Evidence submitted back in September, addressing the committee's question of how the 2015 NSS should handle the uncertainty over the UK’s role in Europe. My evidence appears on pages 53-58:
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/national-security-strategy/The%20next%20security%20strategy%20(forth%20review)/ThenextNationalSecurityStrategyEvidence18122014.pdf
Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Diplomacy and International Governance at Loughborough University London.
Friday, December 19, 2014
Sunday, November 16, 2014
London, England, Britain and Europe: Places Apart?
A short piece about the position of London in English, UK and EU politics. Written for the blog of the APSA British Politics Group.
Academics are often as guilty as many others for lazily using ‘London’ as a catch-all term to describe the UK, UK Government, the financial institutions of ‘the City of London’, England, or ‘the South’ or South East of England. Of course, as the UK’s capital city this usage can often seem logical enough. But London is a place in itself, a city of millions with a distinct population, an economic and social system with its own needs and interests, a place with an identity and politics of its own.
At a time when attention is fixed on Scotland it is worth remembering that it is not just Scotland or areas such as Wales or Northern Ireland that are distinct political spaces. London, an area with a larger and faster growing population and economy than anywhere else in the UK, and the UK’s most powerful cultural and political centre, deserves more attention. And, for this author and others, it deserves its own fully devolved government. The ‘London question’ – how the rest of the UK relates to its capital city that is fast becoming another place – is one of the most pressing questions in British politics.
To continue reading please visit the blog of the APSA British Politics Group.
Labels:
devolution,
English politics,
London,
UK-EU
Friday, November 14, 2014
Piece for E!Sharp: 10 questions for the EU about a Brexit
Every week seems to bring a new row between Britain and the rest of the EU. UK-EU relations have never been what could be called stable or easy-going. But relations today seem to have reached new lows. Britain comes across as a wrecker or blackmailer that is ‘lighting a fire under the EU’, to quote Philip Hammond MP, Britain’s Foreign Secretary. Things are so bad that few doubt leaked reports that Angela Merkel is prepared to see Britain leave rather than agree to British demands to restrict freedom of movement within the EU.
If UK-EU differences cannot be reconciled and a British exit becomes highly likely - admittedly very big ifs in themselves - then the EU needs to give careful thought to ten questions about where this could lead it. Britain too will need to think about the EU’s likely answers. How UK-EU relations develop in the face of a Brexit will depend less on what London demands and more on how the rest of the EU - the much larger partner in this - responds.
For the full piece please visit: http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/247-10-questions-for-the-eu-about-a-brexit/
Monday, October 27, 2014
Piece for European Geostrategy
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For the complete piece follow this link: http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/united-kingdom-europe-should-it-come-or-go/ |
Labels:
Brexit,
British foreign policy,
EU,
European geopolitics,
NATO,
UK-EU
Thursday, October 23, 2014
Written evidence to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
Follow this link for a pdf or webpage copy of evidence I submitted to the inquiry 'The future of devolution after the referendum'. My evidence argues for a devolved parliament and government for London. Can also be found on one of my academia.edu pages.
Tuesday, October 07, 2014
What if the EU ...?
Today the DGAP and PISM released the edited compilation of the full 'What if the EU ...?' series I contributed a piece to. See pages 15-17 for my piece, 'Living Awkwardly Ever After: What If the British Had Voted to Leave the European Economic Community in 1975?'
Sunday, October 05, 2014
Piece on UK-EU relations for the blog of the APSA British Politics Group
A short piece for the blog of the APSA British Politics Group in which I summarise the findings of the 2014 DGAP report I edited with Almut Moller, 'The United Kingdom and the European Union: what would a Brexit mean for the EU and other states around the world?”
http://britishpoliticsgroup.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/european-and-international-views-of-uk.html
http://britishpoliticsgroup.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/european-and-international-views-of-uk.html
Thursday, October 02, 2014
It’s time for a Balance of Competences Review of the UK
A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog.
Scotland’s vote to remain within the UK has triggered a pressing constitutional debate about the allocation of powers and competences in the UK. Meanwhile, the UK government has been busy reviewing the balance of competences of the EU. With attention now on the imbalances and inconsistencies in the distribution of competences within the UK, the recent EU review might offer lessons for approaching the UK’s constitutional conundrum.
