Piece for LSE EUROPP blog

London and Berlin are not speaking the same language when it comes to EU reform.

The UK and Germany have both expressed a desire to reform the way the EU functions. Almut Möller and Tim Oliver argue that due to their contrasting constitutional traditions and outlooks, the two countries risk misunderstanding or antagonising one another. They point out that the German discussion around EU competences is part of a country-wide debate on federalism, while the UK’s proposition of a competences review is informed by the ideas of Parliamentary sovereignty and the repatriation of power.

In his January speech on Europe, David Cameron committed a future Conservative government to renegotiating the relationship between Britain and the EU. This new relationship would then be put to the British people in an ‘in-out’ referendum. Seeking allies in their efforts to change the EU, and thus keep Britain in, Cameron along with many others in the UK have set their sights on Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel. 

They hope that the need for reform in the Eurozone will open the way for a review of EU competences and repatriation of powers. These hopes have been heightened by occasional comments about the need for reforms in the EU from German politicians. However, Britain risks missing the point that German debates about EU competences are shaped by a political and constitutional outlook that is in sharp contrast to that of the UK.

First, German debates about Europe have always been framed in a way that reflects what Germany feels is good for Europe, not just Germany. Although the country is becoming more at ease with the notion of self-interest, British unilateralism and national self-interest sit uneasily with this approach. Second, the UK should not think it can use German debates on EU reforms for domestic purposes. Tactically speaking, it might be useful to point out to the UK public that London is not alone in its reform agenda. However, if taken too far this might be seen as London trying to manipulate Berlin, and could potentially annoy Germany. Finally, Britain’s efforts could tempt Germany to stress that the UK alone cannot lead this debate. The UK must connect its agenda to wider European and national debates about competences and needs to regain credibility from a continental perspective.

To understand this situation better, Britain and Germany should remind themselves of their contrasting constitutional histories and cultures. Germany’s thinking on EU competences is part of a domestic debate about federalism. The patchwork of kingdoms, dukedoms and principalities that made up Germany until 1871, still exist today in the form of sixteen Bundesländer (federal states). While the constitution might be clear about the distribution of power between the central government and the federal states, in reality, the demarcation of competences is not so clear-cut. Over the past ten years two major commissions have been convened on the reform of the German federal system, and it looks like a third one is on the way.

This debate extends to the EU. The commitment of successive federal governments to hand over powers to the EU led the Bundesländer to push for constitutional rights in the early 1990s. Germany’s powerful constitutional court has regularly chastised the federal government for going beyond its powers in these matters.

To this we must add memories of 1933-45 and the Western Allies’ subsequent insistence on strong regional government to constrain central government, as well as Germany’s later determination to see itself integrated into the EU. Germany’s views on what the EU should and should not do emerge from this historical background. The Bundesländer has been at the forefront of debates about competences in the EU and have managed to incorporate exclusive, shared, supporting, supplementing and coordinating competences into the EU’s legal order categories in the Lisbon Treaty, similar to those found in the German constitution.

In contrast, the UK’s debates about federalism and EU competences are not well-developed; they are often muddled, and almost entirely focused on the UK. British politics remains dominated by the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty, with all power retained by Westminster. Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, along with the recreation of a Greater London Assembly, might have started a process of turning the UK into a federal system. Yet, devolution implies powers can also be taken back or suspended, as they have been on occasion in Northern Ireland, when the peace process has faltered. The majority of the UK continues to be governed by one of the most centralised systems in Europe. For Westminster, powers and competences are not shared, they are either centralised or devolved. For Westminster, competences held by the EU are seen in a similar way as powers in devolved government: they are given, not shared, and can be taken back by Westminster.

So, it was no surprise that when the UK government announced it would conduct a ‘Balance of Competences Review’ to examine the role of the EU in British life and whether that balance needs to be redressed, Germany declined to participate. Berlin sensed the review was driven more by Westminster’s self-interest, than a desire to reform for the good of Europe. Cameron has since changed his approach and now talks of EU-wide subsidiarity and democracy, rather than unilateral repatriation. This moves some way towards ‘talking the talk’ of the Germans on the balance of competences, but Germany remains wary. After the difficult ratification of the last round of the Lisbon Treaty, there is little appetite for far-reaching reforms. Ironically, Germany has become more pragmatic with regard to treaty reform, while the British agenda is becoming more ambitious, and even ideological.

British misunderstanding of Germany’s approach surfaced again during the recent German federal elections. Angela Merkel mentioned the possibility that reforms to the Eurozone might lead to a review of the balance of EU competences and did not rule out the transfer of competences back to member states. However, Merkel was speaking in a federal election campaign and in a parallel election campaign in Bavaria, a region crucial for her party. Bavaria is noted for guarding against Berlin handing powers to Brussels. To German ears, Merkel’s comment was yet another contribution to the federalism debate. For British commentators, it was misinterpreted as a major concession to Cameron.

Finally, from Germany’s perspective, Westminster’s obsession with the EU might seem strange when the possibility of a UK break-up has become more real now than ever before. Instead of obsessing about EU competences, Westminster might like to pay more attention to rebalancing the competences within the UK and moving towards a more federal system. A federal United Kingdom and a federal Germany might then be able to better understand each other’s views on reform of the European Union.

