A recent piece for E!Sharp on the forthcoming Scottish referendum.
Recent
debates about the future of Scotland’s place in the UK and the UK’s future in
the EU have highlighted the less sceptical view the
Scots take of EU membership. As the FT’s Philip Stephens warned: ‘If Britain leaves Europe,
Scotland leaves Britain.’ So what happens if in September’s referendum on Scottish
independence the Scots vote to leave the UK? Would a Scottish exit make the
remaining peoples of the UK – and by this the focus will be largely on the English
– think twice about exiting the EU, or embolden them to push ahead?
While we
should not resign ourselves to the idea the UK is destined to leave, the loss
of Scotland would mean the loss of a section of the British population more
likely to vote in favour of remaining within the EU. London and Wales are also highly likely
to vote to stay in, and sometimes polling suggests other areas
of England outside London might also support continued membership. However, these may
be unable to tip the balance against an out vote, or change a largely one-sided
debate that favours Euroscepticism. It is also worth remembering that even the
Scottish, Londoners and Welsh are not overwhelmingly pro-European. Scotland itself
has seen growing levels of Euroscepticism. Support for
membership hovers between 53-61%, not far removed from
the 58% level of support the Scots
registered in the 1975 UK-wide referendum on membership of the then EEC. This
was then the second lowest regional vote, below the UK average of 67%. Recent
polling revealed only 4% of Scots want an
independent Scotland to join the Euro. And the Scottish Government made clear in
‘Scotland’s Future: Your
guide to an independent Scotland’ that in joining the EU an independent
Scotland would seek to retain the UK’s opt-outs from the Euro, Schengen and some
justice and home affairs legislation. They also aim to retain Scotland’s €354 million share of the British
budgetary rebate that is deeply resented elsewhere in the EU. Salmond himself threatened the EU with
retaliation on fisheries if Scotland struggled to secure EU membership. An
independent Scotland might be keener to remain a member of the EU, take a less antagonistic
line than the UK, and could set out to distance itself significantly from the
UK’s Eurosceptic reputation. But it currently looks set to start out as a
member that sits in the slow-lane of a multi-speed Europe. Nevertheless, remove
Scotland from the numbers and the remaining UK tips further in favour of those
who support getting out altogether.
Scotland’s
decision could embolden those in England who believe a union with Europe can be
broken just as easily, if not more so. Scotland and England have been bound
together for over three hundred years. A shared crown and some religious,
social, trading and military links go back much further. It is a union that has
been bloodied by innumerable wars that have shaped the world, including one for
shared survival still within the living memory of the oldest generation and
recalled in memorials throughout the UK. The union has also been bound together
by a shared politics, currency, economics, laws, welfare, social policies, language,
and popular culture. These might have frayed and varied in application across
the UK, but they are more substantial than those that bind the EU together. If
the Scots are prepared to break such a union then expect English Eurosceptics
to ask why England cannot be given a similar (and from their perspective, long
overdue) say on whether to break a union with the EU that is only forty years
old. That Scottish nationalists would have won a vote most polling had long
said was unwinnable will further embolden English Eurosceptics. To this must be
added growing levels of Euroscepticism throughout the EU that have added to feelings
in Britain that a vote is necessary and a win possible. If Scotland finds it
difficult to get into the EU then this will provoke a backlash in Scotland, the
remaining UK and from across the EU. A Scottish vote to leave the UK should be
a reminder that political arrangements that seem permanent can change, something
the EU should not think itself exempt from.
A
Scottish exit from the UK will also not settle internal political issues within
the UK that help fuel Euroscepticism and support for parties such as UKIP.
Imbalances and divisions between the UK’s different regions and nations have
become increasingly contentious and play a part in Euroscepticism. Scotland’s
exit would remove one of these areas, but not solve the problem. The issue of
London would remain unsettled. Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, recently
called London ‘the Dark Star,’ and Vince Cable, the
UK’s Business Secretary, described it as a ‘giant suction machine draining the life out of
the rest of the country.’ Without Scotland London will loom even larger
over the remaining UK. Nor
will it settle tensions over immigration. Take away Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, with their beautiful if sparsely populated large areas such
as the Scottish Highlands, and England becomes Europe’s most densely populated
country,
ahead of the Netherlands. England’s population of 53 million is growing, with
the UK predicted to close with Germany
by the middle of the century. In some areas of England there is a growing level
of frustration and anger over immigration, crowded services, inadequate infrastructure,
a perception that areas such as Scotland and London get preferential treatment,
and a declining faith in the overall UK political system. As research by the IPPR into English
nationalism found, the more English a person is the more Eurosceptic they are
likely to be. The outcome, as Ben Wellings recently
argued,
is that: ‘Euroscepticism is the
most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that provides
the political content for English nationalism.’
It may be
that the shock of losing the Scots and negotiating a new relationship with them
could lead enough people in England to pause and reflect on whether an exit
from the EU is a good idea. The complexity of a Scottish exit and Scotland’s continued
interdependence with the remaining UK could reveal the limits of both Scottish
sovereignty and the likely limits of English sovereignty outside the EU. Without
Scotland the remaining UK would undergo another reduction in economic and
military power prompting some reassessment of British-English power and
national identity. This could serve as part of a larger critical juncture in
England’s development, an event akin to the disaster of Suez. It would trigger a
reappraisal of British-English identity and the country’s place in the world
and Europe. The outcome could be a greater acceptance of the EU.
Such hopes
have long been present in Britain’s debate about its relationship with the EU,
and recent debates have shown no signs of this changing. At a time when a core part
of the UK is preparing to vote on whether to leave the UK, some of
Westminster’s political elite instead obsess about the EU as the greatest
threat to the UK’s future. Europe has for too long been used as a source of
resentment. Europe, Eurosceptics argue, holds Britain – or England – back. In
Scotland this politics of resentment is directed at the UK or Westminster. With
or without Scotland it will not be easy for some in England to give up this
deceptively simple argument. And the Scots themselves may find they are indeed
held back by England. A British exit from the EU deeply worries Ireland, heavily linked as it
is to the UK. For Scotland, independent or not, there would similarly be no easy
escape.
