Latest post for E!Sharp: Can an in-out referendum solve the European question in British politics?

The prospect of an in-out referendum is one we all know will figure in the UK’s forthcoming general election. The average British voter might care little for the nuances of EU membership, or even say the issue ranks high in their election priorities. But it weaves itself into so many issues that we can expect it to be up there in the headlines, especially with the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and UKIP all committed – in varying ways – to holding an in-out referendum.

It is hoped that a referendum can allow the British people to once and for all solve the question of Britain’s commitment to Europe, providing a cathartic, decisive decision whether it be to stay or go. Given such expectations we need to take a step back and realise that all sides – both Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans – risk expecting too much of a referendum.

The European question is a multifaceted one driven primarily by Britain’s domestic politics. It was for this reason that when I recently wrote an article on this topic for International Affairs, the Chatham House journal, I gave it the title ‘To be or not to be in Europe: is that the question?’ In short: no. Britain’s European question is connected to a range of issues – constitutional change, changing identities, political economy, fragmenting party politics, responses to globalisation and the changing geopolitics of Europe – not simply whether Britain wants to be formally in or out of the EU.

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It’s time for a Balance of Competences Review of the UK

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog. 

Scotland’s vote to remain within the UK has triggered a pressing constitutional debate about the allocation of powers and competences in the UK. Meanwhile, the UK government has been busy reviewing the balance of competences of the EU. With attention now on the imbalances and inconsistencies in the distribution of competences within the UK, the recent EU review might offer lessons for approaching the UK’s constitutional conundrum.

Since July 2012 the UK government has been undertaking an audacious review into UK-EU relations called the ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’. Driven by a belief, especially within the Conservative Party, that the EU has taken too much power (to simplify the more technical term of ‘competences’) from the UK, the review set out to test this claim and publish its findings in 32 evidence based sectoral reports. By doing so the review provides evidence for a bigger political discussion that will follow it, and as such is noted intended to reach any clear political decisions itself. Those political decisions are likely to feed into whether to move forward in a renegotiation of the UK’s membership of the EU, something that could then be followed by an in-out referendum.

The constitutional distribution of powers within the UK – whether to areas such as Scotland or to local government – has been the subject of any number of reports and inquiries. Today, thanks to the Scottish referendum, the need to address the issue is more real than ever before. Indeed, how the UK approaches the issue is likely to either make or break it. This has led to various calls for constitutional conventions and Royal commissions. If the UK government is prepared to invest a great deal of time and effort into the matter of the EU’s balance of competences, should it not do the same for the UK? As historian Timothy Garton-Ash argued in the Guardian: “In what rational universe can [the EU’s balance of competences] be separated from determining the balance of competences inside the UK?” Could then a review of the balance of competences of the UK be undertaken? Does the EU review offer lessons or even perhaps a model – if the time is available – to finding a way to rebalance and sort the current constitutional mess the UK is in?

The Imbalanced Union

The list of problems with the UK’s internal balance of powers is a long and familiar one, one the debate in Scotland has once again thrown a light on. Devolution has been focused on certain areas such as Scotland and Wales, allowing them to develop as more distinct political spaces within the UK, building on existing differences that pre-date devolution. While this is to be welcomed as a move away from the over-concentration of power in Westminster, the lack of any clearly defined UK-wide agendas in health or transport means these areas can seem increasingly detached from the UK. Devolving further powers, as promised in a variety of ways by the main UK parties during the Scottish referendum debate, could form part of a solution to the flawed setup whereby Scotland spends money it has no responsibility for raising. But it then leaves open the problem of what it is that Westminster does for Scotland beyond foreign, defence and some tax and macroeconomic policies. Then there is the West Lothian question of why Scottish MPs can vote on matters that pertain to England while English MPs cannot vote on similar matters for Scotland as they have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. This all adds to the impression that there is little strategic sense of how the UK as a whole is or should be changing together constitutionally.

Even if the Scots had voted to leave, the imbalances within the remaining UK would not have gone away. Questions already exist about the voting rights of Welsh and Northern Ireland MPs, and the dominance of Greater London over the rest of the UK is an underlying theme the management of which is arguably the most demanding challenge of all. The failure of Labour’s half-hearted attempt at English regionalism in the 2004 North East referendum has stalled further efforts at devolution within England. London’s place in the UK is often crudely taken to mean the government in Whitehall or the political elite in Westminster. This is an unfair description of Britain’s and the EU’s biggest city, the home to more people than live in Scotland and Wales combined, and a region with its own political institutions such as the Mayor, London Assembly, and ‘the City.’ Attempts to fill out the incomplete devolution settlement by granting further powers – perhaps even fully devolved powers – to London would also lead to questions about whether London MPs should be barred from voting on non-London English matters. Not that ‘English laws’ themselves are that clearly discernable, as the McKay Commission found. Proposals for an English Parliament immediately run into questions surrounding the balance of competences: what powers and competences should rest with it, which with local or regional government, and which at UK level.

Greater London’s own current political and administrative setup raises questions about the rather pathetic, emaciated state of local government, especially in England. As the London Finance Commission noted, as a proportion of GDP Canada’s ratio of local and regional spending is nine times higher than that in the UK. In France the ratio is nearly three times greater. On everything from housing, tube lines, planning and schools, Whitehall and Westminster – and especially HM Treasury – call the shots in England, with knock-on effects for the other parts of the UK thanks to the way money is allocated. With local councillors largely powerless, and few people in England with access to any other level of representation, MPs are overwhelmed with local matters. Meanwhile the UK executive that MPs are sent to Westminster to hold to account goes about its business, albeit one where a centralised Whitehall itself is overloaded with work.

This growing inability to offer a UK-wide policy agenda is not a mere dry, technical issue. It means the UK can lack some common political themes or mechanisms to manage relation between its different parts. The United Kingdom is there to serve a purpose: for most UK citizens that purpose will be unclear if Westminster lacks any means of doing anything or behaving as a UK-wide government. The imbalances are felt even in foreign policy, one area Westminster retains powers. A study by the IPPR into Englishness found a strong link between Euroscepticism and English frustration at the imbalanced constitutional status of the UK.

A Balance of Competences Review of the UK?

Solving these imbalances will not be easy. As mentioned, there have been a large number of detailed and insightful reports, each putting forward proposals. There have been repeated calls for constitutional conventions, Royal Commissions or some meeting of representatives from the UK’s various parliaments to hammer out a deal. Whatever is chosen, a means will need to be found to provide an evidence based assessment of the current distribution of powers. The UK Government’s review of the EU’s competences offers some lessons, but nine points need to be taken into account.

First, while the EU review is a complex one, it is made more straightforward thanks to the EU’s competences being set out in its treaties. These treaties provide a constitutional map for the EU that the UK lacks with its uncodified constitution. The EU’s more limited competences also mean the review does not really have to tackle the thorny issue of tax raising powers and allocation of spending, something HM Treasury may be the most unwilling to see change. It has also not been a speedy one, the review having started in July 2012 and expected to conclude in the autumn of 2014. While a UK review could be more compact, we should be under no illusions that the scale would be much larger.