Piece for E!Sharp on a Brexit

Is the EU asleep as Britain sleepwalks out of the EU?

http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/151-is-the-eu-asleep-as-britain-sleepwalks-out-of-the-eu/

There is no shortage of analysis into what it would mean for Britain to quit the EU. But what it would mean for the EU is less than clear, something I discovered while researching the potential impact of a UK exit on the EU. The UK might be characterised as an awkward or unwilling partner, one that has delayed European integration, but it has also brought much to the EU, something largely unbeknown to its own people let alone to the rest of the EU. Whether for better or worse, losing Britain would hardly be an insignificant moment for the EU’s development. Ed Miliband, leader of the UK’s Labour Party, warned that despite the British debate, Britain risks ‘sleepwalking out of the EU’. But with debate elsewhere in the EU so limited, is the EU also asleep?

To some in the EU discussing the idea of a member state leaving is a taboo. The inclusion in the EU’s treaties of a withdrawal clause setting out how a member state might withdraw was itself resisted by some who saw it as a challenge to the founding aim of the EU creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ The idea Britain might break with this, or as Prime Minister David Cameron suggested, stay in the EU but drop the commitment to ‘ever closer union,’ is a direct challenge to that aim.

Losing a member state opens a Pandora’s Box of potential problems. Nobody is too sure how the withdrawal clause would work. The EU would have to draw up negotiating red-lines and in facing the UK hold its nerve in negotiating with a state with which it has mutually deep economic and political relations it would not want to endanger, but one it would not want to be held to ransom over either.

The remaining EU would also have to change. Institutions, budgets and policies would be open to reform. Smaller states may gain over larger states. North and West could lose out to South and East. Instead of facing the Atlantic the EU would face more towards the Mediterranean. Germany’s central position could be further enhanced. Europe could succumb to more protectionist thinking. The position of Ireland would need to be thought about. A withdrawal might connect with growing Euroscepticism elsewhere unleashing centrifugal forces unravelling the EU, especially if the Euro faced another period of crisis. It would change relations with the rest of non-EU Europe such as Norway or Turkey. Relations with the U.S. could change, as might NATO. Or perhaps a UK withdrawal will have only a limited impact on the EU’s internal dynamics, if anything freeing it of an awkward partner, making it easier to move towards ‘ever closer union’.

The rest of the EU might be forgiven for thinking this is a recurring bad dream from which it regularly awakes to find all is well. Britain has long bemoaned its EU membership. Cameron’s commitment to a referendum echoes the successful, if ultimately insignificant, renegotiation followed by an in-out referendum in 1975. It remains open to speculation whether another referendum will even happen. Instead it might appear better for the EU to wait it out and call Britain’s bluff by remaining silent.

Ignoring British demands certainly appeals to those who see Cameron’s approach as nothing short of trying to blackmail the rest of the EU. Cameron’s demand for a renegotiated relationship or Britain will likely vote to leave, rests on the idea the EU cannot say no because letting Britain go would hurt the EU. The potential disruption and damage to the EU is not something to be overlooked. But from the perspective of the rest of the EU the loss of the UK would probably not be lethal to European integration. Instead it is the UK who would suffer more. It’s as if Britain is threatening to shoot the EU in the foot while aiming the gun at its own head. Refusing to discuss a Brexit therefore stems in part from a view of Cameron’s strategy as self-defeating, illogical and just plain bonkers.

More than anything the eurozone crisis poses a far greater threat. This is especially so for Germany, the country that more than any other will make the final call on relations with the UK. If anything, Britain’s attempts to try and separate itself from the eurozone crisis has provoked feelings of anger at Britain’s latest show of non-solidarity, with some feeling the loss of the UK might be necessary collateral damage for saving the euro. What this collateral damage would be, however, remains unclear.

It may be that privately parts of the EU have concluded that any renegotiation is doomed because what the EU can offer and what Britain will demand are destined to be too far apart, making a withdrawal inevitable. If so then the only strategy seems to be to remain silent and hope for the best. But this still begs the question of what the EU will look like if the UK does leave.

Book review of Zhiqun Zhu's 'New Dynamics in East Asian Politics: Security, Political Economy and Society'

Will appear in Political Studies Review, Volume 13 of the Journal, Issue 1, January 2015, available via Wiley Online Library. 

Zhiqun Zhu (2012) New Dynamics in East Asian Politics: Security, Political Economy and Society. London: Continuum. 337pp, £19.99 (p/b), ISBN 978 1 4411 6621 0

This wide ranging book works well as an introduction to studying the contemporary politics of East Asia. Focused on China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas, the book’s interdisciplinary approach leads it to being neatly divided into three sections covering security and foreign policy, new political economy, and changing societies. As Zhu explains in the introduction, the aim of the book is to avoid a traditional approach of writing about government, institutions and processes. This is born out in the largely well-written and researched chapters which cover a wealth of topics including the media, gender, national identity and nationalism, student politics, the film industry, local politics, the changing nature of anti-Americanism, environmental issues, security and foreign policy, welfare, and political economy. Throughout the book the coverage ranges from the international and wider-regional perspective through to the national and local. The chapters use a range of theoretical approaches and research models. Each chapter draws on a good selection of sources, with the end of each chapter including further readings and useful questions for on-going discussion.

