significant trading and political relations with the EU. And what the EU will agree to depends in large part on what type of EU emerges as the British depart and what it decides is in its best interests. A more protectionist inward looking EU, or one that worries about the possible appeal of a UK outside the EU, may be in no mood to grant the UK a good deal. Alternatively, an EU that feels more confident and united could simply expect the UK to fall in line with whatever is offered.

A wider view of a Brexit would also be taken by powers outside Europe. For countries such as China,Australia, New Zealand or Canada, the EU is better off with the UK inside it. But a Brexit will not make them give up on the rest of the EU, a multilateral relationship that is collectively more important than their bilateral relationship with the UK. Even for Washington, a Brexit would not simply be about what it would mean for UK-US relations. The larger US-European relationship, while more brittle than the smaller but deeper UK-US one, is cumulatively of greater strategic significance to Washington. If the exit of one of Europe’s leading international and military powers further complicated European cooperation on foreign, security and defence – long sought by the USA – then it could further weaken efforts to strengthen the European side of NATO. This would exacerbate US frustrations about Europe that developments in Ukraine have once again exposed and deepened.

And the future of transatlantic relations rests on more than just NATO. Any attempt by the UK to secure a UK-US free trade deal would be a poor substitute for a much larger, and globally significant, US-EU trade pact. With the UK already heavily linked to the US, an EU exit would likely lock it in even more, leaving it able only to offer up the military assets it still has in hopes of retaining influence over US decision making. Meanwhile other allies in Europe would grow in importance for the USA. The UK would be stuck, unable to do anything such as pivot to Asia, but with its primary political, security and defence concerns still concentrated in its regional home of Europe and the North Atlantic, but where it has spurned and risked locking itself out of the predominant political, economic, security – if not traditional defence – organisation of Europe. It would be a losing scenario for all concerned.

It is this complex set of possibilities and implications at the European and international level that both the UK and EU need to keep in mind as they move forward. For the EU and its member states it will be the implications for their national interests and the wider implications for Europe as a whole that will shape any decision as to whether – to borrow from President Lyndon Johnson – it is better to have the UK inside the EU tent pissing out, or outside the tent pissing in. For the UK, focusing on what is the best or worst exit deal or renegotiated relationship for Britain overlooks that this is more a question of what is good or bad for the rest of Europe. And that is not a question the British alone can answer.

London bucks the UKIP surge and appears headed in a direction far removed from the rest of the UK

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog.

It should come as no surprise that UKIP failed to make significant gains in London during the recent European and local elections. A global and European city that benefits immensely from how the UK is currently run and which is home to the UK’s largest non-British population was never going to be fertile territory for a party campaigning on an anti-immigration, anti-Europe and anti-London ticket. The results highlight that Britain’s capital city is growing into a more distinct political space in the UK, writes Tim Oliver.

The local and European election results provided UKIP with a series of spectacular gains across the UK. Coming first in the UK’s elections to the European Parliament meant they became the first party since the start of the twentieth century to secure first place in a UK-wide election ahead of the Conservatives, Labour or Liberals. The party even secured its first MEP in Scotland, a part of the UK often (if not entirely accurately) seen as more pro-European.

But UKIP’s achievements – especially in the local election results that took place on the same day across certain areas of England and Wales – were dampened by the party’s inability to make a breakthrough in London. Securing only ten councillors across London played a part in lowering UKIP’s overall projected national share of the vote to 17% (on a turnout UK-wide of about 34%), less than the 23% from local elections in 2013. UKIP’s one London MEP was elected on a 6.10% increase in votes, but with 16.87% of London’s votes this was UKIP’s second lowest regional result and increase in support after their result inScotland. The party that succeeded in London was Labour. As I argued in March, London has long been difficult terrain for UKIP with polling showing Londoners to be amongst the least Eurosceptic in the UK.

