The following review was prepared for an academic journal who now tell me it will be out sometime in late 2009...!

Paul Wilkinson (ed) (2007) Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11. Abingdon: Routledge. 417pp, £22.99, 978 0 415 38375 2

Analysing terrorist threats and the adequacy of the UK’s response is to walk a tightrope of exaggeration on one side and underplaying the reality of the threat on the other. Wilkinson’s book faces the unenviable task of analysing the UK’s balancing act while providing a balanced analysis itself. In doing so it examines a number of issues.

First, it provides an assessment of the groups posing a threat to the UK. Along with chapters on international terrorist groups there are chapters reminding us of the numerous Northern Ireland and animal rights groups that continue to pose a threat. But it is groups like Al-Qaeda that command the most attention; groups and movements that as the book highlights the UK complacently overlooked in the past. Such is the level of the threat that as the book notes (p51) by 2003 there were an estimated 100 suicide bombers resident in the UK. Figures such as this are presented in a calm and analytical way and not in such a way as to simply alarm.

Second, the book discusses the various means of attack that these groups either seek or have at their disposal. Here the dangers of nuclear, biological or cyber terrorism are not over-hyped. But so too are the authors careful not to downplay methods with the most catastrophic of consequences.

Third, the book addresses the ability of the UK to cope with the full range of threats and whether the UK is sufficiently keeping one step ahead. Central to this is the theme of joined up government, or more accurately: governance. For as the book shows, tackling these threats extends across areas from maritime or aviation security through to immigration and cyber-security.

Every chapter is very well referenced and a good introduction and conclusion top and tail the book. There are, however, three areas where the book slips. First, the book doesn’t mention threats such as that which the British government recently identified as the single biggest threat to the UK’s security: infectious diseases. While of course the book is about terrorist threats, there is a lack of discussion about how the UK prepares for a wider mixture of threats; an approach the recently published UK National Security Strategy attempted. Second, the sheer number of acronyms used makes the book an alphabet soup, frustrating even for those familiar with the area. A list at the back of the book would have been extremely welcome. Finally, while the book is a study of the UK it doesn’t consider sufficiently the UK’s links with the EU, the USA or other allies and how sufficient these links are.

Tim Oliver
London School of Economics and Political Science

Progressive Foreign Policy. Edited by David Held and David Mepham. [Book Review for International Affairs 2008]
Polity, London, 2007. 258pp. Index. £16.99 ISBN: 9780745641167

Concern about the ethics of British foreign policy long pre-dates the arrival of New Labour in 1997; human rights, for example, were a recurring issue in relations with the USSR. But this is not to deny that events and debates since 1997 have meant that today it would be difficult to reflect on New Labour’s and Tony Blair’s time in power without giving serious thought to the role ethical concerns have played – or not played – in the UK’s relations with the rest of the world. For David Held and David Mepham, the ideas set out back in 1997 and heard throughout the following decade have been an attempt to articulate a ‘progressive foreign policy’ which they define as a commitment to human rights, social justice, sustainability, democracy, the international rule of law and multiculturalism. Their book of edited chapters attempts not only to hold New Labour’s record to account by setting them against these ideals, but also to show how conceptions of foreign policy are changing such that a progressive foreign policy is the only viable option if Britain is to face the emerging challenges in international relations. As such the book is a valuable addition to the debate about the future of UK foreign policy.

The book contains twelve chapters from a range of distinguished authors. The first section covers broad themes such as how the UK needs to adapt to the changing nature of security through to how sustainability needs to play a more central role in foreign policy thinking. Michael Clarke offers a salutary analysis of how traditional concepts of security need to be broadened to cover issues as varied as energy insecurity, terrorism, food supply or global warming. Meanwhile Mary Kaldor offers a reminder that the spread of democracy is not just brought about via top-down mechanisms but from the bottom-up. The next set of chapters cover relations with the USA, Europe, the Middle East and China. Given that debates about UK foreign policy too often revolve around the transatlantic relationship the addition of the latter two help demonstrate that UK foreign policy is being shaped not just by decisions in Washington or Brussels but by the rise of new powers and old problems that date back to the empire. The final chapters cover the issues of the global institutions that Britain needs to push forward in reforming global governance. But reform is also needed at home as shown in the chapter by Leni Wild and Paul Williams who cover UK policy making.