The book faces four problems, all of which it largely overcomes. First, tying together such a wide range of topics was never going to be easy. But the book manages this by allowing the reader an insight into how this area of the world is coping with globalisation, changes in technology, shifts in power, and the political expectations and outlooks of the peoples of the region. Second, it provides a balanced approach in its coverage of the five states, although clearly due to its size China receives the most attention. The USA is ever-present, understandable given its role as a major East Asian power. However, its use as the main point of reference when making comparisons meant other areas of the world such as South East Asia, Europe or the Middle East received few mentions. Third, the book successfully resists the temptation to focus solely on international relations and security, instead drawing out the incredible economic and social transformations. But it provides a good analysis of the military and political tensions that could undermine these transformations, but which are also being driven by them in part. Finally, the book’s aim to discuss contemporary developments means some chapters will date very quickly, although the overall analysis of the book will remain of interest for many years. 

Piece for the Huffington Post about the UK and TTIP

The British Problem Facing a Transatlantic Trade Deal

Posted: 10/25/2013 6:16 pm

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tim-oliver/the-british-problem-facin_b_4164712.html

The British Government needs a transatlantic trade deal to show the European Union works for Britain, but not only could British threats to leave the E.U. scupper the deal, a successful transatlantic deal could also weaken Britain's commitment to the EU. Britain's dilemma could weaken transatlantic relations.

For successive British governments a deal opening up further the transatlantic marketplace has proved an elusive one. With the U.S.A. and Europe as Britain's main economic partners, even a small deal could produce significant gains for Britain's economy.

Today the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T.T.I.P.) offers hopes for the U.K. For both sides of the Atlantic it promises desperately needed economic growth and a much sought after geopolitical means for the West to face the rise of new powers. Despite T.T.I.P. being the largest bilateral trade deal ever attempted, negotiations aim to conclude by the end of 2014.

But progress has already run into problems. While delays from the U.S. government shut down can be made up, other obstacles are emerging from concerns pushed by agricultural, cultural and social interest groups. The 2014 European Parliament elections look set to produce a Parliament less sympathetic to either the E.U. or a transatlantic deal. And it remains to be seen whether the U.S. Congress can sustain bipartisan support.

British Problems for T.T.I.P.

For Britain's current coalition government T.T.I.P. offers the chance to show how Britain's membership of the E.U. works for the country. For Britain the E.U. has always been more of a means to an end of trade and security, and much less so the E.U.'s founding political ideal of 'ever closer union'. By joining with the rest of the E.U. the U.K. faces the U.S.A. as an economic equal, not the junior partner in a deep and important but inherently imbalanced 'special relationship'. A trade deal also plays well with the current government's aim for export led growth.

Britain is also central to T.T.I.P., thanks not only to its large trade and investment links with both sides, but also because of its central place in transatlantic geopolitical thinking. As a country that puts great effort into maintaining close relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, T.T.I.P. would aid Britain's long-standing aim of closer relations between the two.

Despite this, T.T.I.P. negotiations are haunted by the possibility the U.K. could quit the E.U. The possibility of this happening has increased in part thanks to Prime Minister David Cameron's commitment that should his Conservative Party win the next general election it will seek a renegotiated UK membership followed by an in-out referendum.

Doubts remain as to whether the U.K. will ever face such a referendum, and even Cameron's plans would not unfold until 2015-2017. With T.T.I.P. negotiations scheduled to be wrapped up by the end of 2014 some may wonder what the problem is.

The possibility of an earlier referendum (to say nothing of implications from the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum) cannot be ruled out, especially if the 2014 European Parliament elections produce a landslide result for the deeply-Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party. If T.T.I.P. negotiations are delayed into 2015 then they could become caught up by a British general election, also occasionally suggested as an earlier date for a referendum.

While T.T.I.P. without the U.K. would not be impossible, it would be more difficult and a lesser deal if secured. The survival of T.T.I.P. could become a bargaining chip in the U.K.'s negotiations with the E.U.

T.T.I.P. Problems for Britain

At the same time, a collapse or significant delay of T.T.I.P. negotiations caused by one or more of Britain's E.U. partners, would fuel British Eurosceptic calls for the U.K. to quit the E.U.. Eurosceptics have long argued the E.U. holds Britain back from negotiating its own trade deal with the U.S.A. and other allies.

But there's a twist. T.T.I.P. is likely to weaken Britain's economic relationship with Europe in favor of its already strong transatlantic relations. While other E.U. states would also experience this, their political commitment to European unity is not reflected in the U.K. where, at least in public debate, the economic dimension has always come first. For British Eurosceptics a weakened U.K.-E.U. economic relationship helps ease the way for a U.K. exit.