Scotland’s vote to remain within the UK has triggered a pressing constitutional debate about the allocation of powers and competences in the UK. Meanwhile, the UK government has been busy reviewing the balance of competences of the EU. With attention now on the imbalances and inconsistencies in the distribution of competences within the UK, the recent EU review might offer lessons for approaching the UK’s constitutional conundrum.
Since July 2012 the UK government has been undertaking an audacious review into UK-EU relations called the ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’. Driven by a belief, especially within the Conservative Party, that the EU has taken too much power (to simplify the more technical term of ‘competences’) from the UK, the review set out to test this claim and publish its findings in 32 evidence based sectoral reports. By doing so the review provides evidence for a bigger political discussion that will follow it, and as such is noted intended to reach any clear political decisions itself. Those political decisions are likely to feed into whether to move forward in a renegotiation of the UK’s membership of the EU, something that could then be followed by an in-out referendum.
The constitutional distribution of powers within the UK – whether to areas such as Scotland or to local government – has been the subject of any number of reports and inquiries. Today, thanks to the Scottish referendum, the need to address the issue is more real than ever before. Indeed, how the UK approaches the issue is likely to either make or break it. This has led to various calls for constitutional conventions and Royal commissions. If the UK government is prepared to invest a great deal of time and effort into the matter of the EU’s balance of competences, should it not do the same for the UK? As historian Timothy Garton-Ash argued in the Guardian: “In what rational universe can [the EU’s balance of competences] be separated from determining the balance of competences inside the UK?” Could then a review of the balance of competences of the UK be undertaken? Does the EU review offer lessons or even perhaps a model – if the time is available – to finding a way to rebalance and sort the current constitutional mess the UK is in?
The Imbalanced Union
The list of problems with the UK’s internal balance of powers is a long and familiar one, one the debate in Scotland has once again thrown a light on. Devolution has been focused on certain areas such as Scotland and Wales, allowing them to develop as more distinct political spaces within the UK, building on existing differences that pre-date devolution. While this is to be welcomed as a move away from the over-concentration of power in Westminster, the lack of any clearly defined UK-wide agendas in health or transport means these areas can seem increasingly detached from the UK. Devolving further powers, as promised in a variety of ways by the main UK parties during the Scottish referendum debate, could form part of a solution to the flawed setup whereby Scotland spends money it has no responsibility for raising. But it then leaves open the problem of what it is that Westminster does for Scotland beyond foreign, defence and some tax and macroeconomic policies. Then there is the West Lothian question of why Scottish MPs can vote on matters that pertain to England while English MPs cannot vote on similar matters for Scotland as they have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. This all adds to the impression that there is little strategic sense of how the UK as a whole is or should be changing together constitutionally.
Even if the Scots had voted to leave, the imbalances within the remaining UK would not have gone away. Questions already exist about the voting rights of Welsh and Northern Ireland MPs, and the dominance of Greater London over the rest of the UK is an underlying theme the management of which is arguably the most demanding challenge of all. The failure of Labour’s half-hearted attempt at English regionalism in the 2004 North East referendum has stalled further efforts at devolution within England. London’s place in the UK is often crudely taken to mean the government in Whitehall or the political elite in Westminster. This is an unfair description of Britain’s and the EU’s biggest city, the home to more people than live in Scotland and Wales combined, and a region with its own political institutions such as the Mayor, London Assembly, and ‘the City.’ Attempts to fill out the incomplete devolution settlement by granting further powers – perhaps even fully devolved powers – to London would also lead to questions about whether London MPs should be barred from voting on non-London English matters. Not that ‘English laws’ themselves are that clearly discernable, as the McKay Commission found. Proposals for an English Parliament immediately run into questions surrounding the balance of competences: what powers and competences should rest with it, which with local or regional government, and which at UK level.
Greater London’s own current political and administrative setup raises questions about the rather pathetic, emaciated state of local government, especially in England. As the London Finance Commission noted, as a proportion of GDP Canada’s ratio of local and regional spending is nine times higher than that in the UK. In France the ratio is nearly three times greater. On everything from housing, tube lines, planning and schools, Whitehall and Westminster – and especially HM Treasury – call the shots in England, with knock-on effects for the other parts of the UK thanks to the way money is allocated. With local councillors largely powerless, and few people in England with access to any other level of representation, MPs are overwhelmed with local matters. Meanwhile the UK executive that MPs are sent to Westminster to hold to account goes about its business, albeit one where a centralised Whitehall itself is overloaded with work.