Second, would a UK review be about the effectiveness or the legitimacy of where powers should reside? When the initial findings of the EU review pointed to a balance that is about right for practical and administrative reasons, the findings were dismissed by Eurosceptics as irrelevant to the bigger question of whether they are legitimate.

Third, the EU review works on the assumption that subsidiarity means a competence should rest with Westminster unless it is shown to be necessary that it rests with the EU. Could a UK review take a position that upholds the idea of parliamentary sovereignty whereby all powers rest with Westminster unless proved to be necessarily otherwise? Would Westminster be prepared to consider the idea of sharing powers? The EU review has served as a reminder that Westminster has something of a zero-sum, majoritarian mentality about power: you devolve power within the UK, not share them; you sign over and can later, if necessary, repatriate powers from the EU, not pool them.

Fourth, even if Westminster is willing to share, as the British government may find with the EU, rebalancing competences could require some powers to be taken back while others are given. How willing would Westminster be to devolve further powers, and how willing would areas such as Scotland be to return some powers to Westminster if this was deemed necessary for an effectively functioning UK-wide system? How might this conflict with long-standing areas of devolution in Scotland, such as education and law where administrative devolution existed long before political devolution in 1999 (and some areas predate the union of 1707)? Some in Scotland would be as unwilling to return some powers to Westminster as some in Westminster would be to hand over powers to the EU, even if in both cases evidence was produced that showed this could improve the balance of competences and make for more effective governance.

Fifth, the balance of EU competences could change in the future, necessitating another review. This is hardly unusual. Federal systems such as Germany and the USA have ongoing debates and mechanisms for reviewing what competences should lie where. The UK would need to move from a situation where it has these debates in Scotland or Greater London to one where they are UK-wide and become a standard constitutional procedure.

Sixth, who is to undertake the review and who is it to serve? The EU review is overseen by the Cabinet Office and the FCO and implemented by individual Whitehall departments. It is unlikely a UK government led review would be seen as impartial by some in the UK. The EU review itself has run into this problem. The British government has been keen to present the review as being about EU reform, and not simply about the UK. Despite this it has been spurned by other EU states who view it as being about the UK’s national interests. Even in the UK, Eurosceptics have dismissed it as a government whitewash.

Seventh, who might dominate and shape the work of a UK review? With the EU review a large amount of evidence and opinions have so far been received from businesses, academics, NGOs, charities, lobby groups, lawyers, political activists, political parties, local and devolved government, a few foreign governments and organisations, and some individual UK citizens. It may end up being viewed as one beholden to well-organised groups such as businesses or political activists. The same could happen in a UK review, where some well organised an resourced areas, such as Scotland or London, could dominate the findings.

Eighth, the EU review has been driven in part by growing political pressure from the emergence of UKIP. What political backing or campaigns would push a UK review? So far most such campaigns have been geographically focused on Scotland, Wales, London, and to a lesser and more vague way in England. Thanks to the Scottish referendum there might now be growing pressure for a constitutional convention, but this has yet to grab much public attention or backing although this could emerge.

Ninth, an emerging problem with the EU review is that it shows a disjuncture between popular feelings about what the EU does and what it actually does. The EU review can provide evidence to help counter such views, but the review cannot do this on its own. A UK review could find that some of the distribution of competences within the UK is contrary to popular opinion or opinions held in certain local area or regions. Changing that opinion will then be for whatever follows the review. How this is to be done would be for whatever that is, for example would a UK balance of competences review serve a constitutional convention that is then followed by a referendum? Or would it be for a general election to settle? The referendum could fail or deepen divisions if an area of the UK rejected it. In a UK review this could become more likely if the review was seen as unfair. Getting the balance right from the start will be important, but this could run into a problem of appearing to prejudice the impartiality of a review if it is intended to gather evidence.

A Rebalanced Union?

We should be under no illusions that the UK faces a series of growing problems about its internal distribution of powers. The UK may move towards a federal union, or continue its current quasi-federal arrangements, become a confederation, or perhaps outline a series of arrangements guaranteeing some form of UK-wide commonwealth. Whatever is the end result, a way will need to be found to review and report on the current distribution of competences. While the issue of the EU is important, obsessions about the UK becoming a part of a federal Europe too easily distract from the need to think more carefully about the UK’s own internal balance of competences. The current EU review shows how difficult a similar review – or indeed, any form or review – of the UK would be.

Europe to Britain: Our Patience is Running Out

A piece for the Huffington Post.

The E.U. values Britain's membership and a "Brexit" would be felt across Europe and around the world. But Britain is not indispensable. If faced with a choice the E.U. comes first, Britain second.

Once again Europe has found itself transfixed by British politics. Scotland's independence referendum raised unease across Europe, whether it was Spanish worries about Catalan independence or German concerns an independent Scotland would carry on Britain's habit of demanding special E.U. opt-outs. But one concern registered everywhere: that a Scottish exit from the U.K. might make a British exit from the E.U. more likely.

Almost all debate about a Brexit is about what it would mean for Britain. Yet a Brexit would have big - but largely unexplored - implications for the E.U. and Europe's place in the world. A recent compilation of research from 26 countries from across Europe and countries such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Singapore and Brazil has shed light on European and international thinking about where U.K.-E.U. relations are headed. The message for Britain is hardly positive.

Britain's European debate does not pass unnoticed. But understanding of the nuanes of the debate varies from country to country. While nobody is planning for a Brexit, many feel plans may become necessary because Britain's debate increaingly seems detached and closed to outside influence. Nobody is under any illusions that a Brexit would be an unprecedented and damaging experience for the E.U. and Europe. It is the U.K., however, that many feel would be the most damaged.

Views of Britain's behaviour are framed more by the wider concerns facing the E.U., especially the Eurozone. While the catchwords of the U.K.'s reform agenda for the E.U. - competitiveness, flexibility, democracy - resonate across the E.U., the real pressure for reform comes from those rescuing the Eurozone.

Countries within the Euro zone, Euro pre-in countries such as Poland and Sweden, and even Denmark with its opt-out, have focused on Germany and France for leadership. Despite its efforts, London is seen as a bystander and at times an additional hurdle.

Too often Britain misunderstands initiatives that seem to align with the U.K.'s own hopes. States such as the Netherlands and Germany seek a better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not London's aims for repatriation. A multispeed E.U. is considered a possibility, but not - as the U.K. might hope - in a pick-and-choose fashion. There is increasingly less appetite in Brussels for "third ways" like Switzerland. For other E.U. member states, London's proposals, while tempting in the short-term, are not seen as sustainable in the longer run as they could leave the E.U. weak and divided.