Many point to London’s large international and immigrant population as the reason for Londoners not backing UKIP and its policies on immigration. Approximately 36.7% of London’s population (according to the 2011 census) was born outside the UK. About 10.3% come from elsewhere in the EU, with a larger proportion coming from areas such as South Asia. London’s white-British population remains the largest single group of residents, but is now around 45% of the city’s population. As home to the UK’s largest ethnic minority communities, Londoners have long grappled with the politics of immigration and racial politics. UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage might have felt awkward at hearing no English spoken on a train journey into central London, but for most Londoners hearing a multitude of other languages spoken is an everyday experience. London’s constantly changing population also makes putting down roots unnecessary. As Tony Travers argues, ‘The word Londoner is an entirely inclusive concept’. For Tessa Jowell, Labour MP for Dulwich and West Norwood and former Minister for London, ‘These [2014 election] results show London as an open, tolerant and diverse city’. Survey data confirms Londoners are less racist than people elsewhere in the UK.

As an explanation this can only go so far. As Tim Stanley has pointed out, London is not exactly immune from racial problems having seen major riots caused in part by racial tensions and the Metropolitan Police continues to face allegations of institutional racism. Londoners are also more than aware that the city’s insanely high property prices are in part thanks to an influx of rich foreign residents. London also showed something of a divided response with support for UKIP being found in London’s outer areas such as Havering and Bexley.

London’s population also gives it a unique identity which causes some problems and opportunities for UKIP. The 2011 census showed that more Londoners (about 31%) identify themselves as British than in any other region of Great Britain. This should not be a surprise given London is home to British institutions such as the monarchy, the BBC or the British Museum. Black and ethnic minority groups are also more likely to identify with being British than English, and they constitute a large proportion of London’s population. So why did the party that labels itself with ‘UK’ struggle with voters who more closely identify themselves with being British? Research by the IPPRinto English identity found that people who identify themselves as British tend to be less Eurosceptic than those who identify themselves as English. As Ben Wellings has argued: ‘Euroscepticism is the most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that provides the political content for English nationalism’. At the same time we must not overlook that 37% of Londoners identified themselves as English, and Scotland also elected its first UKIP MEP. UKIP then can secure support across the UK and identities, but the low results in both London and Scotland reminds us that it remains in large part a party driven by an emerging – or changing – English nationalism.

London’s British identity sits with its international one. A large part of the material wealth of London is tied to the economic vibrancy of the European market as part of wider transatlantic and global markets. Britain might not be in the Euro, but that does not stop London handling more euro foreign-exchanges than the Eurozone combined. Nor does it stop London being the headquarters of one hundred of Europe’s top 500 companies. Companies such as Goldman Sachs and the Lord Mayor of London have warned of the cost to London and the UK of an exit from the EU. As the BBC’s Economics editor Robert Preston argues: ‘Much of the rest of the UK sees globalisation and its manifestations – such as immigration – as disempowering, impoverishing and a threat. Whereas for Londoners, globalisation is an economic competition they are apparently winning’.

London also wins from a political setup and relationship with both the UK and the EU that works well for it. Its mayor, assembly, the organisations that represent the ‘City of London’ such as its Lord Mayor, its numerous councils and groups, MPs, MEPs and Lords, and its intimate connections with British government in Whitehall, Royal Court in St James’s, and the UK Parliament and Supreme Court in Westminster give it a combined political voice far greater than anywhere else in the UK. The British media are also based largely in London. As a result the EU and UK Government do not appear as remote and uncontrollable as they might in other areas of the UK. There could be no clearer example than David Cameron wielding the UK’s EU veto to defend the interests of financial institutions based largely in London. As Mayor of London, former Conservative MP Boris Johnson has rarely held back from attacking the EU, perhaps better capturing any unease amongst Londoners about the EU than UKIP have been able to. Londoners might be less Eurosceptic than people elsewhere in the UK, but that level of support is hardly overwhelming and could decline should the EU-City of London relationship break down.

London’s privileged position, population and identity has not passed unnoticed. UKIP’s own campaign was in part ‘anti-London’. ‘London’ has become a by-word for something that is distant, strange and out of control, similar to Brussels across the EU or Washington D.C. in the US. While London has long been a place slightly apart from the rest of Britain, today people across the UK, and especially England, increasingly view London as a place far removed from the country they feel they inhabit. Suzanne Evans, a former Conservative councillor for Merton who defected to UKIP but lost her seat in the recent local elections, blamed UKIP’s poor performance in London on its young, educated, cultured, media-savvy population that can’t understand the heartache felt by the rest of the country. This might have been picked over for her insinuation that UKIP supporters elsewhere are old, not educated (to a certain extent Londoners are indeed younger and on average better qualified) or cultured and that the ‘media-savvy’ were somehow duped by media criticism of UKIP. But her warning that London is becoming a place apart from the rest of the UK has been echoed elsewhere.