The book succeeds in offering an evaluation of New Labour’s record, showing that while there have been mistakes over Iraq or missed opportunities in Europe progress has been made across a variety of areas such as in aid and development. The book is therefore broad in its coverage and while evaluating New Labour’s past record the book does not dwell on the past and looks as much to the future. But several criticisms over omissions can be made. Cursory mention is given to India, Russia or areas such as South America. The policy making angle is covered well by Wild and Williams; but less attention is given elsewhere in the book to how the wider British state at home may have to change to reflect these new challenges. There is a tendency to write more about global civil society or human rights than about civil society or civil liberties in Britain and how they will cope with the challenges to British foreign policy. The book also at times lacks historical depth. Finally a concluding chapter would have been welcome, especially one that opened the book up to an audience beyond the UK as the topics touched on have relevance to every country in the world.

One domestic dimension that is given a good hearing is the need for Britain’s relations with the outside world to be viewed as a concern across government and not just as the realm of traditional foreign policy actors such as the FCO or the MoD. As Andrew Gamble and Ian Kearns note, there is a need for a national security strategy (p126), something that the British government finally published in March 2008. The strategy is both an attempt by Gordon Brown to distance himself from the personalised foreign policy of the Blair era and the product of a longer term trend within government to view the external and internal dimensions of security and foreign policy as closely interrelated. As both the strategy and this book show, responding to the security challenges posed by global terrorism or climate change – while keeping an eye on the possible re-emergence of a traditional direct military threat – requires an increased level of cooperation across all levels of governance in the UK. Criticisms of the strategy when it appeared, after months of drafting and redrafting across Whitehall, might also be levelled against this book: that delivering the objectives set out – and there are many, perhaps too many – will be exceptionally difficult, will require a new level of public understanding which government may find difficult to generate, and will demand very hard choices that Britain may be unwilling to make in terms of spending, internal reform and external cooperation.

Tim L. Oliver
London School of Economics and Political Science

Brown needs quick wits for his international balancing act

TONY Blair's departure from Downing Street raised a flickering hope that Gordon Brown would bring with him a shift in British foreign policy away from a devotion to Washington to closer multilateral engagement with other allies and the United Nations.

Attempts by Brown during his trip to Washington to convey a message that UK-US relations remain much the same cannot cover up how Britain has to actively push forth with alternative relationships. After his trip to Washington, Brown moves on to the United Nations in New York where he comes face to face with a world where the UK cannot rely on special relationships or even necessarily the continued engagement of the US.

Blair's first meeting with Bush in 2001 confronted fears the new Bush administration would push the US into isolationism. Similarly, Brown finds a US increasingly uneasy with its role in the world, chastened by a war in Iraq that two thirds of Americans now think was a mistake, and matched by a similar uncertainty that they are winning the "War on Terror".

Isolationism is back on the agenda with the debate set to rage in the run-up to the 2008 Presidential election. Brown has clearly taken note, for beneath the assurances of close relations there is a distinct unease at the change of mood in the US, but with little certainty as to what it will mean for Britain and the wider international system.

Brown must therefore balance a range of tensions that have bedevilled previous British Prime Ministers. On the one hand appearing candid and distant with the US and pushing forth the UK's other relationships, on the other he must maintain a working relationship with Washington that seeks to ensure the US makes full use of the multilateral options on offer.

Yet this isn't the only international balancing act Brown faces. Even Blair couldn't ignore that Britain increasingly approaches the US, the UN and the wider international system from a European perspective. The UK has led efforts to develop the EU's foreign, security and defence policy. It remains to be seen whether these can later be co-ordinated with the US or not.

British approaches at the UN, or on issues such as Iran and climate change have been built through the EU, not the US. To state that relations with the US are the "single most important bilateral relationship" disguises the fact that Britain's relationship with the EU is the more important because the UK is a leading part of the EU.

Having worked on debt relief, development and environmental change, Brown now faces the more pronounced issues of war and peace and the negative image the UK carries in the world thanks to Iraq.