This does not mean nobody worries about losing the U.K. Almost every state worries about losing Britain's free-market, liberal outlook. Yet some countries note a growing "mercantilist" attitude in British thinking. Some countries traditionally close to the U.K. also note a decline in economic links, and some are clear they would seek to exploit the economic opportunities that could arise from Britain's marginalisaiton. Britain can forget any hope of securing a withdrawal deal which allows it to undercut the E.U. States outside the E.U. fear the economic disruptions of a Brexit, and dread the E.U. becomming more inward looking.

Euroepan secuirty would also be changed. France would be left facing Germany's "culture of restraint" on international affairs, leaving little hope of improvements in European defence. For the USA, a Brexit would stunt long-standing hopes for improvements to European defence cooperation, weakening relations between the E.U. and NATO. A Brexit would create opportunities for outside powers to play on European divisions.

While economic and security concerns remind other E.U. members of the U.K.'s role, they do not necessarily generate sympathy. Instead the feeling is exasperation at London's inability to offer anything but negative leadership. The U.K.'s debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct attack on the Single Market's right of free movement of people and labour. E.U. countries fear the influence of British Eurosceptics on their own domestic debate and are frustrated London has not done more to confront the issue.

The end result is a situation where the rest of the E.U. is angry at how the U.K. appears to be advancing agendas that are about Britain's national interest and where the threat of Brexit is used as leverage - or blackmail as some see it - to achieve these aims.

For both the E.U. and the U.K., avoiding a further deterioration of relations will not be easy. With the U.K.'s general election campaign soon to get underway (and the ongoing fallout from Scotland's referendum), engaging London on European policies is likely to become even more difficult.

With Britain on the sidelines of E.U. politics, both the U.K. and the rest of the E.U. will need to appreciate that this could easily turn into the outside. Britain could leave, or the E.U. could lose patience and end up excluding Britain by integrating in ways that leave it behind.

A devolved government for London would be a big step towards rebalancing power in the UK

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog : http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/a-devolved-government-for-london-would-be-a-big-step-towards-rebalancing-power-in-the-uk/ 

In the wake of the Scottish independence referendum, and Cameron’s announcement of a ‘devolution revolution’, Tim Oliver argues for creating a fully devolved government for London. This would not only improve the running of the most important region in the UK, it would go some way towards breaking the problematic link between the politics and government of the UK and the politics and government of London.

Devolving more power to the UK’s nations, regions and cities, as promised in response to the surge in support for Scottish independence, would bring a welcome change to the over-centralised nature of the UK state, especially in England. In the debate so far, London has often been portrayed as the villain, with anger directed at the over-centralised UK government based there, the incredible power the wider metropolis wields over the rest of the UK, and how UK government and London’s interests too often align. Yet as the UK’s most powerful, rich and most populous region, London itself cannot be forgotten in whatever happens now Scotland has voted to stay in the UK. Creating a fully devolved government for London – or technically ‘Greater London’ to use the term for the geographical administrative area – would not only improve the running of the most important region in the UK, it would go some way towards breaking the problematic link between the politics and government of the UK and the politics and government of London.

No other large developed state has a capital city that dominates the rest of the country as London dominates Britain. London’s population equals that of Scotland and Wales combined, with a growing population meaning Northern Ireland can soon be added to the list. If the larger metro-region measurement is used then London is home to 13.6 million people, or 21% of the UK’s population. Its economy dwarfs that of any other region, producing about 22% of the UK’s economic output, making it the richest area of the UK, with central London the richest area in Europe. ‘The City’, London’s financial heart, is not just the centre of British business but the centre of global finance.

London is home to most of the UK’s main government, security, diplomatic, media and cultural institutions (including large investments such as the Millennium Dome and the London Olympics). It is home to thelargest concentration of top-ranking universities in the world. It also stands out as Europe’s premier international city, especially for business. Paris might come close to matching London on population, but in terms of high-skilled knowledge based jobs Paris does not come even remotely close. London’s growing population is a cosmopolitan one, fed by immigration, with over a third of Londoners born outside the UK. For London, competition and comparison is not with Glasgow, the North West of England or even cities such as Berlin. It measures itself against the likes of New York, Tokyo, Dubai, Rio and Hong Kong. In the UK and Europe, London is in a league of its own.

This dominant position creates a host of problems for the rest of the UK. Economically, London has something of a stranglehold over the UK, with ‘the City’ in particular wielding incredible power, leaving the UK vulnerable to financial shocks. Investment floods into London thanks to the returns being much higher, a report by the IPPR estimated that per-capita transport spending in London is 500 times as much as that in the north-east of England. London’s insanely high property prices drive up prices across the UK. Large amounts of the infrastructure of the UK, whether roads, rail, air or energy supplies, are structured with London in mind. And things show no signs of changing. London’s expanding population and economy mean it will go on shaping UK needs. Little surprise then that people ranging from Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond to the LSE’s Professor Tony Travers have described London as the UK’s ‘dark star’ sucking in people, resources and energy.

For many inhabitants of the UK, London can also be a foreign country. London’s white-British population remains the city’s largest single group of residents, but is now around 45% of the population. Its international and large immigrant population makes for an identity that is a mix of English, British, European and international. The EU itself is not viewed as the threat it is in some other areas of the UK. This is not to say that London is without racial or social problems, the London riots of 2011 being a vivid demonstration of underlying tensions. However, as the BBC’s Economics editor Robert Preston argues: ‘Much of the rest of the UK sees globalisation and its manifestations – such as immigration – as disempowering, impoverishing and a threat. Whereas for Londoners, globalisation is an economic competition they are apparently winning’.

Little wonder then that to the rest of the UK London can appear an increasingly distant, alien and controlling power. Whether in Scotland or in the rise of UKIP across England, campaigning on an ‘anti-London’ ticket pays dividends. The UK Parliament and Government in London – or more specifically in the Westminster and Whitehall areas of central London – can appear to live in a London zone 1 bubble of their own, one beholden to central London’s needs and lifestyle whether in the finance and international focused agenda of ‘the City’ or the housing needs that gave rise to the much despised ‘bedroom tax’. That the largely London centred UK media only recently awoke to the news that Scotland might break from the UK only adds to the impression that London lives in a world of its own.

To be fair, millions of Londoners themselves criticise the way the UK and their city are run, with a common enough complaint being that the rest of the UK drains London of taxes and investment. It is for this reason that proposals to create an English Parliament soon run into the problem of London: base such a Parliament in London and it adds to London’s hold on England and the UK; build it outside London and the Parliament risks being ignored by the UK’s most powerful region. Similar problems face proposals to move UK government out of London into some purpose built city akin to Washington D.C. or Canberra. The London Question is in so many of the problems that confront the UK: the centralisation and accountability of power, Scotland’s future, growing English nationalism, relations with Europe, growing inequality, unease about immigration, population change, the future of British identity, questions about where to invest, and the role of finance in the UK’s economy.