It is easy to see why London appears headed in a direction far removed from the rest of the UK. We should not be surprised that London is developing as a more distinct political space – and one seeking more autonomy – in a way similar in some respects to that witnessed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Some developments in London have gone further than in other areas of the UK and are likely to continue spreading across England and the rest of the UK. By 2050 a third of Britain’s population could be from black and ethnic minority groups, UK central government is coming under increased pressure to cede powers to areas such as Scotland and within England, Britain’s various identities are in flux, and the EU and globalisation will remain realities London, England and the rest of the UK cannot run away from.

This presents a series of dilemmas for UK government and British politics. In order to avoid London moving too quickly ahead of the rest of the UK, the UK government will come under increased pressure to more fairly distribute the economic gains from the EU and globalisation that are currently accruing mostly to London. It will need to do so while tackling unease about immigration and population change, while also allowing less centralised control so decisions on such matters can be taken at a more local, city or regional level. Such decentralisation may offer a way for Labour, Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to better manage their appeal to both metropolitan voters and more traditional backers elsewhere. UKIP’s support elsewhere in the UK serves as a reminder that while London matters because of its size, economic and political power and because it is something of a sign of the Britain to come, focusing on the capital city will not be enough to win elections and manage the whole UK.

If Scotland leaves the UK, will England leave the EU?

A recent piece for E!Sharp on the forthcoming Scottish referendum. 

If Scotland leaves the UK, will England leavethe EU?

Recent debates about the future of Scotland’s place in the UK and the UK’s future in the EU have highlighted the less sceptical view the Scots take of EU membership. As the FT’s Philip Stephens warned: ‘If Britain leaves Europe, Scotland leaves Britain.’ So what happens if in September’s referendum on Scottish independence the Scots vote to leave the UK? Would a Scottish exit make the remaining peoples of the UK – and by this the focus will be largely on the English – think twice about exiting the EU, or embolden them to push ahead?

While we should not resign ourselves to the idea the UK is destined to leave, the loss of Scotland would mean the loss of a section of the British population more likely to vote in favour of remaining within the EU. London and Wales are also highly likely to vote to stay in, and sometimes polling suggests other areas of England outside London might also support continued membership. However, these may be unable to tip the balance against an out vote, or change a largely one-sided debate that favours Euroscepticism. It is also worth remembering that even the Scottish, Londoners and Welsh are not overwhelmingly pro-European. Scotland itself has seen growing levels of Euroscepticism. Support for membership hovers between 53-61%, not far removed from the 58% level of support the Scots registered in the 1975 UK-wide referendum on membership of the then EEC. This was then the second lowest regional vote, below the UK average of 67%. Recent polling revealed only 4% of Scots want an independent Scotland to join the Euro. And the Scottish Government made clear in ‘Scotland’s Future: Your guide to an independent Scotland’ that in joining the EU an independent Scotland would seek to retain the UK’s opt-outs from the Euro, Schengen and some justice and home affairs legislation. They also aim to retain Scotland’s €354 million share of the British budgetary rebate that is deeply resented elsewhere in the EU. Salmond himself threatened the EU with retaliation on fisheries if Scotland struggled to secure EU membership. An independent Scotland might be keener to remain a member of the EU, take a less antagonistic line than the UK, and could set out to distance itself significantly from the UK’s Eurosceptic reputation. But it currently looks set to start out as a member that sits in the slow-lane of a multi-speed Europe. Nevertheless, remove Scotland from the numbers and the remaining UK tips further in favour of those who support getting out altogether.