The appointment to the Government of Sir Mark Malloch Brown, former Deputy Secretary General of the UN, while not well received by his neo-conservative opponents in Washington, did win Brown plaudits from some at the UN. Yet many remain wary.

The problem for Brown is that, as even President Bush has begun to realise, for all their faults, the UN and multilateral approaches can solve problems over Iran and North Korea, not to mention Zimbabwe, Darfur and Israel-Palestine. They offer more potential than the unilateral approach of going it alone.

Yet the UN and other institutions such as the IMF and World Bank cry out for reform but from all angles it seems nigh on impossible due to a combination of rich countries – the UK included – being unwilling to give up vested interests and the developing world's suspicions and divisions.

The growth of powers, such as India and China, only serves to make reform more urgent. At heart, the tensions over human rights, sovereignty and international justice remain as complex and intimidating as anything domestic UK politics has thrown up for Brown. As Brown negotiates his first steps in the foreign policy arena, the underlying issue defining Britain's place in the world remains Iraq. It is no longer a question of whether Britain will withdraw from Iraq, but when and how.

No British Prime Minister has an easy time in international affairs, and the intense briefing accompanying Brown's visit to Washington shows how big a problem he faces in simply conveying a clear message; let alone a clear set of policy choices.

A man not gifted for communication – but for hard thinking – needs to show he can be a quick thinker and a better communicator in explaining the complex challenges Britain under its new Prime Minister faces in its relations with the rest of the world.

The Mr Men and Little Miss at Uni

One of the small pleasures of living and working as a Senior Member at International Hall (IH) of Residence and wrting the hall newspaper is producing stuff like this...

The world of every British child would have been a poorer place were it not for Roger Hargreaves!

Where there’s drink there SHOULD be food.

When it comes to food and alcohol I’ve often said the world can be divided into two groups of people: those who like to combine drinking alcohol with eating food and those who prefer just to drink. My loyalties lie with the former; I’ve never understood the temptation to simply drink and drink, for me alcohol has to be combined with food which makes it a more social and pleasurable experience. So I was happy to read a good piece by Nicholas Lander in the FT this weekend arguing for more food with drink.

As Lander notes, alcohol is absorbed into the blood stream more slowly and less dramatically whenever accompanied by food, and because we can’t physically drink and eat at the same time we reduce the speed we drink at. What gets me is that this is basic bloody common sense, yet widely ignored.

I know there are numerous cultural, historical, political and of course economic factors behind all this which I don’t want to go on and on about, blah, blah... I just long for the day when I can enjoy a night out in the UK with a choice of bars that offer food and drink and not simply have to resort to mentioning the idea of a restaurant with my comments immediately interpreted as a complaint that is met with a bag of Walkers. Fat chance of it happening…

Draft piece below for the Yorkshire Post about the role of the Foreign Secretary in UK government and politics. It's to coincide with the launch of the book 'British Diplomacy: Foreign Secretaries Reflect' edited by Graham Ziegner. Christopher Hill and I wrote the concluding chapter on New Labour.

The Crowded World of the Foreign Secretary

Heading Britain’s foreign policy sounds a powerful and glamorous job. The international travel, the meetings with world leaders, the elaborate state dinners with accompanying pomp and circumstance; all point to importance and purpose. Yet the diplomatic circus hides a job that is one of the most frustrating and ambiguous in government. What is the point of a foreign secretary in a globalised world where all levels of UK government and politics have links to the international affairs which were once the preserve of the diplomats at the Foreign Office?

As current Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket recently noted herself, the UK needs ‘360 degree diplomacy’ to tackle the new challenges globalisation presents. The same can be said of her own job, which is increasingly about managing bureaucracy, public diplomacy and domestic demands as it is about traditional statecraft.

It is a far cry from the simpler world of 1948 when Sir Winston Churchill set out three interlocking circles representing Britain’s place in the world: Empire/Commonwealth; USA; Europe. Churchill’s was a world where foreign secretaries and the rest of government knew the difference between the foreign and the domestic, if only because of the long time it took to communicate with or travel by steamship to foreign postings.

Today the empire and steamships are no more, and the Commonwealth no longer stands at the centre of Britain’s outlook. Yet the UK’s connection to ‘the global’ continues to grow, demonstrated in the open nature of the UK’s economy, increased ease of travel and communication, Britain’s demographic and historical links with large parts of the world, and its leading membership of international organisations.