A way then is needed to break the link between the government of London and the government of the UK. In the absence of an English Parliament or new capital city, the answer could lie in the creation of a fully devolved government for London. Greater London already has a devolution settlement that dare not speak its name. The (re)establishment in 1999 of the Greater London Authority, with its Assembly and Mayor, provide London with political institutions to reflect the distinct political space the metropolis has increasingly become. Recent proposals to increase the powers and funding of the GLA could become a reality if UK government goes forward with devolving more powers. Welcome as they are, London could go further and by doing so add to much needed political change in the rest of the UK. A devolved government of London would, in cooperation with the city’s local authorities, run the metropolis’s life in a way similar to that in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. All three have varying powers, but following any of them would allow London to run itself more than ever before. It should be for Londoners to decide if they need a bedroom tax. If the elected government of London wanted to cover the tuition fees for London’s university students, and could find the money, then so be it.

A devolved London government offers several benefits for the UK and London. The most immediate gain for the UK would be a clearer gap between running London and running the UK. UK ministers and departments in Whitehall would have to think less about London, where their writ no longer extended as once it did, and more about the rest of the UK. This then paves the way for those looking for ways to establish devolved government within England and a move towards a more federal system. There will likely be no neat solution here, but London at least provides a neater starting point than many other areas.

The possibility that in many policy areas UK ministers could end up as ministers mainly for non-London England would make abundantly clear the need for wider change at UK level to bring in a federal UK-wide level of policy making. Similarly the Westminster Parliament would be confronted with the need to not only face the West Lothian Question – where fifty nine Scottish MPs can vote on English matters but English MPs cannot vote on similar matters that have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament – but also a Watford Gap Question where seventy three London MPs could vote on matters covering the rest of England but which won’t affect their constituencies because the powers now lie with the London Assembly. London itself would gain by being allowed to run its own affairs, easing some tensions between Londoners and the rest of the UK over issues such as investment, health, housing, or taxation. It would also clarify the issue of funding to London. London can be portrayed as either a subsidy-junky or the largest prop to the rest of the UK economy. The way forward is a more transparent system of funding for London, something the creation of a government of London would help bring about.

Of course such a proposal is not without its problems. Support for such a move would be needed from Londoners, or else it could quickly become an unwanted and unpopular level of bureaucracy. If powers were devolved would they be accompanied by genuine funding independence, or would HM Treasury continue to hold the purse strings? Hopes a devolved government of London might help break the link between UK government and politics and that of London need to take into account that London will still be the home of the UK’s political, business, cultural and media elite, with informal links between them remaining extremely strong. And where in this would we fit ‘the City’, an entity which can best be described as a powerful small city-state that has long existed at the heart of England and the UK.

Would changing the institutional arrangements of the UK’s constitution do enough to rebalance the imbalances in private investment and the influence on the UK’s international relations? The newly empowered Assembly and government could end up beholden to specific interests, as some argue thecurrent Mayor has become with London’s banking sector. Granting London control of its own affairs while the rest of England continued to be governed by institutions based in the centre of London would provoke further anger at London having it all its own way, driving London and the rest of the country further apart. And would a separate system for London work when the existing arrangement of a mayor and assembly have not dampened criticism of London’s domination of the UK, if anything perhaps exacerbating a sense of injustice that London has added representation? Such changes in London would therefore have to be accompanied by wider changes elsewhere in England along with a move by UK government to provide a federal level of oversight that covers London and other areas of the UK (although how this would apply to Scotland given it may entail taking back or rebalancing some powers is another matter).

The devolution process in the UK has long suffered from a lack of strategy. Adding London without due consideration for the rest of England and UK would only add to the chaos that could lead to UK government ending up as a weak shell that only deals with some large macroeconomic matters and external relations. And even if, for example, London were granted the same powers as Scotland, it is no guarantee that those powers would be used. Despite the significant powers granted to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament and Government have in some areas pursued profoundly conservative policy agendas.

These are not small concerns, and we should all be aware of the risk of rushing into decisions that fuel constitutional uncertainty or which add to London’s dominant position. But whatever the Scots, Welsh, Northern Irish or rest of England decide to do, we cannot avoid the question of what to do about London, its intimate relationship with UK government and their relations with the rest of the UK. Granting London a devolved government is one proposal that could go some way towards addressing this and which could trigger wider thinking and changes to the way the whole UK is run. Devolving power to London would be the ultimate test of whether UK central government is willing to give up powers and embrace fundamental reform of the UK’s constitutional system. While I’m under no illusions that such changes are either easy or going to happen anytime soon, the London Question is an unavoidable one that will remain at the heart of UK politics for a long time to come.

Brexit Stage Right

A comment piece for Foreign Policy magazine (online) on the geopolitics of a British exit from the EU.

A ‘Brexit’ would have important implications at the European and international levels

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy blog and EUROPP blog: 

The implications of a ‘Brexit’ for the UK has been endlessly discussed, but its implications for the EU and other international powers has hardly been considered. Tim Oliver explores the complex set of possibilities and implications at the European and international level that both the UK and EU need to keep in mind as they move forward.

UKIP’s success in the recent European Parliament elections has once again raised questions about whether Britain is headed towards an EU exit, AKA ‘a Brexit’. The likelihood of this happening remains open to debate. But the debate is focused almost entirely on what such a move could mean for Britain. In contrast, with only a few exceptions, the implications for the EU and wider international relations are given next to no thought. Ed Miliband’s warning that Britain risks sleepwalking towards an EU exit should be heeded by the rest of the EU who appear to be asleep to what it could mean for them. The same might be said for other powers such as the USA. A British exit will change the EU and European integration with implications for the UK, transatlantic relations and the West.

An EU without the UK could go a number of ways. When added to the Eurozone’s problems, a Brexit could tip the EU towards being a more inward-looking, less Atlantic focused union shaped more by the outlook of smaller states and whose centre of power has moved eastwards. Alternatively it could strengthen the position of Germany. Or, more neatly aligned with the Eurozone and rid of its most awkward member, the EU could tip towards a United States of Europe. While some other states may contemplate following the UK, hoping a Brexit will reveal the EU to be a house of cards that comes crashing down as soon as the British leave will likely only prove true if a Brexit combines with wider problems in the EU to trigger a crisis in Germany, the EU’s heart. While Britain has contributed much to the EU, it alone has not held the EU back, caused all its problems or held it together.

Even if, as seems likely, quitting the EU damages the UK’s standing, a Britain outside the EU will remain a major European power. It will be one of the EU’s biggest trading and political relationships. By the 2040s it will have overtaken Germany as the most populous country in Europe. Britain will therefore not disappear from EU politics, just as it is nonsense to think a vote to leave the EU means the EU disappears from British politics. From the outside London may well attempt to use its new position to change or redraw Europe’s regional politics, moving arrangements away from the politically driven European Union towards a more traditional state based trading system with NATO (read USA) as the security provider. Whether a Brexit can redraw the regional politics of Europe will depend in large part on how the UK copes outside the EU and how the EU copes without it.

A Brexit offers the EU and Europe some possible positive opportunities. A new arrangement with the UK on the outside could offer ways forward in relations with Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Switzerland, or even Ukraine; states that may never join the EU but with whom the EU will always have – or seek – a close relationship. However, the UK and/or the EU may be unwilling to extend any UK-EU model to these other states, and those states may themselves reject such an offer preferring their own individually tailored models instead.