This growing inability to offer a UK-wide policy agenda is not a mere dry, technical issue. It means the UK can lack some common political themes or mechanisms to manage relation between its different parts. The United Kingdom is there to serve a purpose: for most UK citizens that purpose will be unclear if Westminster lacks any means of doing anything or behaving as a UK-wide government. The imbalances are felt even in foreign policy, one area Westminster retains powers. A study by the IPPR into Englishness found a strong link between Euroscepticism and English frustration at the imbalanced constitutional status of the UK.
A Balance of Competences Review of the UK?
Solving these imbalances will not be easy. As mentioned, there have been a large number of detailed and insightful reports, each putting forward proposals. There have been repeated calls for constitutional conventions, Royal Commissions or some meeting of representatives from the UK’s various parliaments to hammer out a deal. Whatever is chosen, a means will need to be found to provide an evidence based assessment of the current distribution of powers. The UK Government’s review of the EU’s competences offers some lessons, but nine points need to be taken into account.
First, while the EU review is a complex one, it is made more straightforward thanks to the EU’s competences being set out in its treaties. These treaties provide a constitutional map for the EU that the UK lacks with its uncodified constitution. The EU’s more limited competences also mean the review does not really have to tackle the thorny issue of tax raising powers and allocation of spending, something HM Treasury may be the most unwilling to see change. It has also not been a speedy one, the review having started in July 2012 and expected to conclude in the autumn of 2014. While a UK review could be more compact, we should be under no illusions that the scale would be much larger.
Second, would a UK review be about the effectiveness or the legitimacy of where powers should reside? When the initial findings of the EU review pointed to a balance that is about right for practical and administrative reasons, the findings were dismissed by Eurosceptics as irrelevant to the bigger question of whether they are legitimate.
Third, the EU review works on the assumption that subsidiarity means a competence should rest with Westminster unless it is shown to be necessary that it rests with the EU. Could a UK review take a position that upholds the idea of parliamentary sovereignty whereby all powers rest with Westminster unless proved to be necessarily otherwise? Would Westminster be prepared to consider the idea of sharing powers? The EU review has served as a reminder that Westminster has something of a zero-sum, majoritarian mentality about power: you devolve power within the UK, not share them; you sign over and can later, if necessary, repatriate powers from the EU, not pool them.
Fourth, even if Westminster is willing to share, as the British government may find with the EU, rebalancing competences could require some powers to be taken back while others are given. How willing would Westminster be to devolve further powers, and how willing would areas such as Scotland be to return some powers to Westminster if this was deemed necessary for an effectively functioning UK-wide system? How might this conflict with long-standing areas of devolution in Scotland, such as education and law where administrative devolution existed long before political devolution in 1999 (and some areas predate the union of 1707)? Some in Scotland would be as unwilling to return some powers to Westminster as some in Westminster would be to hand over powers to the EU, even if in both cases evidence was produced that showed this could improve the balance of competences and make for more effective governance.
Fifth, the balance of EU competences could change in the future, necessitating another review. This is hardly unusual. Federal systems such as Germany and the USA have ongoing debates and mechanisms for reviewing what competences should lie where. The UK would need to move from a situation where it has these debates in Scotland or Greater London to one where they are UK-wide and become a standard constitutional procedure.
Sixth, who is to undertake the review and who is it to serve? The EU review is overseen by the Cabinet Office and the FCO and implemented by individual Whitehall departments. It is unlikely a UK government led review would be seen as impartial by some in the UK. The EU review itself has run into this problem. The British government has been keen to present the review as being about EU reform, and not simply about the UK. Despite this it has been spurned by other EU states who view it as being about the UK’s national interests. Even in the UK, Eurosceptics have dismissed it as a government whitewash.
Seventh, who might dominate and shape the work of a UK review? With the EU review a large amount of evidence and opinions have so far been received from businesses, academics, NGOs, charities, lobby groups, lawyers, political activists, political parties, local and devolved government, a few foreign governments and organisations, and some individual UK citizens. It may end up being viewed as one beholden to well-organised groups such as businesses or political activists. The same could happen in a UK review, where some well organised an resourced areas, such as Scotland or London, could dominate the findings.