Scotland’s decision could embolden those in England who believe a union with Europe can be broken just as easily, if not more so. Scotland and England have been bound together for over three hundred years. A shared crown and some religious, social, trading and military links go back much further. It is a union that has been bloodied by innumerable wars that have shaped the world, including one for shared survival still within the living memory of the oldest generation and recalled in memorials throughout the UK. The union has also been bound together by a shared politics, currency, economics, laws, welfare, social policies, language, and popular culture. These might have frayed and varied in application across the UK, but they are more substantial than those that bind the EU together. If the Scots are prepared to break such a union then expect English Eurosceptics to ask why England cannot be given a similar (and from their perspective, long overdue) say on whether to break a union with the EU that is only forty years old. That Scottish nationalists would have won a vote most polling had long said was unwinnable will further embolden English Eurosceptics. To this must be added growing levels of Euroscepticism throughout the EU that have added to feelings in Britain that a vote is necessary and a win possible. If Scotland finds it difficult to get into the EU then this will provoke a backlash in Scotland, the remaining UK and from across the EU. A Scottish vote to leave the UK should be a reminder that political arrangements that seem permanent can change, something the EU should not think itself exempt from.

A Scottish exit from the UK will also not settle internal political issues within the UK that help fuel Euroscepticism and support for parties such as UKIP. Imbalances and divisions between the UK’s different regions and nations have become increasingly contentious and play a part in Euroscepticism. Scotland’s exit would remove one of these areas, but not solve the problem. The issue of London would remain unsettled. Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, recently called London ‘the Dark Star,’ and Vince Cable, the UK’s Business Secretary, described it as a ‘giant suction machine draining the life out of the rest of the country.’ Without Scotland London will loom even larger over the remaining UK. Nor will it settle tensions over immigration. Take away Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with their beautiful if sparsely populated large areas such as the Scottish Highlands, and England becomes Europe’s most densely populated country, ahead of the Netherlands. England’s population of 53 million is growing, with the UK predicted to close with Germany by the middle of the century. In some areas of England there is a growing level of frustration and anger over immigration, crowded services, inadequate infrastructure, a perception that areas such as Scotland and London get preferential treatment, and a declining faith in the overall UK political system. As research by the IPPR into English nationalism found, the more English a person is the more Eurosceptic they are likely to be. The outcome, as Ben Wellings recently argued, is that: ‘Euroscepticism is the most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that provides the political content for English nationalism.’

It may be that the shock of losing the Scots and negotiating a new relationship with them could lead enough people in England to pause and reflect on whether an exit from the EU is a good idea. The complexity of a Scottish exit and Scotland’s continued interdependence with the remaining UK could reveal the limits of both Scottish sovereignty and the likely limits of English sovereignty outside the EU. Without Scotland the remaining UK would undergo another reduction in economic and military power prompting some reassessment of British-English power and national identity. This could serve as part of a larger critical juncture in England’s development, an event akin to the disaster of Suez. It would trigger a reappraisal of British-English identity and the country’s place in the world and Europe. The outcome could be a greater acceptance of the EU.

Such hopes have long been present in Britain’s debate about its relationship with the EU, and recent debates have shown no signs of this changing. At a time when a core part of the UK is preparing to vote on whether to leave the UK, some of Westminster’s political elite instead obsess about the EU as the greatest threat to the UK’s future. Europe has for too long been used as a source of resentment. Europe, Eurosceptics argue, holds Britain – or England – back. In Scotland this politics of resentment is directed at the UK or Westminster. With or without Scotland it will not be easy for some in England to give up this deceptively simple argument. And the Scots themselves may find they are indeed held back by England. A British exit from the EU deeply worries Ireland, heavily linked as it is to the UK. For Scotland, independent or not, there would similarly be no easy escape.

Liberal Democrats and the UK-US relationship

I thought I should upload a chapter I wrote with Ben Jones for a conference and publication on how allies of the USA view the US. This is from 2011, and what I've uploaded is one of the final drafts I have saved, so it's NOT for citation. Please email me to check if you'd like to reference it. Some of the ides at the start, particularly on the Lib Dem worldview, are quite hazy. I've been working on them since and further publications are to follow.

The chapter is on my page on academia.edu:

https://www.academia.edu/1513613/The_Liberal_Democrats_and_the_UK-US_Relationship 

Evidence to the House of Lords EU Sub-Committee C (External Relations) inquiry into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The written evidence I submitted with Dan Hamilton to the Lords EU Sub-Committee C's inquiry into TTIP can be found on pages 94-100 here.

The committee's full report will be published in due course.

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/TTIP/TTIPwrittenevidencevolumeFINAL.pdf

Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee's inquiry into Government Policy Towards the USA

Written evidence I submitted to the Commons FAC's inquiry into UK government policy towards the USA can be found here. I've also pasted the text below. The full report, which includes several references to my evidence, can be found here. 