Shared Problems for the U.S.A., Europe and Britain

For the EU, T.T.I.P. could be become a bargaining chip used by the U.K. to leverage a renegotiated U.K.-E.U. relationship. At the same time, it could push further towards the exit one of its largest member states and one central to transatlantic relations.

For the U.S.A., it would be difficult to imagine a T.T.I.P. without the U.K. It would certainly make T.T.I.P. a more difficult sell to Congress. A U.K. exit from the E.U. would also leave the U.S.A. facing an E.U. changed by the disappearance of one of its most liberal, free trade members.

More damaging for all involved, especially the UK, would be the weakening - or dashing - of hopes T.T.I.P. could provide a stronger geopolitical relationship between the two core parts of the West. Weakening the two relationships it has relied so heavily upon would be a spectacular home-goal for the U.K. But can the rest of the E.U. and the U.S.A. bank on the U.K. not doing so?

Piece for the Huffington Post on US views of a Brexit

My first outing for the Huffington Post. More such pieces to follow.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tim-oliver/the-last-thing-america-needs_b_4097564.html

A European Union Without Britain Is the Last Thing America Needs

Compared to the House of Commons vote on Syria, a British referendum vote to quit the European Union would have far more significant implications for the future of transatlantic relations.

The House of Commons decision not to support U.S. military action against Syria, along with opinion polls pointing towards growing public support to quit the E.U., has prompted warnings the U.K. risks isolating itself from both the U.S.A. and the E.U. But focusing on the implications for U.K.-U.S. and U.K.-E.U. relations distracts from the larger relationship Britain's isolationism would affect: the U.S.-European relationship.

The U.S.A. would be left facing an E.U. changed by the disappearance of one of its largest, economically liberal and outward-looking members. Europe's divisions could be deepened, the E.U. and N.A.T.O. weakened and wider transatlantic relations complicated. Alternatively, the U.S.A. could find itself facing a more united E.U., with the U.K. adrift between the two.

An EU in Flux

A British exit could plunge the E.U. into more navel gazing as it negotiates a U.K. exit, and changes its institutions, budgets and policies to reflect the U.K.'s disappearance.

Combined with changes to the Eurozone, the E.U.'s balance of power could shift. The E.U. could become more inward-looking, tending more toward protectionism. Instead of looking out to the Atlantic the union could look more towards the Mediterranean. Smaller states could gain over large states. The Franco-German axis could be unsettled, leaving a more dominant Germany. E.U. enlargement could stall in the face of unease amongst western states at Europe's center shifting further south or eastwards.

On the other hand, rid of a notoriously awkward and non-Euro member, the Eurozone could become the undisputed core of the E.U., pushing the E.U. further towards "ever closer union." Europe's social model could be freed of British attempts to weaken it. Of course, the extent to which Britain's awkwardness can slow the E.U. has been put into perspective by the Eurozone's own struggles to find solidarity and leadership.

Washington would also face a wider Europe changed by the U.K.'s post-withdrawal relationship with the E.U. If the U.K. and other non-E.U. members thrived and the Eurozone continued to struggle, then Britain's withdrawal could trigger centrifugal forces leading other member states to question their membership, in turn unravelling the E.U. But should the U.K. suffer and the Eurozone stabilise, then the U.K. could be further isolated.

Europe Further Divided

For the U.S.A. or Asia, a British withdrawal may reinforce views of Europe as riven by division and decline. There will still be no answer to "who speaks for Europe?" if the U.K. and other non-E.U. European states disagree with the E.U. Europe could become more vulnerable to divide and rule by external powers.

The disappearance from the E.U. of one of its major military powers could further strain efforts at Europe-wide defense cooperation, whether through the E.U. or N.A.T.O. Alternatively, freed of British hesitancy, E.U. defense efforts could be reinvigorated, albeit never destined to reach their full potential without the U.K.

There will be no shortage of applicants to fill London's place of claiming to be America's closest ally in the E.U. While such applicants might not offer a relationship that can claim to be as "special" as that with the U.K., for the U.S.A. they will be of increased importance thanks to Europe remaining an area of the world in which it retains considerable interests.

However, should a British exit further destabilize the E.U., complicate transatlantic relations and threaten the prospects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to enhance transatlantic cooperation in the face of rising powers, then it would only further dampen what hopes Washington still has for Europe to act as an effective partner.

Britain Adrift in Transatlantic Relations

The vote on Syria raised once again the debate about Britain's place in the world, but this is a debate shaped more than anything else by discussion about Britain's place in Europe. This is a debate so persistent and divisive because it goes to the heart of British identity, security and political economy. It is on the issue of Europe that rests so much of the question of what country the UK wants to be.

A decision by the British to answer this question by quitting the E.U. will still leave the U.S.A. facing a Britain struggling to come to terms with its place in the world. Some talk of a vote to quit the E.U. as the means to reclaim Britain's sovereignty, asserting Britain's independence as a "Switzerland with nukes." That those nukes would have to be carried on U.S. built and serviced missiles shows the limits of that independence.

More importantly, Britain would still struggle to assert its sovereignty in the face of a Europe where the E.U. is likely to remain the predominant political actor, and a more important actor in the daily lives of the British than any other state or international organisation, including the U.S.A.