Eighth, the EU review has been driven in part by growing political pressure from the emergence of UKIP. What political backing or campaigns would push a UK review? So far most such campaigns have been geographically focused on Scotland, Wales, London, and to a lesser and more vague way in England. Thanks to the Scottish referendum there might now be growing pressure for a constitutional convention, but this has yet to grab much public attention or backing although this could emerge.
Ninth, an emerging problem with the EU review is that it shows a disjuncture between popular feelings about what the EU does and what it actually does. The EU review can provide evidence to help counter such views, but the review cannot do this on its own. A UK review could find that some of the distribution of competences within the UK is contrary to popular opinion or opinions held in certain local area or regions. Changing that opinion will then be for whatever follows the review. How this is to be done would be for whatever that is, for example would a UK balance of competences review serve a constitutional convention that is then followed by a referendum? Or would it be for a general election to settle? The referendum could fail or deepen divisions if an area of the UK rejected it. In a UK review this could become more likely if the review was seen as unfair. Getting the balance right from the start will be important, but this could run into a problem of appearing to prejudice the impartiality of a review if it is intended to gather evidence.
A Rebalanced Union?
We should be under no illusions that the UK faces a series of growing problems about its internal distribution of powers. The UK may move towards a federal union, or continue its current quasi-federal arrangements, become a confederation, or perhaps outline a series of arrangements guaranteeing some form of UK-wide commonwealth. Whatever is the end result, a way will need to be found to review and report on the current distribution of competences. While the issue of the EU is important, obsessions about the UK becoming a part of a federal Europe too easily distract from the need to think more carefully about the UK’s own internal balance of competences. The current EU review shows how difficult a similar review – or indeed, any form or review – of the UK would be.
Europe to Britain: Our Patience is Running Out
The E.U. values Britain's membership and a "Brexit" would be felt across Europe and around the world. But Britain is not indispensable. If faced with a choice the E.U. comes first, Britain second.
Once again Europe has found itself transfixed by British politics. Scotland's independence referendum raised unease across Europe, whether it was Spanish worries about Catalan independence or German concerns an independent Scotland would carry on Britain's habit of demanding special E.U. opt-outs. But one concern registered everywhere: that a Scottish exit from the U.K. might make a British exit from the E.U. more likely.
Almost all debate about a Brexit is about what it would mean for Britain. Yet a Brexit would have big - but largely unexplored - implications for the E.U. and Europe's place in the world. A recent compilation of research from 26 countries from across Europe and countries such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Singapore and Brazil has shed light on European and international thinking about where U.K.-E.U. relations are headed. The message for Britain is hardly positive.
Britain's European debate does not pass unnoticed. But understanding of the nuanes of the debate varies from country to country. While nobody is planning for a Brexit, many feel plans may become necessary because Britain's debate increaingly seems detached and closed to outside influence. Nobody is under any illusions that a Brexit would be an unprecedented and damaging experience for the E.U. and Europe. It is the U.K., however, that many feel would be the most damaged.
Views of Britain's behaviour are framed more by the wider concerns facing the E.U., especially the Eurozone. While the catchwords of the U.K.'s reform agenda for the E.U. - competitiveness, flexibility, democracy - resonate across the E.U., the real pressure for reform comes from those rescuing the Eurozone.
Countries within the Euro zone, Euro pre-in countries such as Poland and Sweden, and even Denmark with its opt-out, have focused on Germany and France for leadership. Despite its efforts, London is seen as a bystander and at times an additional hurdle.
Too often Britain misunderstands initiatives that seem to align with the U.K.'s own hopes. States such as the Netherlands and Germany seek a better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not London's aims for repatriation. A multispeed E.U. is considered a possibility, but not - as the U.K. might hope - in a pick-and-choose fashion. There is increasingly less appetite in Brussels for "third ways" like Switzerland. For other E.U. member states, London's proposals, while tempting in the short-term, are not seen as sustainable in the longer run as they could leave the E.U. weak and divided.