The threat of terrorism long ago blurred the border between the domestic and foreign. Its heightened nature today requires cooperation from Yorkshire to Afghanistan, London to Cairo. Combating this and other urgent issues such as environmental problems or international development requires cooperation across UK government.

With the Department for International Development leading in Africa, the Home Office taking the lead on internal and external security, the Treasury pushing forward on environmental issues and the Scottish Executive taking an interest in EU energy policy, one might wonder if the only growing demand for a foreign secretary’s services is in dealing with the increasing number of Brits abroad needing consular services.

It is in Europe that we see this problem at its starkest. The Europe Britain joined in the 1970s was a foreign policy issue; since then European integration – whether for good or bad – has bound the UK into a union that is now daily domestic politics. Whether in economic or social policy, defence or local government, no area of British government goes without some connection with Brussels and other EU states. The foreign secretary has become one amongst many members of the government deal with the EU, and who make policy through Europe that shapes the UK and the UK’s relations beyond Europe.

And while the European constitution and the success of the Euro might have stalled, the EU is determined to push forward cooperation on defence and foreign policy. The unpleasant memory of Europe’s inability to deal with the former Yugoslavia remains vivid; and challenges such as the Middle East or an increasingly assertive Russia will continue to compel European cooperation.

The UK and future foreign secretaries will remain at the heart of this, irrespective of their party’s view on the EU. No UK government or foreign secretary can abandon cooperation with the EU; even during the Iraq War, which severely strained relations with several EU partners, the UK and the EU pushed forward with cooperation on issues ranging from Iran to Russia, international environmental cooperation to defence cooperation.

The key problem for a foreign secretary is that cooperation through Europe or across the Atlantic means managing relations with the rest of UK government to ensure joined up foreign policy. So it was that a few years ago the Foreign Office ran a ‘stakeholder survey’ to consult with those across UK government and politics about how it might better perform its job. But joining up policy or working with stakeholders is not the same as setting the direction. In Europe and Britain’s other key relationship, with the United States, the foreign secretary has consistently played second fiddle to the Prime Minister. Rarely do foreign secretaries articulate new visions of British interests in Europe or the USA; here lies a role for the PM alone.

But we must be cautious. The imagery and rhetoric that accompanies prime ministers in foreign affairs feeds the perception that the office has become presidential; but the substance is often much less. Examples such as Iraq or the Falklands, or close relations with George Bush or Mikhail Gorbachev can distract us from the daily grind of diplomatic and government work that makes the world go around. The managing of international affairs cannot soundly be based on peripatetic prime ministers getting to know fellow leaders on a first-name basis, any more than successful domestic government can rely on micromanagement from Number 10.

But neither can any foreign secretary believe that they run the show on foreign affairs. Every foreign secretary has been acutely aware that their jobs carries the risk of becoming merely the Prime Minister’s errand boy, or else the minister who deals only with states outside the EU, NATO, the G8 and Africa. The present degree of reflection and self-analysis – with talk of ‘360-degree diplomacy’, ‘joined up foreign policy’ and ‘stakeholder surveys’ – serves to illustrate the shifting sands on which the traditional ‘head office’ of British diplomacy finds itself, and the challenging nature of the job facing any Foreign Secretary seeking to lead it into the future.

Draft of a review of 'Independent Diplomat' by Carne Ross. Should appear in the next issue of International Affairs.

Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite. By Carne Ross. Hurst and Company, London. 2007. 243pp. Index. £15.00 ISBN: 978 1 85065 843 6

Carne Ross’s resignation from the British Foreign Office following his evidence to the Butler Inquiry will be familiar to anybody interested in Iraq or British foreign policy. As he outlines in Independent Diplomat what drove him to give his evidence and eventually resign was his increasing disillusionment not only with policy towards Iraq but with the very nature of diplomacy. This book, therefore, is not simply a memoir and discussion about events leading up to the Iraq War. It is part memoir and confession; part essay on the nature of contemporary international relations and diplomacy; and part manifesto for Independent Diplomat the organisation.

