Thursday, December 12, 2013

Another piece for the Huffington Post

Cool the Talk of TTIP as an 'Economic NATO'

Calling the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) an "economic NATO" seems logical enough, but the comparison should not be taken too far.
The build-up to and launch of TTIP negotiations between the United States and the European Union has led to a flurry of debate and speculation about what the world's largest trade and investment deal could herald. The deal could bring welcome opportunities for economic prosperity in the U.S. and Europe, and the chance to push wider global trade negotiations. It also offers the West a geopolitical tool, and it is this that has attracted deserved but sometimes excited comment.
By uniting the two core parts of the West, TTIP would allow them to engage emerging economic powers which are quickly shaping the global economy. By bringing together 40 percent of the world economy, rules agreed across the Atlantic could then form the core of global rules and norms, shaping the rise of new powers. Some commentators have gone so far as to declare that TTIP could be an 'economic NATO.'
The metaphor seems logical, and in part it is. For more than 50 years the two sides of the North Atlantic have pursued various policies to bind themselves together economically to complement NATO's military bonds. If the U.S. and the Europeans can combine their economic power then, like NATO, they would command the planet's most powerful and transformative economic relationship.
But it pays to be circumspect when making the comparison.

Piece for The National Interest.

A UK-EU Divorce: Bad News for America

The recent unveiling of a bust of Sir Winston Churchill in the Capitol Building offered a reminder of the long-standing special relationship between Great Britain and the United States. But there is something that keeps the relationship special today which the British shy away from: Britain’s membership in the European Union.
Since the 1960s, successive American administrations—Democratic and Republican—have supported the UK’s participation in European integration, a project the United States encouraged in order to help unite Western Europe after the Second World War.
Read the complete piece here

Britain outside Europe? The US View (DGAP's IP Journal)

UK withdrawal from the EU would be a double loss

Jeffrey LightfootTim Oliver

Britain is one of the United States' most important relationships, but Britain's position within the EU is central to its importance. A UK exit from Europe would weaken the geopolitical position of Britain and change the EU and Europe in ways which could be detrimental to US interests.

US support for a strong British role in Europe helped create fear that Britain was an "American Trojan horse" set to sabotage European unity on behalf of Washington. No one personified these fears more than French President Charles de Gaulle, who twice vetoed UK entry into the Common Market. Yet these fears overlooked the USA’s close relations with other major continental European powers, especially Germany. And they misunderstood the fundamental interest the United States had in European unity on economic and security grounds, concerns born from its involvement in two World Wars centered around Europe.The US has been a long-standing supporter of both European integration and a British role in the European project. The US-designed Marshall Plan for assisting the reconstruction of Europe required European unity and cooperation as a means of facilitating reconstruction and security. When in 1962 retired US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role” he immediately followed it with another clear statement: “The attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the US and on being the head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, unity, or strength – this role is about played out.” The part about playing “a separate power role apart from Europe” is often overlooked, not least by the British. Acheson’s speech reflected growing opinion in Washington DC that has led US administrations from Kennedy onward to push for UK participation in European integration.