This does not mean nobody worries about losing the U.K. Almost every state worries about losing Britain's free-market, liberal outlook. Yet some countries note a growing "mercantilist" attitude in British thinking. Some countries traditionally close to the U.K. also note a decline in economic links, and some are clear they would seek to exploit the economic opportunities that could arise from Britain's marginalisaiton. Britain can forget any hope of securing a withdrawal deal which allows it to undercut the E.U. States outside the E.U. fear the economic disruptions of a Brexit, and dread the E.U. becomming more inward looking.
Euroepan secuirty would also be changed. France would be left facing Germany's "culture of restraint" on international affairs, leaving little hope of improvements in European defence. For the USA, a Brexit would stunt long-standing hopes for improvements to European defence cooperation, weakening relations between the E.U. and NATO. A Brexit would create opportunities for outside powers to play on European divisions.
While economic and security concerns remind other E.U. members of the U.K.'s role, they do not necessarily generate sympathy. Instead the feeling is exasperation at London's inability to offer anything but negative leadership. The U.K.'s debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct attack on the Single Market's right of free movement of people and labour. E.U. countries fear the influence of British Eurosceptics on their own domestic debate and are frustrated London has not done more to confront the issue.
The end result is a situation where the rest of the E.U. is angry at how the U.K. appears to be advancing agendas that are about Britain's national interest and where the threat of Brexit is used as leverage - or blackmail as some see it - to achieve these aims.
For both the E.U. and the U.K., avoiding a further deterioration of relations will not be easy. With the U.K.'s general election campaign soon to get underway (and the ongoing fallout from Scotland's referendum), engaging London on European policies is likely to become even more difficult.
With Britain on the sidelines of E.U. politics, both the U.K. and the rest of the E.U. will need to appreciate that this could easily turn into the outside. Britain could leave, or the E.U. could lose patience and end up excluding Britain by integrating in ways that leave it behind.
Saturday, September 20, 2014
A devolved government for London would be a big step towards rebalancing power in the UK
A piece for the LSE's British Politics and Policy Blog : http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/a-devolved-government-for-london-would-be-a-big-step-towards-rebalancing-power-in-the-uk/
In the wake of the Scottish independence referendum, and Cameron’s
announcement of a ‘devolution revolution’, Tim Oliver argues for
creating a fully devolved government for London. This would not only improve
the running of the most important region in the UK, it would go some way
towards breaking the problematic link between the politics and government of
the UK and the politics and government of London.
Devolving more power to the UK’s nations, regions and cities,
as promised in response to the surge in support for Scottish independence,
would bring a welcome change to the over-centralised nature of the UK state,
especially in England. In the debate so far, London has often been portrayed as
the villain, with anger directed at the over-centralised UK government based there,
the incredible power the wider metropolis wields over the rest of the UK, and
how UK government and London’s interests too often align. Yet as the UK’s most
powerful, rich and most populous region, London itself cannot be forgotten in
whatever happens now Scotland has voted to stay in the UK. Creating a fully
devolved government for London – or technically ‘Greater London’ to use the
term for the geographical administrative area – would not only improve the
running of the most important region in the UK, it would go some way towards
breaking the problematic link between the politics and government of the UK and
the politics and government of London.
No other large developed state has a capital city that dominates the
rest of the country as London dominates Britain. London’s population equals
that of Scotland and Wales combined, with a growing
population meaning Northern Ireland can soon be added to the
list. If the larger metro-region measurement is used then London is home to 13.6 million people,
or 21% of the UK’s population. Its economy dwarfs that of any other region,
producing about 22% of
the UK’s economic output, making it the richest area of the UK,
with central London the richest area in
Europe. ‘The City’, London’s financial heart, is not just the centre
of British business but the centre of global finance.
London is home to most of the UK’s main government, security,
diplomatic, media and cultural institutions (including large investments such
as the Millennium Dome and the London Olympics). It is home to thelargest
concentration of top-ranking universities in the world. It also
stands out as Europe’s premier international city, especially for business.
Paris might come close to matching London on population, but in terms of high-skilled
knowledge based jobs Paris does not come even remotely close.
London’s growing population is a cosmopolitan one, fed by immigration, with
over a third of
Londoners born outside the UK. For London, competition and
comparison is not with Glasgow, the North West of England or even cities such
as Berlin. It measures itself against the likes of New York, Tokyo, Dubai, Rio
and Hong Kong. In the UK and Europe, London is in a league of its own.