As a memoir the book is at times enthralling and at others banal. It is Ross’s experiences at the British Mission to the UN in New York, specifically in dealing with Iraq that he gives attention to. He provides an insightful and candid discussion of how the UK and the rest of the UN approached the issues of Iraqi WMD and the Oil for Food programme. In doing so he explores whether or not the British government lied over Iraq. As Ross notes, the situation regarding WMD is a blurred and difficult one where we come across what some would term ‘noble half-truths’; but it is clear that in the run up to the conflict there was nothing to suggest significant rearmament or intent to attack Iraq’s neighbours (p73). This is woven into discussion of the ludicrousness of how policy was discussed and agreed. He describes the drawn out and nauseating work drafting impenetrable documents that were more about abstract diplomatic games in New York than the reality on the ground. The secrecy and lack of accountability Ross and his fellow diplomats enjoyed in playing this game is set out in forthright terms.

It is this strange world of diplomacy that is the main target of the book. This is a world where the complexities of a globalised world are reduced to factoids used to wage diplomatic wars in some realpolitik zero-sum game. There is no objective truth with terms such as ‘interests’ banded around without much thought as to what they actually mean: economic (trade and maximum growth, rarely anything else); security (always realist reinforcing a cycle of unstable competition); values (always vague, contradictory and often abused) (pp116-125). In exposing this diplomatic circus he in turn takes a shot at the study and theories of international relations. Here he perhaps takes too narrow an approach to IR theory doing many people who work in IR a disservice. But his critique goes to the very nature of theory itself, arguing that the world is far more complicated than anybody – be they diplomats or academics – can begin to measure or understand. Beyond this his central concern is with how the structure of international diplomacy disadvantages the weak; that in a globalised world the need for a more inclusive and open format of diplomacy is more urgent than ever.

This is where the book tends more towards a manifesto than analysis. Ross outlines what drove him to establish Independent Diplomat the organisation, a consultancy for democratic entities such as Kosovo, Somaliland and the Saharawis of Western Sahara; entities that lack the resources to engage in diplomacy on a par with other actors in international relations. The book outlines why such an organisation is needed, providing a view of diplomacy from the poorer and weaker side of the negotiating table, the opposite side to which Ross was accustomed to sitting on. Independent Diplomat is an interesting venture, but a key weakness of the book is that little is actually said about it. Most of the detail about the organisation can be found on pp191-198. Beyond this there is little discussion of how it deals with the arcane and irrational style of diplomacy that Ross outlines in most of the book.

This absence is the key weakness in this book, especially for readers of International Affairs. Discussing the experiences of Independent Diplomat in more detail could have added something new to the debate about the nature of contemporary international affairs and diplomacy; instead the book actually says very little that’s new. Certainly Ross’s insight into how policy was made over Iraq is new and of interest to those who study the conflict, but his analysis and discussion of the nature of international relations and diplomacy has been well rehearsed elsewhere. Frustratingly the reader will struggle to find substantial reference to this; I for one wondered why there was no reference to the work of Shaun Riordan, another former and disillusioned UK diplomat whose book ‘The New Diplomacy’ (Polity, 2003) provides a far more nuanced discussion of how diplomacy might develop. Perhaps Carne Ross has in mind a second book outlining the experiences of Independent Diplomat the organisation; one can only hope so as it is an interesting exercise that can only helps shed light on the current state of international relations and diplomacy.

This made me chuckle: 'If Kitchener was not a great man', Margot Asquith once remarked, 'he was, at least, a great poster.'

Nick Cohen

A well written piece by Rebecca Weisser in The Australian reviewing Nick Cohen's new book 'What's Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way' can be found via this link: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21237861-28737,00.html

It ends with the following brilliant example of the type of moral bankruptcy of some on the left that Cohen so powerfully exposes in his book:

In denouncing the failings of the Left, Cohen made an unwanted discovery - its anti-Semitism.

A headline on The Guardian website, "David Aaronovitch and Nick Cohen are enough to make a good man anti-Semitic", was challenged by an enraged reader who protested against the inherent bigotry and demanded the headline be rewritten as, "David Aaronovitch and Nick Cohen are enough to make a good man, or woman, anti-Semitic."