Despite what some in the UK may hope, any new UK-EU relationship will depend largely on what the remaining EU (including the European Parliament) is prepared to grant it. The UK will be the junior partner, despite the UK’s significant trading and political relations with the EU. And what the EU will agree to depends in large part on what type of EU emerges as the British depart and what it decides is in its best interests. A more protectionist inward looking EU, or one that worries about the possible appeal of a UK outside the EU, may be in no mood to grant the UK a good deal. Alternatively, an EU that feels more confident and united could simply expect the UK to fall in line with whatever is offered.

A wider view of a Brexit would also be taken by powers outside Europe. For countries such as China,Australia, New Zealand or Canada, the EU is better off with the UK inside it. But a Brexit will not make them give up on the rest of the EU, a multilateral relationship that is collectively more important than their bilateral relationship with the UK. Even for Washington, a Brexit would not simply be about what it would mean for UK-US relations. The larger US-European relationship, while more brittle than the smaller but deeper UK-US one, is cumulatively of greater strategic significance to Washington. If the exit of one of Europe’s leading international and military powers further complicated European cooperation on foreign, security and defence – long sought by the USA – then it could further weaken efforts to strengthen the European side of NATO. This would exacerbate US frustrations about Europe that developments in Ukraine have once again exposed and deepened.

And the future of transatlantic relations rests on more than just NATO. Any attempt by the UK to secure a UK-US free trade deal would be a poor substitute for a much larger, and globally significant, US-EU trade pact. With the UK already heavily linked to the US, an EU exit would likely lock it in even more, leaving it able only to offer up the military assets it still has in hopes of retaining influence over US decision making. Meanwhile other allies in Europe would grow in importance for the USA. The UK would be stuck, unable to do anything such as pivot to Asia, but with its primary political, security and defence concerns still concentrated in its regional home of Europe and the North Atlantic, but where it has spurned and risked locking itself out of the predominant political, economic, security – if not traditional defence – organisation of Europe. It would be a losing scenario for all concerned.

It is this complex set of possibilities and implications at the European and international level that both the UK and EU need to keep in mind as they move forward. For the EU and its member states it will be the implications for their national interests and the wider implications for Europe as a whole that will shape any decision as to whether – to borrow from President Lyndon Johnson – it is better to have the UK inside the EU tent pissing out, or outside the tent pissing in. For the UK, focusing on what is the best or worst exit deal or renegotiated relationship for Britain overlooks that this is more a question of what is good or bad for the rest of Europe. And that is not a question the British alone can answer.

London bucks the UKIP surge and appears headed in a direction far removed from the rest of the UK

A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog.

It should come as no surprise that UKIP failed to make significant gains in London during the recent European and local elections. A global and European city that benefits immensely from how the UK is currently run and which is home to the UK’s largest non-British population was never going to be fertile territory for a party campaigning on an anti-immigration, anti-Europe and anti-London ticket. The results highlight that Britain’s capital city is growing into a more distinct political space in the UK, writes Tim Oliver.

The local and European election results provided UKIP with a series of spectacular gains across the UK. Coming first in the UK’s elections to the European Parliament meant they became the first party since the start of the twentieth century to secure first place in a UK-wide election ahead of the Conservatives, Labour or Liberals. The party even secured its first MEP in Scotland, a part of the UK often (if not entirely accurately) seen as more pro-European.

But UKIP’s achievements – especially in the local election results that took place on the same day across certain areas of England and Wales – were dampened by the party’s inability to make a breakthrough in London. Securing only ten councillors across London played a part in lowering UKIP’s overall projected national share of the vote to 17% (on a turnout UK-wide of about 34%), less than the 23% from local elections in 2013. UKIP’s one London MEP was elected on a 6.10% increase in votes, but with 16.87% of London’s votes this was UKIP’s second lowest regional result and increase in support after their result inScotland. The party that succeeded in London was Labour. As I argued in March, London has long been difficult terrain for UKIP with polling showing Londoners to be amongst the least Eurosceptic in the UK.

Many point to London’s large international and immigrant population as the reason for Londoners not backing UKIP and its policies on immigration. Approximately 36.7% of London’s population (according to the 2011 census) was born outside the UK. About 10.3% come from elsewhere in the EU, with a larger proportion coming from areas such as South Asia. London’s white-British population remains the largest single group of residents, but is now around 45% of the city’s population. As home to the UK’s largest ethnic minority communities, Londoners have long grappled with the politics of immigration and racial politics. UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage might have felt awkward at hearing no English spoken on a train journey into central London, but for most Londoners hearing a multitude of other languages spoken is an everyday experience. London’s constantly changing population also makes putting down roots unnecessary. As Tony Travers argues, ‘The word Londoner is an entirely inclusive concept’. For Tessa Jowell, Labour MP for Dulwich and West Norwood and former Minister for London, ‘These [2014 election] results show London as an open, tolerant and diverse city’. Survey data confirms Londoners are less racist than people elsewhere in the UK.

As an explanation this can only go so far. As Tim Stanley has pointed out, London is not exactly immune from racial problems having seen major riots caused in part by racial tensions and the Metropolitan Police continues to face allegations of institutional racism. Londoners are also more than aware that the city’s insanely high property prices are in part thanks to an influx of rich foreign residents. London also showed something of a divided response with support for UKIP being found in London’s outer areas such as Havering and Bexley.

London’s population also gives it a unique identity which causes some problems and opportunities for UKIP. The 2011 census showed that more Londoners (about 31%) identify themselves as British than in any other region of Great Britain. This should not be a surprise given London is home to British institutions such as the monarchy, the BBC or the British Museum. Black and ethnic minority groups are also more likely to identify with being British than English, and they constitute a large proportion of London’s population. So why did the party that labels itself with ‘UK’ struggle with voters who more closely identify themselves with being British? Research by the IPPRinto English identity found that people who identify themselves as British tend to be less Eurosceptic than those who identify themselves as English. As Ben Wellings has argued: ‘Euroscepticism is the most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that provides the political content for English nationalism’. At the same time we must not overlook that 37% of Londoners identified themselves as English, and Scotland also elected its first UKIP MEP. UKIP then can secure support across the UK and identities, but the low results in both London and Scotland reminds us that it remains in large part a party driven by an emerging – or changing – English nationalism.

London’s British identity sits with its international one. A large part of the material wealth of London is tied to the economic vibrancy of the European market as part of wider transatlantic and global markets. Britain might not be in the Euro, but that does not stop London handling more euro foreign-exchanges than the Eurozone combined. Nor does it stop London being the headquarters of one hundred of Europe’s top 500 companies. Companies such as Goldman Sachs and the Lord Mayor of London have warned of the cost to London and the UK of an exit from the EU. As the BBC’s Economics editor Robert Preston argues: ‘Much of the rest of the UK sees globalisation and its manifestations – such as immigration – as disempowering, impoverishing and a threat. Whereas for Londoners, globalisation is an economic competition they are apparently winning’.