This dominant position creates a host of problems for the rest of the
UK. Economically, London has something of a stranglehold
over the UK, with ‘the City’ in particular wielding incredible
power, leaving the UK vulnerable to financial shocks. Investment floods into
London thanks to the returns being much higher, a report by the IPPR estimated
that per-capita transport spending in London is 500 times as
much as that in the north-east of England. London’s insanely high property
prices drive up prices across the UK. Large amounts of the infrastructure of
the UK, whether roads, rail, air or energy supplies, are structured with London
in mind. And things show no signs of changing. London’s expanding population
and economy mean it will go on shaping UK needs. Little surprise then that
people ranging from Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond to
the LSE’s Professor Tony Travers have
described London as the UK’s ‘dark star’ sucking in people, resources and
energy.
For many inhabitants of the UK, London can also be a foreign country.
London’s white-British population remains the city’s largest single group of
residents, but is now around 45% of
the population. Its international and large immigrant population
makes for an identity that is a mix of English, British, European and
international. The EU itself
is not viewed as the threat it is in some other areas of the UK. This is not to
say that London is without racial or social problems, the London riots of 2011
being a vivid demonstration of underlying tensions. However, as the BBC’s Economics editor Robert Preston
argues: ‘Much of the rest of the UK sees globalisation and its
manifestations – such as immigration – as disempowering, impoverishing and a
threat. Whereas for Londoners, globalisation is an economic competition they
are apparently winning’.
Little wonder then that to the rest of the UK London can appear an
increasingly distant, alien and controlling power. Whether in Scotland or in
the rise of UKIP across England, campaigning on an ‘anti-London’ ticket pays
dividends. The UK Parliament and Government in London – or more specifically in
the Westminster and Whitehall areas of central London – can appear to live in a
London zone 1 bubble of their own, one beholden to central London’s needs and
lifestyle whether in the finance and international focused agenda of ‘the City’
or the housing needs that gave rise to the much despised ‘bedroom tax’. That
the largely London centred UK media only recently awoke to the news that
Scotland might break from the UK only adds to the impression that London lives
in a world of its own.
To be fair, millions of Londoners themselves criticise the
way the UK and their city are run, with a common enough complaint being that
the rest of the UK drains London of taxes and investment. It is for this reason
that proposals to create an English Parliament soon run into the problem of
London: base such a Parliament in London and it adds to London’s hold on
England and the UK; build it outside London and the Parliament risks being
ignored by the UK’s most powerful region. Similar problems face proposals to
move UK government out of London into some purpose built city akin to
Washington D.C. or Canberra. The London Question is in so many of the problems
that confront the UK: the centralisation and accountability of power,
Scotland’s future, growing English nationalism, relations with Europe, growing
inequality, unease about immigration, population change, the future of British
identity, questions about where to invest, and the role of finance in the UK’s
economy.
A way then is needed to break the link between the government of London
and the government of the UK. In the absence of an English Parliament or new
capital city, the answer could lie in the creation of a fully devolved
government for London. Greater London already has a devolution settlement that
dare not speak its name. The (re)establishment in 1999 of the Greater London
Authority, with its Assembly and Mayor, provide London with political
institutions to reflect the distinct political space the metropolis has
increasingly become. Recent proposals to
increase the powers and funding of the GLA could become a reality if UK
government goes forward with devolving more powers. Welcome as they are, London
could go further and by doing so add to much needed political change in the
rest of the UK. A devolved government of London would, in cooperation with the
city’s local authorities, run the metropolis’s life in a way similar to that in
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. All three have varying powers, but
following any of them would allow London to run itself more than ever before.
It should be for Londoners to decide if they need a bedroom tax. If the elected
government of London wanted to cover the tuition fees for London’s university
students, and could find the money, then so be it.
A devolved London government offers several benefits for the UK and
London. The most immediate gain for the UK would be a clearer gap between
running London and running the UK. UK ministers and departments in Whitehall
would have to think less about London, where their writ no longer extended as
once it did, and more about the rest of the UK. This then paves the way for
those looking for ways to establish devolved government within England and a
move towards a more federal system. There will likely be no neat solution here,
but London at least provides a neater starting point than many other areas.