For the U.S.A., a British exit would change both the U.K. and the E.U., forcing it to reassess the relative merits to be given to its bilateral relationship with the U.K. compared to its much larger multilateral relationship with the E.U. Navigating a course between the two is not something any U.S. Administration should relish
.

Comment on the UK Government's review into the balance of competences between the UK and the EU

I've been taking more and more interest in the UK Government's review into the balance of competences between the UK and the EU. It's a great case study for examining the coalition, the operation of Whitehall, UK-EU relations and how we understand the EU today. The following piece appeared on the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog:

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/37115

The government’s review of EU competences offers valuable academic insights into both Britain and the EU

Blog Admin

The British government’s ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’ into the EU’s role in British life might be surrounded by political tensions, but as Tim Oliver argues, it offers a unique insight into the operation of British government, the politics of the UK’s coalition government, UK-EU relations, the evolution of the EU, and how today we assess what the EU is and approach arguments about what it should be.

The Coalition government’s announcement in July 2012 that, as agreed at the insistence of the Conservative Party as part of the 2010 Coalition Agreement, it was to conduct a full review of the EU’s involvement in British life, has now reached its half way stage. In July 2013 the government published six reviews: health, taxation, the single market, animal health and welfare and food safety, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, and foreign policy. A total of 32 reviews will be published by the autumn of 2014.

Each review follows a similar format: first explaining the historical development of the area reviewed; second, assessing the current situation; third, asking what the UK’s national interest is in the area; finally exploring what options there are for going forward, such as repatriation of powers. The reviews avoid making recommendations, their intention being to inform the political decision that will follow the review. Each draws on evidence submitted in writing or taken in person at a range of meetings.

While 26 reports are still to be published, it is already clear that for academics the review can open up to analysis a variety of issues in current British and international politics.

Coalition Politics

For students of how the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is operating, the political management of the review, its origins and eventual use offer a way of examining how the three groups that shape the government on this issue – Liberal Democrats, the strongly Eurosceptic parts of the Conservative Party, and the less Eurosceptic parts of the Conservative party – approach an issue that deeply divides them. Accusations by John Redwood, a strongly Eurosceptic Conservative MP, that the review is turning into a whitewash shows how it may be seen by some Eurosceptics. Given the depth of such tensions it remains to be seen whether the review will last the course. Nevertheless, both its political outcomes and its use as an instrument for managing such a deep political tension will be a focus for studying the operation of Britain’s first post-1945 coalition government.

Operation of Whitehall

It is, of course, nothing new for a government to use a technical, in-depth inquiry to neutralise a sensitive issue. This review, however, will have presented unique challenges for Whitehall, thanks to its implications for coalition relations, cross-governmental scope, international implications and wider domestic sensitivity. The review then offers a unique example of officialdom walking the fine line between the political and technical, with the language used in the review, indeed the very bureaucratic sounding name, intended to ensure it runs as a technical and inherently dull activity. So far the reviews published provide a wealth of technical detail. Nevertheless, despite the 390 public submissions I count so far, questions will inevitably be asked about how open, selective and thorough the process has been. If the review is to serve as a central plank to any British renegotiation then the method of the review, and thus the reliability of the approach, will come under significant political, media and academic scrutiny.

UK-EU Relations

The sheer breadth of the 32 reviews in themselves tell us something about the nature of the UK-EU relationship, something Eurosceptics will point to as what they feel is wrong. At the same time, the detail of the review, and to a lesser extent exercises such as the Conservative group ‘Fresh Start’, have provided a welcome injection of detailed evidence based analysis to the debate. This in itself is a radical change given how, as the Leveson Report on Press Regulation made clear, Britain’s media has often resorted to simply making up stories about the EU. For academic analysis, particular interest will be into how – or if – a technical review shapes final public opinion. Will politicians, the media and voters be swayed by an approach based on the opinions of experts and evidence, or will emotion, gut instinct and made-up stories prevail? And how will the narrow reviews connect to the wider cross-cutting debates about Britain’s political economy, identity, constitution, security and place in the world?

For those interested in how a state identifies its national – or European – interests, the review process opens up the British system, although much remains behind closed doors. The evidence submitted to each review lays bare the competition between private, civil society, international, political and governmental interests that so often shape a state’s views. It shows an EU member state coming to terms with how to balance sovereignty, competing national and sectoral interests, international obligations and membership of the EU.

The reviews specific purpose of informing a possible renegotiated relationship between the UK and EU, one that is to reflect the UK’s national interest, should make it a central point of reference for studying any such attempt. When the history of the 2010-2020 period of UK-EU relations is written it could well be about a renegotiation, an in-out referendum and potentially a withdrawal; events that will have defined so much of UK politics, Britain’s place in the world and an EU changed by a change in relations with one of its largest members. The review will underpin much of this, and be referred back to for guidance should the UK opt to withdraw.

Comparisons have already been made with other reviews intended to propose reforms to the EU, such as the Dutch review. The British review will take its place amongst the many studies and academic reviews of an EU in a state of flux. Academics are in a position to put aside the politics that led other member states to decline involvement in what some see as a unilateral British review. Instead we can examine and assess a review that is amongst the most extensive, well-resourced and organised of any review of EU activity since the 2001-2003 European Convention.