Written evidence from Dr Tim Oliver (USA 13)

Fritz Thyssen TAPIR Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C.

A UK withdrawal from the EU: implications for the USA and transatlantic relations

Summary

• Britain’s relationship with the EU is often seen as one of the key benefits it can offer in the UK-US relationship. Despite talk of an ‘Asian pivot’, Europe – and increasingly the EU – remains crucial to US economic, security and political interests.
• The UK should never lose sight of the US-EU relationship and what British policy towards the EU could mean for this much larger transatlantic relationship.
• A British withdrawal from the EU could have significant implications for both the USA and the EU. The paper outlines the possible implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal, and what this could then mean for the USA’s relationships with the EU and UK.
• For the USA, a UK withdrawal from the EU could be a lose-lose scenario: reducing the geopolitical position of Britain, one of its closest allies; and changing the EU and Europe in ways which could be detrimental to US interests.
• UK policy towards the EU could also have implications for the wider transatlantic relationship. A breakdown in UK-EU relations could undermine or weaken the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This would be a loss to the UK’s long-standing policy of encouraging closer geopolitical relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. It would also be a loss to US efforts to engage the EU in a wider geopolitical relationship.

About the author

Tim Oliver is a Transatlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR). From 2012-2014 the fellowship will see him based at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin), the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (Washington D.C.), and the RAND Corporation (Washington D.C.). His fellowship is funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. He was educated at the University of Liverpool and later received his MSc and PhD from the London School of Economics. His PhD in international relations was taken under the supervision of Professor William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire). He has taught at the LSE, UCL and prior to his current fellowship spent several years as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Before Sandhurst he spent several years working in the Liberal Democrat Whips’ Office of the House of Lords. He has also worked in the European Parliament, Brussels. His current research includes a focus on the implications for the EU and USA of a UK withdrawal from the EU. The opinions expressed in this evidence are his own and should not be taken as reflecting those of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations or the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

Implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal

1. The House of Commons vote rejecting UK involvement in military action in Syria raised a range of concerns in the USA about British isolationism and retreat. Many of these concerns were wide of the mark. The UK-US relationship has endured many periods of crisis, some far more serious than the Syria vote. A vote to leave the EU would not cause an immediate crisis in relations with the USA. But it would change the nature of the UK-US relationship in the longer term.
2. Focusing on the implications for UK-US relations reveals only part of the problem for the USA. A British withdrawal would also change the EU, meaning the USA would have to adapt its relationship with Brussels and the other member states.Therefore to understand the implications for the USA of a British withdrawal, we need to examine how the EU could be changed, and what this could mean for the USA and transatlantic relations.
3. While there is a considerable amount of literature examining the implications for the UK of a withdrawal from the EU, the implications for the EU is a very under researched topic. The following analysis is drawn from research I undertook while writing the study ‘Europe Without Britain: Assessing the impact on the EU of a British withdrawal’, published in September 2013 by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).[1]
4. A UK withdrawal would have three sets of inter-connected implications for the EU:
5. First, the EU would have to spend time negotiating a withdrawal with the UK. The timeframe set out in Article 50 – the untested withdrawal clause of the EU’s treaties – is two years, possibly longer if both sides deem it necessary. There is a good chance the withdrawal negotiations will follow failed/rejected negotiations for an alternative relationship for the UK within the EU. These negotiations could have taken between 1-2 years. When added to wider changes in the EU – in particular a possible treaty change to deal with the Eurozone’s problems – the context within which a UK withdrawal could take place would be one of considerable institutional flux and naval-gazing by the EU.
6. Second, the EU’s institutions, voting systems, budgets and policies will need to change in order to fill the gap left by the UK. When these are combined with changes to the Eurozone, a British withdrawal could add to shifts in the EU’s balance of power. Numerous under-researched scenarios exist as to how the EU might change.
1. The most common concern found elsewhere in the EU – and in the USA – about a UK withdrawal is that it could make the EU more inward looking, pushing the EU towards protectionism and away from a more liberal economic order. It could also make the EU more inward looking on security issues. The union would look more towards the Mediterranean instead of the Atlantic. Smaller states could gain over large states. The Franco-German axis could be unsettled, leaving an even more dominant Germany. EU enlargement to states such as Turkey or Ukraine, something already suffering from ‘enlargement fatigue’, could grind to a halt in the face of unease amongst northern and western states at the EU’s centre shifting further south or eastwards. The implications for the Irish Republic would also have to be taken into account.
2. On the other hand, rid of what many in the EU consider a notoriously ‘awkward partner’ the Eurozone could become the undisputed core of the EU, pushing the EU further towards ‘ever closer union’. Future problems facing the Eurozone could be more easily and directly dealt with. Europe’s social model could be freed of British attempts to weaken it.  EU efforts at foreign, security and defence cooperation would lose an important partner. But while the UK is central to such efforts, it has also been central to limiting them. Its removal could act as a spur to EU action in these areas, especially if further political union emerged following the Eurozone crisis. The extent to which Britain slows the EU has been put into perspective by the Eurozone’s own struggles to find solidarity and leadership. Nevertheless, with the UK removed from the formal decision making process the EU would be free to develop in ways the UK would be unable to vote against or veto.
7. The third set of implications relate to the EU’s external relations: with the rest of non-EU Europe; with the wider world, including the USA; and the EU-UK relationship.
1. The wider political and economic framework of relations in Europe could be changed, with implications for the EU’s relations with states such as Norway and Switzerland. If the UK and other non-EU members thrived and the Eurozone continued to struggle, then Britain’s withdrawal could trigger centrifugal forces that lead other member states to question their membership, in turn unravelling the EU. However, this ‘domino theory’ has to be set against the likelihood of another domino effect within the EU should the UK secure a renegotiated relationship granting it special privileges. Other states could then demand concessions, creating a much feared ‘pick and mix’ approach to EU membership. At the same time, if the UK struggles outside the EU then the UK’s appeal would be limited, strengthening the EU’s position. A background concern here is the problems the EU’s enlargement policy has faced with states in central and Eastern Europe. If the UK’s decision appealed to far-right or far-left political parties in these states, then it could add to the problems faced in anchoring these states into a European mainstream.
2. The UK and EU will need to think about how the rest of the world might interpret a British withdrawal. Could it be taken as another sign of European division, disunity and weakness? It will mean there will still be no clear answer to “who speaks for Europe?” if the UK and other non-EU European states disagree with the EU. Europe could become more vulnerable to divide and rule by external powers, for example how might Russia interpret the move with regard to its approach to states in Eastern Europe? Would France come under more focused pressure to cede/share its permanent UNSC seat with the EU? Implications for the USA are discussed below.
3. Finally, Article 50 requires the EU to attempt to negotiate a post-withdrawal relationship with the withdrawing member. Unless some form of relationship were agreed allowing the UK a direct say in internal EU business (something the EU has strongly resisted with all other non-EU European states), then the UK would move from decision maker to a decision taker and decision shaper. Should the EU remain the predominant political and economic organisation in Europe, then the UK will need to pursue close relations with it. The UK is therefore highly likely to put great effort into shaping the EU’s policy agenda, both through lobbying efforts in Brussels, and through efforts directed at individual member states. While we should not overplay the UK’s potential to sow divide and rule to secure its ends, we should also not overestimate the EU’s ability to present a united front to the UK. The EU has struggled to present such a position in relations with the USA, Israel, Russia and others. With the UK, the EU would face a state containing a government, business community and civil society who would have over forty years of experience of EU politics, and a bigger interest in the EU than any other non-EU state.