The possibility that in many policy areas UK ministers could end up as
ministers mainly for non-London England would make abundantly clear the need
for wider change at UK level to bring in a federal UK-wide level of policy
making. Similarly the Westminster Parliament would be confronted with the need
to not only face the West Lothian Question – where fifty nine Scottish MPs can
vote on English matters but English MPs cannot vote on similar matters that
have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament – but also a Watford Gap Question
where seventy three London MPs could vote on matters covering the rest of
England but which won’t affect their constituencies because the powers now lie
with the London Assembly. London itself would gain by being allowed to run its
own affairs, easing some tensions between Londoners and the rest of the UK over
issues such as investment, health, housing, or taxation. It would also clarify
the issue of funding to London. London can be portrayed as either a subsidy-junky or
the largest prop to
the rest of the UK economy. The way forward is a more transparent system of
funding for London, something the creation of a government of London would help
bring about.
Of course such a proposal is not without its problems. Support for such
a move would be needed from Londoners, or else it could quickly become an
unwanted and unpopular level of bureaucracy. If powers were devolved would they
be accompanied by genuine funding independence, or would HM Treasury continue
to hold the purse strings? Hopes a devolved government of London might help
break the link between UK government and politics and that of London need to
take into account that London will still be the home of the UK’s political,
business, cultural and media elite, with informal links between them remaining
extremely strong. And where in this would we fit ‘the City’, an entity which
can best be described as a powerful small city-state that has long existed at
the heart of England and the UK.
Would changing the institutional arrangements of the UK’s constitution
do enough to rebalance the imbalances in private investment and the influence
on the UK’s international relations? The newly empowered Assembly and
government could end up beholden to specific interests, as some argue thecurrent Mayor has
become with London’s banking sector. Granting London control of its own affairs
while the rest of England continued to be governed by institutions based in the
centre of London would provoke further anger at London having it all its own
way, driving London and the rest of the country further apart. And would a
separate system for London work when the existing arrangement of a mayor and
assembly have not dampened criticism of London’s domination of the UK, if
anything perhaps exacerbating a sense of injustice that London has added
representation? Such changes in London would therefore have to be accompanied
by wider changes elsewhere in England along with a move by UK government to provide
a federal level of oversight that covers London and other areas of the UK
(although how this would apply to Scotland given it may entail taking back or
rebalancing some powers is another matter).
The devolution process in the UK has long suffered from a lack of
strategy. Adding London without due consideration for the rest of England and
UK would only add to the chaos that could lead to UK government ending up as a
weak shell that only deals with some large macroeconomic matters and external
relations. And even if, for example, London were granted the same powers as
Scotland, it is no guarantee that those powers would be used. Despite the
significant powers granted to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament and Government
have in some areas pursued profoundly conservative
policy agendas.
These are not small concerns, and we should all be aware of the risk of
rushing into decisions that fuel constitutional uncertainty or which add to
London’s dominant position. But whatever the Scots, Welsh, Northern Irish or
rest of England decide to do, we cannot avoid the question of what to do about
London, its intimate relationship with UK government and their relations with
the rest of the UK. Granting London a devolved government is one proposal that
could go some way towards addressing this and which could trigger wider
thinking and changes to the way the whole UK is run. Devolving power to London
would be the ultimate test of whether UK central government is willing to give
up powers and embrace fundamental reform of the UK’s constitutional system.
While I’m under no illusions that such changes are either easy or going to
happen anytime soon, the London Question is an unavoidable one that will remain
at the heart of UK politics for a long time to come.
Wednesday, September 17, 2014
A piece for British Influence on the DGAP report on European and international views of a Brexit
British Influence have pushed our report on the UK-EU relationship as seen by states around the EU and the world. You can read about it here:
http://britishinfluence.org/prospect-brexit-seen-europe-beyond/
http://britishinfluence.org/prospect-brexit-seen-europe-beyond/
Monday, September 01, 2014
Greater attention should be paid to the consequences of a ‘Brexit’ for the EU and other states around the world, not just the UK
A short piece on the LSE's EUROPP blog summarising our edited 124 page report The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a “Brexit” mean for the EU and other States around the World?
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/09/01/greater-attention-should-be-paid-to-the-consequences-of-a-brexit-for-the-eu-and-other-states-around-the-world-not-just-the-uk/
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/09/01/greater-attention-should-be-paid-to-the-consequences-of-a-brexit-for-the-eu-and-other-states-around-the-world-not-just-the-uk/
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