The Evolution of the EU

For students of international relations and European integration the review does something we rarely see: a state comprehensively cataloguing the impact on it of the international. Any reading of the reviews also shows how Europeanisation often reflects globalised pressures or wider Western multilateral efforts.

With the EU remaining an organisation of member states, the UK’s experiences can to some extent be extrapolated to other member states. Here the scale of EU involvement in British life might seem to point to some form of downloading or spill-over theory of integration, but the reviews also point to examples where Britain has successfully uploaded or cross-loaded its policy agenda. As Simon Usherwood has noted of the published reviews, that they point to a broadly appropriate balance of competences reflects the complex negotiating system of the EU.

Theoretical debates aside, with the EU in a state of flux the review serves as an exercise of taking-stock of the EU’s development, an entity which remains sui generis in international relations. That today many in the EU struggle to think of it as an international organisation, which it technically remains, is demonstrated in page after page of the published reviews.

Conclusion

How will academics analyse the review in several years’ time? Will we see it as a futile, politically motivated activity, subsumed into the larger political tensions of the coalition government at a time of heightened tensions between the UK and the EU? Or will we look at both the politics and beyond it to see a review, which while it has its problems, stands as a unique experience for both Britain and the EU, and a unique opportunity for the study of both?

Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 

About the Author

Tim Oliver is a Fritz Thyssen Transatlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C. Educated at the University of Liverpool and the London School of Economics, he has worked in the European Parliament, the House of Lords, and taught at UCL, LSE and as a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Selected FP spots from 16-22 September 2013

1. UK and South Africa: A Relationship Worth Maintaining
   Alex Vines of Chatham House and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive, South African Institute of International Affairs, remind us of the close relations between South Africa and the UK, especially relevant when the FCO is pushing for stronger relations with African states. 
2. 64% of Brits have a favourable view of the UN
   Pew Research shows global views of the UN
3. Tony Blair nearly destroyed the Foreign Office. William Hague is rebuilding it
   Peter Oborne's short piece notes an important step forward - or back to the future - for the FCO: the re-opening of its language school. 
4. UK should use competence review as a constructive exerciseMichael Emerson of the Centre  for European Policy Studies looks at how the Balance of Competences Review could work for the UK. Despite ongoing concerns about the political neutrality review, it looks to be on course to provide a wide-ranging review - the first of its type in the EU - of the role the EU plays in the UK.
5. Hand-waving as renegotiation: The UK’s (and EU’s) limited option
   Meanwhile Simon Ushwerwood considers some of the options Britain faces should the Balance of Competences Review need to be used in a renegotiation. 
6. Labour should 'be prepared to use military force as a last resort
   Labour still wrestling with the fallout from the Syria vote.
7. Foreign aid: transparency will help African nations prosper
   The Observer's editorial makes a valid, if perhaps obvious point.
8. Transatlantic Trends 2013
   More to come from this regular survey, but the basics are here. 
9. Green Standard 2013
   The Green Alliance review how the three UK wide parties green credentials compare on the economy, communities, nature and international leadership.
10. Trident and the Liberal Democrats
    There was plenty of analysis of the Lib Dem decision to back a 'Trident-Lite' system. This BASIC review is neat and to the point. 

A piece for the LSE's EUROPP blog.

A piece for the LSE's EUROPP blog about whether the EU's unwillingness to discuss the possibility of a 'Brexit' is playing into the hands of Eurosceptics.

The EU’s unwillingness to discuss the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ is playing into the hands of Eurosceptics

British Prime Minister David Cameron has made a commitment to hold a referendum on the UK’s EU membership, should his party win the next general election. Tim Oliver writes that while the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ has been much discussed in the UK context, across the rest of the EU the issue has largely been downplayed or avoided. He argues that if EU leaders continue to remain silent on the topic it may add momentum to the arguments of British Eurosceptics.

In Britain the idea of quitting the European Union provokes lively debate about its desirability, likelihood and what it could mean. But as I recently discovered while researching the potential impact of a UK exit on the EU, debate elsewhere in the EU is limited. Yet it would be a significant moment for the EU if a country of 63 million Europeans voted to leave. So why, when the possibility has become more real than ever before, has debate elsewhere been so limited?

First, discussing the idea of a withdrawal from the EU has long been a taboo. Under international law there is nothing to prevent a member state exercising the right to leave, exactly what the UK would have done had it voted to leave in its 1975 referendum. Yet it was not until the advent of the European Constitution in 2004 that the right was clearly stated. Even then the idea faced opposition. Amendments were tabled to remove the article outlining a process of withdrawal, now known as Article 50 TEU.

As the Dutch Government made clear in justifying an amendment to delete the article: ‘facilitating the possibility to withdraw from the Union is contrary to the idea of European integration as set out in the preamble of the TEU: “Resolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.’ The idea Britain might break with this, or as David Cameron has suggested, seek to stay in the EU but drop the commitment to ‘ever closer union,’ questions the EU’s founding ideas. No wonder it provokes an uncomfortable silence from elsewhere.