Implications for US-European relations

8. The USA could face a lose-lose scenario from a British withdrawal from the EU. First, as discussed further below, from the perspective of the USA and other powers, the UK’s geopolitical significance would be significantly reduced. Second, the USA would also face an EU changed by the UK’s withdrawal, and changed in a way potentially detrimental to US interests.
9. There would no shortage of applicants to fill the position of claiming to be the USA’s closest ally within the EU. While such applicants might struggle to offer a relationship that could claim to be as ‘special’ as that with the UK, for the USA they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe, and the EU, being an area of the world in which it will retain considerable interests. As President Obama made clear in his state visit to the UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for global action in the world today. Should the UK absent itself from the predominant political and economic organisation in Europe, then it would be disengaging from a partner the USA increasingly looks towards working with.
10. The extra effort the US would put into these other relationships inside the EU, would in part stem from a desire to ensure the EU does not change to the detriment of US interests. This is not to argue the EU with the UK inside has always been congenial to US interests. Nor is it to argue that the UK is the only way the US can exert influence (the ‘American Trojan Horse’ theory). Nor is it to argue the EU must always align itself with US interests. But a British withdrawal could add to existing US worries about the EU’s development and capabilities, and how they will impact on the USA and the wider security environment in Europe and its near abroad.
11. A British withdrawal could add to US concerns that Europe lacks the political energy to think about the geostrategic implications of the rise of powers such as China and Brazil. These concerns have been fuelled in recent years by the EU’s focus on its internal problems such as the Eurozone crisis, or before this over the failure to adopt the EU constitution. The USA would not want to see further ‘naval-gazing’ brought on by a British withdrawal.
12. A British withdrawal could also add to a fear Europe will continue to free-ride on a US security guarantee, one primarily provided through NATO. The USA has shown clear frustration at Europe’s inability to deal with security issues in its near-abroad, for example in the Middle East and North Africa. Changes to the configuration of US defence capabilities mean the USA is likely to continue to try and shift some of the burden of dealing with issues in these areas towards Europe.
13. It would be wrong to assume a UK withdrawal from the EU would have no impact on NATO or not weaken it in anyway. The disappearance from the EU of one of its major military powers could further strain efforts at Europe-wide defence cooperation, whether through the EU or NATO. Nobody should cheer the failure of the EU, Europe’s dominant economic and political organisation, to facilitate improved cooperation on defence spending and business. If the EU continues to struggle in this, then Washington may well wonder what hope remains for Europe ever organising itself better on defence – whether through NATO or the EU. If, however, a UK withdrawal opened the way for the EU to organise better on defence, then the USA’s key military ally in the EU will have absented itself from this, necessitating stronger links between the USA and the developing EU defence capability.
14. For the foreseeable future the US will continue to work through NATO or through coalitions of the willing on key issues. But in the longer-term, the United States will likely need a stronger and more coherent European Union to advance commoninterests in the face of emerging powers. If the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership were successfully negotiated then the centre of gravity in transatlantic relations could shift further from NATO towards the US-EU relationship. From Washington’s perspective, having a pro-American UK in the EU enhances the prospects of the EU being a reliable American partner with whom it can defend and advance common interests.

Implications for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

15. TTIP has emerged as an important development for all sides in the Atlantic relationship. For the current British government TTIP offers numerous opportunities: it offers the chance to show the EU works for the UK by helping to secure the largest bilateral trade deal in history; it could advance the UK’s long-standing aim of binding the two sides of the Atlantic closer together; it could provide for all sides a much-needed geopolitical framework through which the two core parts of the West can approach the opportunities and challenges of emerging powers; and it could provide much needed export led growth for the UK. The UK plays a central part in TTIP, both economically and geopolitically. However, Britain’s relationship with the EU presents a series of problems for TTIP’s negotiation and operation.
16. There is a risk TTIP could become caught up in the UK's attempts to renegotiate its relationship within the EU. The idea the UK could quit the EU is currently a background concern for TTIP, but it is not one that has passed unnoticed. TTIP negotiations aim to conclude by the end of 2014, but they have already run into problems. Negotiations could be delayed further by the 2014 European Parliament elections possibly seeing the election of a parliament more critical of the EU and of TTIP. It alsoremains to be seen whether bipartisan support can be maintained in the US Congress. In the UK context the possibility of an in-out EU referendum before the widely expected date of 2016/17 (to say nothing of implications from the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum) cannot be ruled out, especially if the 2014 European Parliament elections produce a landslide result for UKIP. If TTIP negotiations were delayed into 2015 then there is the possibility they could become caught up in a British General Election, also occasionally suggested as an earlier date for an in/out referendum. Any delay beyond the middle of 2015 could find TTIP negotiations taking place at the same time as the UK and EU begin attempts at a renegotiated relationship. While a TTIP without the UK would not be impossible – indeed, the USA and EU have warned this could happen – it would be more difficult and a lesser deal if secured. It might also be a more difficult sell to the USCongress.
17. At the same time, a collapse or significant delay of TTIP negotiations caused by one or more of Britain's EU partners, would fuel calls for the UK to quit the EU. Eurosceptics have long argued the EU holds Britain back from negotiating its own trade deal with the USA. But there's a twist. TTIP is predicted to weaken Britain's economic relationship with Europe in favour of its already strong transatlantic economic relations. While other EU states would also experience this, their political commitment to some form of political union is not reflected in the UK where, at least in public debate, the economic dimension has always come first. For British Eurosceptics a weakened UK-EU economic relationship would help ease the way for a UK exit.
18. No doubt a UK outside the EU could secure some form of partnership within TTIP, but what this partnership would be is not clear. Canada’s position could offer one model, but what this might be remains unclear. Nor is it clear the EU would allow the UK anything less than a backseat in TTIP: TTIP will clearly rest on a Washington-Brussels axis.
19. Any discussion of the UK joining NAFTA, or seeing TTIP as a purely trade and investment deal, overlooks the USA’s desire for a wider geopolitical relationship with Europe, and in particular here, the EU. This returns us to US concerns the EU is found to be lacking when it comes to geostrategic thinking. A UK withdrawal that weakens EU efforts to think in a more geostrategic way, or which complicate or undermine TTIP, would only dampen what hopes Washington still has that Europeans – Britain included – can act as effective partners. Any weakening of the links between the two sides of the Atlantic – the core of UK foreign policy – would also be a spectacular home-goal by the UK.