London also wins from a political setup and relationship with both the UK and the EU that works well for it. Its mayor, assembly, the organisations that represent the ‘City of London’ such as its Lord Mayor, its numerous councils and groups, MPs, MEPs and Lords, and its intimate connections with British government in Whitehall, Royal Court in St James’s, and the UK Parliament and Supreme Court in Westminster give it a combined political voice far greater than anywhere else in the UK. The British media are also based largely in London. As a result the EU and UK Government do not appear as remote and uncontrollable as they might in other areas of the UK. There could be no clearer example than David Cameron wielding the UK’s EU veto to defend the interests of financial institutions based largely in London. As Mayor of London, former Conservative MP Boris Johnson has rarely held back from attacking the EU, perhaps better capturing any unease amongst Londoners about the EU than UKIP have been able to. Londoners might be less Eurosceptic than people elsewhere in the UK, but that level of support is hardly overwhelming and could decline should the EU-City of London relationship break down.

London’s privileged position, population and identity has not passed unnoticed. UKIP’s own campaign was in part ‘anti-London’. ‘London’ has become a by-word for something that is distant, strange and out of control, similar to Brussels across the EU or Washington D.C. in the US. While London has long been a place slightly apart from the rest of Britain, today people across the UK, and especially England, increasingly view London as a place far removed from the country they feel they inhabit. Suzanne Evans, a former Conservative councillor for Merton who defected to UKIP but lost her seat in the recent local elections, blamed UKIP’s poor performance in London on its young, educated, cultured, media-savvy population that can’t understand the heartache felt by the rest of the country. This might have been picked over for her insinuation that UKIP supporters elsewhere are old, not educated (to a certain extent Londoners are indeed younger and on average better qualified) or cultured and that the ‘media-savvy’ were somehow duped by media criticism of UKIP. But her warning that London is becoming a place apart from the rest of the UK has been echoed elsewhere.

It is easy to see why London appears headed in a direction far removed from the rest of the UK. We should not be surprised that London is developing as a more distinct political space – and one seeking more autonomy – in a way similar in some respects to that witnessed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Some developments in London have gone further than in other areas of the UK and are likely to continue spreading across England and the rest of the UK. By 2050 a third of Britain’s population could be from black and ethnic minority groups, UK central government is coming under increased pressure to cede powers to areas such as Scotland and within England, Britain’s various identities are in flux, and the EU and globalisation will remain realities London, England and the rest of the UK cannot run away from.

This presents a series of dilemmas for UK government and British politics. In order to avoid London moving too quickly ahead of the rest of the UK, the UK government will come under increased pressure to more fairly distribute the economic gains from the EU and globalisation that are currently accruing mostly to London. It will need to do so while tackling unease about immigration and population change, while also allowing less centralised control so decisions on such matters can be taken at a more local, city or regional level. Such decentralisation may offer a way for Labour, Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to better manage their appeal to both metropolitan voters and more traditional backers elsewhere. UKIP’s support elsewhere in the UK serves as a reminder that while London matters because of its size, economic and political power and because it is something of a sign of the Britain to come, focusing on the capital city will not be enough to win elections and manage the whole UK.

Liberal Democrats and the UK-US relationship

I thought I should upload a chapter I wrote with Ben Jones for a conference and publication on how allies of the USA view the US. This is from 2011, and what I've uploaded is one of the final drafts I have saved, so it's NOT for citation. Please email me to check if you'd like to reference it. Some of the ides at the start, particularly on the Lib Dem worldview, are quite hazy. I've been working on them since and further publications are to follow.

The chapter is on my page on academia.edu:

https://www.academia.edu/1513613/The_Liberal_Democrats_and_the_UK-US_Relationship 

Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee's inquiry into Government Policy Towards the USA

Written evidence I submitted to the Commons FAC's inquiry into UK government policy towards the USA can be found here. I've also pasted the text below. The full report, which includes several references to my evidence, can be found here. 

Written evidence from Dr Tim Oliver (USA 13)

Fritz Thyssen TAPIR Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C.

A UK withdrawal from the EU: implications for the USA and transatlantic relations

Summary

• Britain’s relationship with the EU is often seen as one of the key benefits it can offer in the UK-US relationship. Despite talk of an ‘Asian pivot’, Europe – and increasingly the EU – remains crucial to US economic, security and political interests.
• The UK should never lose sight of the US-EU relationship and what British policy towards the EU could mean for this much larger transatlantic relationship.
• A British withdrawal from the EU could have significant implications for both the USA and the EU. The paper outlines the possible implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal, and what this could then mean for the USA’s relationships with the EU and UK.
• For the USA, a UK withdrawal from the EU could be a lose-lose scenario: reducing the geopolitical position of Britain, one of its closest allies; and changing the EU and Europe in ways which could be detrimental to US interests.
• UK policy towards the EU could also have implications for the wider transatlantic relationship. A breakdown in UK-EU relations could undermine or weaken the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This would be a loss to the UK’s long-standing policy of encouraging closer geopolitical relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. It would also be a loss to US efforts to engage the EU in a wider geopolitical relationship.

About the author

Tim Oliver is a Transatlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR). From 2012-2014 the fellowship will see him based at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin), the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (Washington D.C.), and the RAND Corporation (Washington D.C.). His fellowship is funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. He was educated at the University of Liverpool and later received his MSc and PhD from the London School of Economics. His PhD in international relations was taken under the supervision of Professor William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire). He has taught at the LSE, UCL and prior to his current fellowship spent several years as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Before Sandhurst he spent several years working in the Liberal Democrat Whips’ Office of the House of Lords. He has also worked in the European Parliament, Brussels. His current research includes a focus on the implications for the EU and USA of a UK withdrawal from the EU. The opinions expressed in this evidence are his own and should not be taken as reflecting those of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations or the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

Implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal

1. The House of Commons vote rejecting UK involvement in military action in Syria raised a range of concerns in the USA about British isolationism and retreat. Many of these concerns were wide of the mark. The UK-US relationship has endured many periods of crisis, some far more serious than the Syria vote. A vote to leave the EU would not cause an immediate crisis in relations with the USA. But it would change the nature of the UK-US relationship in the longer term.
2. Focusing on the implications for UK-US relations reveals only part of the problem for the USA. A British withdrawal would also change the EU, meaning the USA would have to adapt its relationship with Brussels and the other member states.Therefore to understand the implications for the USA of a British withdrawal, we need to examine how the EU could be changed, and what this could mean for the USA and transatlantic relations.
3. While there is a considerable amount of literature examining the implications for the UK of a withdrawal from the EU, the implications for the EU is a very under researched topic. The following analysis is drawn from research I undertook while writing the study ‘Europe Without Britain: Assessing the impact on the EU of a British withdrawal’, published in September 2013 by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).[1]
4. A UK withdrawal would have three sets of inter-connected implications for the EU:
5. First, the EU would have to spend time negotiating a withdrawal with the UK. The timeframe set out in Article 50 – the untested withdrawal clause of the EU’s treaties – is two years, possibly longer if both sides deem it necessary. There is a good chance the withdrawal negotiations will follow failed/rejected negotiations for an alternative relationship for the UK within the EU. These negotiations could have taken between 1-2 years. When added to wider changes in the EU – in particular a possible treaty change to deal with the Eurozone’s problems – the context within which a UK withdrawal could take place would be one of considerable institutional flux and naval-gazing by the EU.
6. Second, the EU’s institutions, voting systems, budgets and policies will need to change in order to fill the gap left by the UK. When these are combined with changes to the Eurozone, a British withdrawal could add to shifts in the EU’s balance of power. Numerous under-researched scenarios exist as to how the EU might change.
1. The most common concern found elsewhere in the EU – and in the USA – about a UK withdrawal is that it could make the EU more inward looking, pushing the EU towards protectionism and away from a more liberal economic order. It could also make the EU more inward looking on security issues. The union would look more towards the Mediterranean instead of the Atlantic. Smaller states could gain over large states. The Franco-German axis could be unsettled, leaving an even more dominant Germany. EU enlargement to states such as Turkey or Ukraine, something already suffering from ‘enlargement fatigue’, could grind to a halt in the face of unease amongst northern and western states at the EU’s centre shifting further south or eastwards. The implications for the Irish Republic would also have to be taken into account.
2. On the other hand, rid of what many in the EU consider a notoriously ‘awkward partner’ the Eurozone could become the undisputed core of the EU, pushing the EU further towards ‘ever closer union’. Future problems facing the Eurozone could be more easily and directly dealt with. Europe’s social model could be freed of British attempts to weaken it.  EU efforts at foreign, security and defence cooperation would lose an important partner. But while the UK is central to such efforts, it has also been central to limiting them. Its removal could act as a spur to EU action in these areas, especially if further political union emerged following the Eurozone crisis. The extent to which Britain slows the EU has been put into perspective by the Eurozone’s own struggles to find solidarity and leadership. Nevertheless, with the UK removed from the formal decision making process the EU would be free to develop in ways the UK would be unable to vote against or veto.
7. The third set of implications relate to the EU’s external relations: with the rest of non-EU Europe; with the wider world, including the USA; and the EU-UK relationship.
1. The wider political and economic framework of relations in Europe could be changed, with implications for the EU’s relations with states such as Norway and Switzerland. If the UK and other non-EU members thrived and the Eurozone continued to struggle, then Britain’s withdrawal could trigger centrifugal forces that lead other member states to question their membership, in turn unravelling the EU. However, this ‘domino theory’ has to be set against the likelihood of another domino effect within the EU should the UK secure a renegotiated relationship granting it special privileges. Other states could then demand concessions, creating a much feared ‘pick and mix’ approach to EU membership. At the same time, if the UK struggles outside the EU then the UK’s appeal would be limited, strengthening the EU’s position. A background concern here is the problems the EU’s enlargement policy has faced with states in central and Eastern Europe. If the UK’s decision appealed to far-right or far-left political parties in these states, then it could add to the problems faced in anchoring these states into a European mainstream.
2. The UK and EU will need to think about how the rest of the world might interpret a British withdrawal. Could it be taken as another sign of European division, disunity and weakness? It will mean there will still be no clear answer to “who speaks for Europe?” if the UK and other non-EU European states disagree with the EU. Europe could become more vulnerable to divide and rule by external powers, for example how might Russia interpret the move with regard to its approach to states in Eastern Europe? Would France come under more focused pressure to cede/share its permanent UNSC seat with the EU? Implications for the USA are discussed below.
3. Finally, Article 50 requires the EU to attempt to negotiate a post-withdrawal relationship with the withdrawing member. Unless some form of relationship were agreed allowing the UK a direct say in internal EU business (something the EU has strongly resisted with all other non-EU European states), then the UK would move from decision maker to a decision taker and decision shaper. Should the EU remain the predominant political and economic organisation in Europe, then the UK will need to pursue close relations with it. The UK is therefore highly likely to put great effort into shaping the EU’s policy agenda, both through lobbying efforts in Brussels, and through efforts directed at individual member states. While we should not overplay the UK’s potential to sow divide and rule to secure its ends, we should also not overestimate the EU’s ability to present a united front to the UK. The EU has struggled to present such a position in relations with the USA, Israel, Russia and others. With the UK, the EU would face a state containing a government, business community and civil society who would have over forty years of experience of EU politics, and a bigger interest in the EU than any other non-EU state.

Implications for US-European relations

8. The USA could face a lose-lose scenario from a British withdrawal from the EU. First, as discussed further below, from the perspective of the USA and other powers, the UK’s geopolitical significance would be significantly reduced. Second, the USA would also face an EU changed by the UK’s withdrawal, and changed in a way potentially detrimental to US interests.
9. There would no shortage of applicants to fill the position of claiming to be the USA’s closest ally within the EU. While such applicants might struggle to offer a relationship that could claim to be as ‘special’ as that with the UK, for the USA they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe, and the EU, being an area of the world in which it will retain considerable interests. As President Obama made clear in his state visit to the UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for global action in the world today. Should the UK absent itself from the predominant political and economic organisation in Europe, then it would be disengaging from a partner the USA increasingly looks towards working with.
10. The extra effort the US would put into these other relationships inside the EU, would in part stem from a desire to ensure the EU does not change to the detriment of US interests. This is not to argue the EU with the UK inside has always been congenial to US interests. Nor is it to argue that the UK is the only way the US can exert influence (the ‘American Trojan Horse’ theory). Nor is it to argue the EU must always align itself with US interests. But a British withdrawal could add to existing US worries about the EU’s development and capabilities, and how they will impact on the USA and the wider security environment in Europe and its near abroad.
11. A British withdrawal could add to US concerns that Europe lacks the political energy to think about the geostrategic implications of the rise of powers such as China and Brazil. These concerns have been fuelled in recent years by the EU’s focus on its internal problems such as the Eurozone crisis, or before this over the failure to adopt the EU constitution. The USA would not want to see further ‘naval-gazing’ brought on by a British withdrawal.
12. A British withdrawal could also add to a fear Europe will continue to free-ride on a US security guarantee, one primarily provided through NATO. The USA has shown clear frustration at Europe’s inability to deal with security issues in its near-abroad, for example in the Middle East and North Africa. Changes to the configuration of US defence capabilities mean the USA is likely to continue to try and shift some of the burden of dealing with issues in these areas towards Europe.
13. It would be wrong to assume a UK withdrawal from the EU would have no impact on NATO or not weaken it in anyway. The disappearance from the EU of one of its major military powers could further strain efforts at Europe-wide defence cooperation, whether through the EU or NATO. Nobody should cheer the failure of the EU, Europe’s dominant economic and political organisation, to facilitate improved cooperation on defence spending and business. If the EU continues to struggle in this, then Washington may well wonder what hope remains for Europe ever organising itself better on defence – whether through NATO or the EU. If, however, a UK withdrawal opened the way for the EU to organise better on defence, then the USA’s key military ally in the EU will have absented itself from this, necessitating stronger links between the USA and the developing EU defence capability.
14. For the foreseeable future the US will continue to work through NATO or through coalitions of the willing on key issues. But in the longer-term, the United States will likely need a stronger and more coherent European Union to advance commoninterests in the face of emerging powers. If the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership were successfully negotiated then the centre of gravity in transatlantic relations could shift further from NATO towards the US-EU relationship. From Washington’s perspective, having a pro-American UK in the EU enhances the prospects of the EU being a reliable American partner with whom it can defend and advance common interests.