Feeding this taboo is a concern that triggering Article 50 would open a Pandora’s Box the rest of the EU might prefer was kept firmly shut and best not thought about. Questions overhang how the process set out in Article 50 is to be enacted. What negotiating red lines should the EU set down? What type of post-withdrawal relationship should be offered to the UK?

Then there is the prospect of shifts in the balance of power within the EU brought about from reorganising its institutions, budgets and policies to make up for the absence of the British. Would small states gain over large states? Would north and west lose out to south and east? Would Europe become less open and more protectionist, and what hopes would there be for EU foreign and security cooperation? What would happen to relations with other non-EU European states, NATO, and the United States? Might other member states be tempted to threaten withdrawal to get their way or, alternatively, could the EU become more willing to threaten the expulsion of a difficult member state? Could the withdrawal be blamed on British Euroscepticism, or would it reflect and connect with growing Euroscepticism elsewhere? Could the withdrawal unleash centrifugal forces that begin the unravelling of the EU, or could the EU, rid of an awkward member, find it easier to move towards ‘ever closer union’?

The rest of the EU could also be forgiven for thinking we’ve been here before. The current debate has strong echoes of the successful, if ultimately insignificant, renegotiation followed by an in-out referendum in 1975. Then there’s the never ending series of complaints and snipes the EU has been subjected to in the UK political debate. Again, the rest of the EU could be forgiven for thinking this is just another example of the British threatening to throw their toys out of the pram. Even in Britain few are certain whether the British will ever follow through on the commitment to hold an EU referendum, everything hanging on developments between now and a general election due by 2015. So why should the rest of the EU pre-empt such a move by confronting the issue? It might appear better to wait it out and call Britain’s bluff by remaining silent.

Ignoring British demands, or refusing to take them seriously, certainly appeals to those who see the approach adopted by David Cameron in his January 2013 speech as nothing short of trying to blackmailthe rest of the EU. Cameron’s demand for a renegotiated relationship or Britain will likely vote to leave, rests on the idea the EU can’t say no because letting Britain go would damage the EU. The potential disruption and damage to the EU is not something to be overlooked, but from the perspective of the rest of the EU it is the UK who would suffer the far bigger consequences. It’s as if Britain is threatening to shoot the EU in the foot while aiming the gun at its own head. A refusal to discuss a Brexit therefore stems in part from a view of Cameron’s strategy as self-defeating, illogical and just plain bonkers.

More than anything the rest of the EU has largely ignored the issue because of the far greater damage the collapse of the euro could bring. This is especially so for Germany, the country that more than any other will make the final call on negotiations with the UK. But this week’s federal election means Germany is not interested right now. If anything, for members of the Eurozone Britain’s attempts to try and separate itself have provoked only feelings of anger at what they see as Britain’s latest show of non-solidarity. Not only has the crisis in the Eurozone therefore left little room to debate the British question, it has if anything provoked some feelings that losing the UK might be necessary collateral damage for saving the euro. What this collateral damage would be, however, is unclear.

How long then can the rest of the EU avoid discussing the issue of a Brexit? There remains a chance a referendum could be triggered sooner than many think. More likely the EU would have to face the issue after 2015. If a newly elected British government pursued a renegotiation and referendum, then it will be difficult for the EU to ignore the possibility of discussing a withdrawal. The British public and the rest of the EU will need to know what will happen should the British say no to any renegotiated relationship and opt to leave.

If anything, the rest of the EU’s silence could add to the momentum for Britain to leave by playing into the hands of Eurosceptics – who would then be left to argue either that the rest of the EU doesn’t care about the UK, or doesn’t want to admit how much it needs it. Here the EU needs to realise that if it were to remain silent and do little to keep Britain in, then a Brexit could end up looking like a passive expulsion. Just as confrontation with an unwanted guest at a party can be avoided by making them feel so uncomfortable and isolated that they leave, so too might it be easier to make things suitably uncomfortable that Britain leaves of its own accord. But it still leaves the unanswered question of what type of party the rest of the EU will then be left with.

Selected FP spots 9-15 September 2013

Every day I spend time clearing Feedly of the close to 500 feeds I've asked it to follow, most connected to British politics, Britain's international relations or international relations in general. Feedly, and before it Google Reader, have long been the way I follow the news, announcements by government, the work of Parliament, think tank publications, events, blogs, and any websites that catch my eye.

Sometimes I miss clearing it for 2-3 days, in which case I face the chore of clearing a backlog of several thousand unread articles. Whether it's a night's worth of feeds or a backlog from a bank holiday weekend, I'll end up skimming most of the articles headlines or summaries. As with skimming a newspaper, only a small proportion of the articles I skim over will interest me. Often a lot of will be repeated in several feeds, the product of that day's news. But everyday articles are fed through that don't fit that day's news summaries. Often they can be reports from think tanks, publications by government, or the work of Parliament.