Implications for UK-US relations

20. The vote on Syria raised once again the debate about Britain’s place in the world, its relations with the USA, and whether it can sustain its ambitions to be a global player. But the debate about Britain’s place in the world – including its relationship with the USA – is shaped more than anything else by discussion about Britain’s place in Europe. This is a debate so persistent and divisive because it goes to the heart of British identity, security and political economy. It is on the issue of Europe that rests so much of the question of what country the UK wants to be.
21. For the USA, a decision by the British to answer this question by quitting the EU will leave Washington facing an ally still facing painful dilemmas about its role in the world. Some talk of a vote to quit the EU as the means to assert Britain’s independence as a ‘Switzerland with nukes.’ That those nukes would be carried on US built and serviced missiles shows the limits of that independence. That Switzerland is more bound to the EU than some in the UK like to think, shows the limited thinking about what being ‘out’ of the EU would mean.
22. More importantly, Britain would still struggle to assert its sovereignty in the face of a Europe where the EU is likely to remain the predominant political actor, and a more important actor in the daily lives of the British than any other state or international organisation, including the USA.
23. For the USA, a British withdrawal would lead it to reassess the relative merits to be given to its bilateral relationship with the UK, compared to its much larger multilateral relationship with the EU and its member states. Few in the American foreign policy community would subscribe to the idea the US-UK relationship would be strengthened if the UK were to leave the EU.
24. This does not mean that outside the EU the UK will not remain an important ally of the USA. Economic links will continue to develop, but in the shadow of TTIP or some other US-EU economic relationship. The practical core of any ‘special relationship’ will more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing and special-forces. British prime ministers will continue the long-standing approach of offering British military contributions to US military operations as a way of securing influence in Washington, in turn securing a continued US defence commitment to the UK. But the UK could find this increasingly difficult in the face of sustained defence cuts. Other options will need to be considered that rely less heavily on a military contribution.
25. It is often overlooked elsewhere in Europe, but also to some extent in the UK, that one of the UK’s aims in pursuing close relations with the USA has been to maintain the USA’s commitment both to Britain and to Europe. Europe and its near-abroad will remain the core of UK security concerns. The UK should not fall into the trap of assuming the USA’s ‘pivot to Asia’ means Europe will no longer matter to the USA, or that the UK can mirror such disinterest. This overlooks the continued interests the USA has in Europe, Washington’s desire to rejuvenate the transatlantic relationship, and its efforts to encourage Europeans to shoulder more of the security responsibilities in Europe’s near-abroad.

The UK must avoid a situation in which a US Administration is forced to choose between a deep and special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a more brittle, but much larger and important relationship with the rest of the EU. From the perspective of Washington the UK and EU are increasingly bound together and should remain so for the health and relevance of the transatlantic relationship. Nor will the USA appreciate being drawn in to play the part of some form of common friend acting as a councillor trying to limit the damage, not least to its own relations with its European allies, from a UK-EU divorce.

October 2013