Fears of the UK serving as a Trojan horse for America resurfaced during the bitter European disputes over the Iraq War. And indeed, throughout the 1990-2000s – and particularly under the Bush administration – Washington would on occasion cherry pick the diplomatic support of individual member states to advance broader diplomatic goals. Yet in backing the US over the 2003 Iraq War, the UK was not alone in the EU, with the then governments (if not necessarily the citizens) of sixteen of the current twenty-eight member states, supporting the war in some way. Moreover, just two years after the Iraq war, President Bush made very clear in his 2005 trip to Brussels that the United States had an enduring interest in a strong, successful European Union.
The American Interest
The Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s support for a strong and united EU, with the UK as an engaged member. US policymakers increasingly appreciate that US power is reduced from just a decade ago, if only in relative terms. Unilateralist impulses have been replaced by a search for like-minded and reliable allies capable of helping to advance common Atlantic values. As President Obama made clear in his state visit to the UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for global action in the world today.
From the perspective of Washington, the UK and EU are increasingly bound together, and must remain so if the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy and relevant in a world marked by the profound shift of power and economic influence away toward the East and the South.
In the medium term, the US will seek to work through NATO or through coalitions of the willing on key issues. But in the longer-term, the US will likely need a strong and coherent EU to advance common interests and values in a globally competitive world. And as Obama’s then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Phil Gordon, declared in a visit to London in January 2013: "We welcome an outward-looking European Union with Britain in it. We benefit when the EU is unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused on our shared interests around the world and in Europe. … We want to see a strong British voice in that European Union. That is in the American interest."
The United States has expressed frustrations at Europe’s inability to act coherently in the world either through the EU or NATO. The EU’s own problems, especially those in the eurozone, leave the United States concerned about the damage a eurozone collapse could cause to both Europe and the United States. Though the US realizes a phase of naval-gazing is inevitable while the EU deals with its eurozone challenges, it nonetheless finds it frustrating. This adds to fears the EU is too inward-looking in general.
From Washington’s perspective, British membership the EU enhances the prospects for the EU and US cooperation. American and British alignment on a range of issues – such as economic liberalization, free trade, and security outlooks – makes UK membership in the EU in the direct interest of the United States. Efforts to reform the EU, to make it more responsive and dynamic, are therefore welcomed by Washington. However the United States is also alert to concerns from other member states that British efforts here are more about British domestic politics and national interest, and not those of either the EU or stable transatlantic relations.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has emerged as a crucial focus of US-EU relations. For the United States this deal is not simply about trade. If successfully negotiated, it could shift the center of gravity of transatlantic relations from NATO toward a US-EU relationship. Britain has been central to efforts to move this forward, thanks in no small part to its position as one of the United States' largest trading and investment partners. But Britain’s strained relations with the EU haunt negotiations.
While a TTIP without the UK (in the case of its secession from the EU) would not be impossible – indeed, the United States and other EU members have warned this could happen – it would be a more difficult deal to secure, especially in Washington, where it would be a more difficult sell to Congress. Talk of Britain joining NAFTA, or securing some other deal with the United States, overlooks how for Washington any such relationship would take place in the shadow of TTIP.
Despite talk of an Asian pivot, the Unites States remains committed to Europe. An improved geopolitical relationship is the prize the United States seeks through TTIP. For Washington, TTIP could be less effective if Britain were not playing a leading part in the EU side of the relationship.
NATO remains an important part of the USA’s relations with Europe, but in part thanks to failures in Europe to organize better on defense or act coherently on security matters, Washington is growing weary of the security alliance. Operations in Libya where the US role proved essential, along with the behavior of states such as Germany over Syria, and the UK after the House of Commons vote, have reinforced concerns. As a result, US concerns that EU defense cooperation could undermine NATO have given way to a desire to see any progress on defense, regardless of the facilitator. Washington see the lack of European capability – be it through NATO or the EU – as the primary risk to NATO and future of transatlantic security cooperation.
Beyond concerns about trade and security, the general political debate in the United States about the UK and the EU can seem lackluster. Relations with the UK are still seen very much through talk about Churchill or Thatcher. While some Republicans lament US relations with the EU, the potential for this to extend into executive policy should the Republicans win the White House is, at best, remote. Moreover, no one in the United States any longer sees the European Union – with its many crises – as a threat to American power, as some did in the late 1990s. Instead, a lazy but popular view of Europe, the UK included, (especially among conservatives) center on it as a place alien to US values and in decline, thanks to such things as socialized medicine and Islamization.
A Brexit: Implications for the United States
For Washingtong, the UK’s geopolitical relevance would be much reduced by withdrawal from the EU. Britain would remain an important ally, with strong economic, social and cultural links. The practical core of any “special relationship” would more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing, and special forces. The UK’s involvement in US intelligence activities monitoring other EU member states points to how strong this link is. British prime ministers will likely continue the long-standing approach of offering British military contributions to US military operations as a way of securing influence in Washington, in turn securing a continued US defense commitment to the UK. But declining UK military capabilities mean this looks set to be increasingly difficult. Other options will need to be considered. The United States does not see EU membership as limiting the UK to only engaging in European matters. Washington welcomes London’s global engagement, but this is built in part on a foundation of European and transatlantic links. Any efforts by Britain from the outside to play a bridging role between the United States and the EU will not likely be welcome in either party. Britain therefore risks finding itself side-lined in US-EU relations.
Britain must avoid a situation in which a US administration is forced to choose between a deep and special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a more brittle, but much larger and important relationship with the rest of the EU. From the perspective of Washington the Britain and EU are increasingly bound together, and should remain so for the health and relevance of the transatlantic relationship. Nor will Washington appreciate – if anything it will deeply resent – being drawn in to play the part of a counselor to limit the damage, not least to its own relations with its European allies, from a UK-EU divorce.
The United States, like powers such as Russia or China, will not assess Britain’s withdrawal simply in terms of what it means for their relations with the UK; they will assess it in terms of what it means for their more important and larger relationship with the EU. The implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal are generally under researched, but it could make the EU more inward-looking, unwilling to enlarge further, less focused on the Atlantic, and even further from being able to martial the full potential for military and diplomatic power. It will remain dependent on a US security guarantee.
Alternatively, freed of an awkward member it could become a more coherent actor. Whichever way the EU moves, the UK should not expect Washington to disengage from the EU because Britain has withdrawn. If anything Britain’s absence will mean that Washington has to increase its relations with the remaining members of the EU, to the detriment of relations with the UK. There would be no shortage of applicants to fill the position of claiming to be Washington's closest ally within the EU, and the United States will be keen to build closer relations with them, for example with France, the Netherlands, or Poland. While such applicants might struggle to offer a relationship that could claim to be as ‘special’ as British-American ties, for Washington they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe, and the EU, being an area of the world in which Washington will retain considerable interests.