Once I've read an article that interests me it usually follows the thousands I skimmed over by being stamped 'marked as read', most never to be seen again. But sometimes an article sticks in my mind that I want to do more with. Some end up saved, then perhaps entered into Zotero. The lucky ones even make it into articles and research. But I've long wanted to try and do more with them than this. So each week I'm going to flag up ten articles I've found of interest, specifically those relating to the UK's international relations. My criteria for interesting? They don't fit the daily news agenda, or if they do they stand out as they say something different.

This is going to take some time to refine, and this week's entry isn't helped by how it was only on Wednesday that I thought I should start doing this, by which time half the week's feeds were marked as read. That, and the lack of a paywall, explains the number of Guardian pieces. That said, here's a first attempt...

1. The Guardian reports on life on the distant remnant of empire that is Ascension Island where inhabitants fear they may be headed the same way as the original inhabitants of Diego Garcia.

2. Mats Persson writes in the Guardian about what the Swedish 2003 Euro referendum can teach us about any UK in-out referendum on the EU. I've argued the way Britain is approaching the issue won't work, and in his piece Mats Persson makes a contribution which goes some way beyond the shallow way an in-out referendum is debated in the UK. 

3. Writing in the Conversation, Michael Galsworthy and Michael Browne make a case for the UK to remain in the EU for the benefits it brings for scientific research. Meanwhile elsewhere on The Conversation John Bryson argues a skills shortage in engineering is undermining Britain's chance of global success. 

4. Writing in the Guardian, Michael White draws out what the German elections could mean for UK-EU relations. 

5. International Affairs September issue has a series of articles on the UK, covering everything from the UK's strategic choices in the face of a US pivoting towards Asia, through to Britain's diaspora links providing new links for its place in the world. There's even a book review by a one Tim Oliver... 

6. The Guardian's map of the UK's arms trade offers a reminder of how local this issue is.

7. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs looks back at the effects on Britain's place in the world of HM the Queen's Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games.

8. The House of Commons Library has updated its Commons Library Standard Note on Parliamentary approval for deploying the armed forces. 

9. The Syria vote continues to provoke debate. Nick Cohen has little time for Ed Miliband's position. Meanwhile, as the Guardian reports, several senior politicians signed a letter drafted by Save the Children, urging the UK not to forget its humanitarian responsibilities. 

10. Tim Street, writing on the BASIC blog, explores the democratic and legal background to Britain's nuclear weapon system, a topic often overlooked in a debate too often narrowed to one of cost. 

On Tuesday the Liberal Democrat conference will see debates and votes on Europe and Trident. I'll therefore leave until next week any articles examining the Liberal Democrat approach to these issues.

Europe Without Britain: Assessing the Impact on the EU of a British Withdrawal

The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - the German Institute for International and Security Affairs - Berlin, has published my research paper analysing the impact on the EU of a British withdrawal. You can access it here. 

I don't support a British withdrawal – a Brexit – from the EU. Nor do I support the way the Prime Minister has approached the idea of a renegotiation of the UK's membership. And while I think the possibility  the British will vote to withdraw is still open to debate, the possibility has clearly increased. What has not increased is debate elsewhere in the EU as to what this might mean for it. Over the next few days I'll outline why this is the case in some comment pieces elsewhere and linked here. 

If this research paper argues one thing more than any other, it is that there needs to be more argument about this issue. A British withdrawal could change the EU quite profoundly, for better or worse. But as things stand most analysis of this is based on very shallow speculation. 

Without setting out the detail of the paper – read it! - I do end the report with 10 questions the EU needs to ask itself about a Brexit:

1. Should the EU refuse to discuss the idea of a British withdrawal until a vote to withdraw actually happens?
2. Should the issue of withdrawal be discussed as part of any renegotiation of Britain’s relationship inside the EU?
3. What red-lines should the EU set down for any discussion of withdrawal, either in any renegotiation or during a withdrawal negotiation? 
4. How is Britain’s part in European integration – both positive and negative – to be assessed?
5. To what extent would a UK withdrawal help solve the problems with the Eurozone and make possible further progress towards ‘ever closer union’?
6. What would a UK withdrawal mean for the EU’s international standing and security?
7. What type of relationship would the EU like to have with a UK that has left the EU, and how would this fit with, or change, the EU’s relationships with other non-EU parts of Europe?
8. Should further written clarification be prepared about Article 50 TEU, and if so who is to do this?
9. What processes should the EU follow to manage the internal changes to the EU brought about by a UK withdrawal?
10. How would a UK withdrawal shift the balance of power in the EU and the direction of European integration?

What would a British Withdrawal from the EU mean for the EU?

Worry not, I'm not advocating a British withdrawal from the EU! But what I am advocating is that the EU starts thinking about what it would mean for it. So far the debate has focused almost entirely on what a withdrawal would mean for the UK. Let me be clear: a British withdrawal would involve bigger costs for the UK than the EU. But we cannot deny the effect on the EU would be palpable. Yet discussion of what could be a major event in the EU's development has been very limited. You can read my piece in the IP Journal of the DGAP: https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/who-suffers-most-brexit

Why an In-Out Referendum Won't Settle the European Question in British Politics

I'm uneasy about adding to the current obsession with arguing about Europe, but for what it's worth here is my two pennies' worth...

http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/britains_european_question.html