Implications for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

15. TTIP has emerged as an important development for all sides in the Atlantic relationship. For the current British government TTIP offers numerous opportunities: it offers the chance to show the EU works for the UK by helping to secure the largest bilateral trade deal in history; it could advance the UK’s long-standing aim of binding the two sides of the Atlantic closer together; it could provide for all sides a much-needed geopolitical framework through which the two core parts of the West can approach the opportunities and challenges of emerging powers; and it could provide much needed export led growth for the UK. The UK plays a central part in TTIP, both economically and geopolitically. However, Britain’s relationship with the EU presents a series of problems for TTIP’s negotiation and operation.
16. There is a risk TTIP could become caught up in the UK's attempts to renegotiate its relationship within the EU. The idea the UK could quit the EU is currently a background concern for TTIP, but it is not one that has passed unnoticed. TTIP negotiations aim to conclude by the end of 2014, but they have already run into problems. Negotiations could be delayed further by the 2014 European Parliament elections possibly seeing the election of a parliament more critical of the EU and of TTIP. It alsoremains to be seen whether bipartisan support can be maintained in the US Congress. In the UK context the possibility of an in-out EU referendum before the widely expected date of 2016/17 (to say nothing of implications from the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum) cannot be ruled out, especially if the 2014 European Parliament elections produce a landslide result for UKIP. If TTIP negotiations were delayed into 2015 then there is the possibility they could become caught up in a British General Election, also occasionally suggested as an earlier date for an in/out referendum. Any delay beyond the middle of 2015 could find TTIP negotiations taking place at the same time as the UK and EU begin attempts at a renegotiated relationship. While a TTIP without the UK would not be impossible – indeed, the USA and EU have warned this could happen – it would be more difficult and a lesser deal if secured. It might also be a more difficult sell to the USCongress.
17. At the same time, a collapse or significant delay of TTIP negotiations caused by one or more of Britain's EU partners, would fuel calls for the UK to quit the EU. Eurosceptics have long argued the EU holds Britain back from negotiating its own trade deal with the USA. But there's a twist. TTIP is predicted to weaken Britain's economic relationship with Europe in favour of its already strong transatlantic economic relations. While other EU states would also experience this, their political commitment to some form of political union is not reflected in the UK where, at least in public debate, the economic dimension has always come first. For British Eurosceptics a weakened UK-EU economic relationship would help ease the way for a UK exit.
18. No doubt a UK outside the EU could secure some form of partnership within TTIP, but what this partnership would be is not clear. Canada’s position could offer one model, but what this might be remains unclear. Nor is it clear the EU would allow the UK anything less than a backseat in TTIP: TTIP will clearly rest on a Washington-Brussels axis.
19. Any discussion of the UK joining NAFTA, or seeing TTIP as a purely trade and investment deal, overlooks the USA’s desire for a wider geopolitical relationship with Europe, and in particular here, the EU. This returns us to US concerns the EU is found to be lacking when it comes to geostrategic thinking. A UK withdrawal that weakens EU efforts to think in a more geostrategic way, or which complicate or undermine TTIP, would only dampen what hopes Washington still has that Europeans – Britain included – can act as effective partners. Any weakening of the links between the two sides of the Atlantic – the core of UK foreign policy – would also be a spectacular home-goal by the UK.

Implications for UK-US relations

20. The vote on Syria raised once again the debate about Britain’s place in the world, its relations with the USA, and whether it can sustain its ambitions to be a global player. But the debate about Britain’s place in the world – including its relationship with the USA – is shaped more than anything else by discussion about Britain’s place in Europe. This is a debate so persistent and divisive because it goes to the heart of British identity, security and political economy. It is on the issue of Europe that rests so much of the question of what country the UK wants to be.
21. For the USA, a decision by the British to answer this question by quitting the EU will leave Washington facing an ally still facing painful dilemmas about its role in the world. Some talk of a vote to quit the EU as the means to assert Britain’s independence as a ‘Switzerland with nukes.’ That those nukes would be carried on US built and serviced missiles shows the limits of that independence. That Switzerland is more bound to the EU than some in the UK like to think, shows the limited thinking about what being ‘out’ of the EU would mean.
22. More importantly, Britain would still struggle to assert its sovereignty in the face of a Europe where the EU is likely to remain the predominant political actor, and a more important actor in the daily lives of the British than any other state or international organisation, including the USA.
23. For the USA, a British withdrawal would lead it to reassess the relative merits to be given to its bilateral relationship with the UK, compared to its much larger multilateral relationship with the EU and its member states. Few in the American foreign policy community would subscribe to the idea the US-UK relationship would be strengthened if the UK were to leave the EU.
24. This does not mean that outside the EU the UK will not remain an important ally of the USA. Economic links will continue to develop, but in the shadow of TTIP or some other US-EU economic relationship. The practical core of any ‘special relationship’ will more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing and special-forces. British prime ministers will continue the long-standing approach of offering British military contributions to US military operations as a way of securing influence in Washington, in turn securing a continued US defence commitment to the UK. But the UK could find this increasingly difficult in the face of sustained defence cuts. Other options will need to be considered that rely less heavily on a military contribution.
25. It is often overlooked elsewhere in Europe, but also to some extent in the UK, that one of the UK’s aims in pursuing close relations with the USA has been to maintain the USA’s commitment both to Britain and to Europe. Europe and its near-abroad will remain the core of UK security concerns. The UK should not fall into the trap of assuming the USA’s ‘pivot to Asia’ means Europe will no longer matter to the USA, or that the UK can mirror such disinterest. This overlooks the continued interests the USA has in Europe, Washington’s desire to rejuvenate the transatlantic relationship, and its efforts to encourage Europeans to shoulder more of the security responsibilities in Europe’s near-abroad.

The UK must avoid a situation in which a US Administration is forced to choose between a deep and special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a more brittle, but much larger and important relationship with the rest of the EU. From the perspective of Washington the UK and EU are increasingly bound together and should remain so for the health and relevance of the transatlantic relationship. Nor will the USA appreciate being drawn in to play the part of some form of common friend acting as a councillor trying to limit the damage, not least to its own relations with its European allies, from a UK-EU divorce.

October 2013