Britain outside Europe? Introduction (the DGAP's IP Journal)

Views on the future of the UK and EU, from Europe and beyond

Almut MöllerTim Oliver

We have debated what a withdrawal or renegotiated relationship with Europe would mean for Britain. But what would a Brexit or new relationship mean for the rest of the EU, other member states, allies, and the global standing of both Europe and the United Kingdom? Analysts from other EU member states and beyond give us their perspectives on the implications of a change in Britain's relationship with the Union.

Reaction to the speech in the UK was considerable. While it is not actually certain that a referendum will be held, it seems increasingly likely. And with opinion polls pointing strongly toward a Eurosceptic vote, the UK could be headed toward leaving the EU.Britain’s relationship with the EU has always attracted considerable comment, not least in the UK itself. This was certainly the case in early 2013 when Prime Minister David Cameron committed a future Conservative government to renegotiate the Britain’s relationship with the EU, which would then be put to the British people in an in-out referendum.

There has been a great deal of debate about what a withdrawal or renegotiated relationship would mean for Britain. Yet by focusing on the UK we overlook the equally important discussion of what such a move could mean for the rest of the EU, other member states, Europe's allies, and the global standing of both Europe and the UK. If Britain exits the Union, this would change the EU, transform the UK’s relations with the EU and its members, and have implications for the UK and the European Union’s position in the world, as well as for relations between member states left in a union without the United Kingdom.
The UK would need the other 27 EU member states to agree to a renegotiated relationship, so it is crucial to understand other countries’ debates on Britain’s plans in order to assess the likelihood that David Cameron can secure his goal. To date there has been little to no attempt to bring together discussion or analysis of what a UK withdrawal or renegotiated relationship would mean for other countries in and beyond the European Union.
This project therefore shifts the perspective of the debate by asking colleagues from think tanks, research institutions, and universities across Europe and beyond how the UK’s current policies toward the EU are being discussed in their country. Over the next half a year we will be publishing several overviews each month on IP Journal.
Contributors have been asked to provide a short overview of the discussions and opinions in their country. For those states within the EU, suggested questions to guide their work include:
1. What debate has there been about the UK’s relations with the EU? What role is Britain seen as having played in the EU?
2. What official government statements and other political opinions have been voiced about the possibility of the UK seeking a renegotiated relationship with the EU?
3. What is the attitude of the general public toward the UK and its relations with the EU? Are there any opinion polls or other measures of public opinion that provide data on this?
4. What are the views of British aims to reform the EU and how to manage relations between the eurozone and the rest of the EU?
5. What impact would a UK withdrawal from the EU have on your state and its relations with the UK?
6. What approach would your state like to see the UK take toward the EU?
For states outside the EU such as the United States and China the questions were slightly adapted:
1. What debate has there been in your country about the UK’s relations with the EU? What role is Britain seen as having played in the EU?
2. What views are their of British aims to reform the EU and how relations between the eurozone and the rest of the EU be managed?
3. What impact would a UK withdrawal from the EU have on your state’s relations with the UK?
4. What impact would Britain's withdrawal have on your state’s relations with the rest of the EU?
5. What approach would your state like to see the UK take toward the EU?
We hope this project will shed light on the so far largely overlooked angles of Britain’s future relationship with the EU, and inspire some new thoughts in London and other capitals on the implications of a British withdrawal from the European Union. With this we also aim to contribute to the wider reform debate about the European Union, including the question of differentiated integration between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of the eurozone.